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"To understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of macro 
economics" (Bernanke 1995, p. 1). It can be argued that understanding 
the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of all economics. The econom 
ics profession has paid much attention to the Depression years. As 
Stephen Cecchetti notes in this volume, "EconLit, the CD-ROM index 
compiled by the Journal of Economic Literature, lists over 400 articles 
on the Great Depression that have appeared since 1969 alone." How 
ever, as the various chapters demonstrate, the complexity of the subject 
warrants further investigation.
Drawing on a wide variety of subdisciplines within economics, the 
six authors in this volume explore the immediate effects of the Great 
Depression, the dramatic fall in output, and the legacy of the Great 
Depression's monetary policy.
In the first chapter, Margo examines the impact of the Great 
Depression on labor and labor markets. Unlike most previous studies, 
Margo analyzes labor during the Depression at both the macroeco- 
nomic and microeconomic levels. The main focus of the chapter is the 
microeconomic level.
Margo draws heavily on the public use microdata sample (PUMS) 
to examine the Great Depression. Drawing on his previous research 
(Margo 1988, 1991), he notes that "the unemployed were dispropor 
tionately young or older and tended to have fewer skills and less educa 
tion than employed persons. These differences were starker comparing 
the employed with the long-term unemployed ... or ... with persons 
on work relief."
In addition, Margo notes that the PUMS is useful in examining 
New Deal work-relief programs. A particularly interesting question, 
which Margo also addressed in a series of previous papers (Margo 
1988, 1991, 1993), concerns the impact of work relief on labor supply.
2 Wheeler
Conventional wisdom holds that the Great Depression helped pro 
duce a more equal income distribution. Margo examines this conven 
tional wisdom and finds that the data do not support it. He finds that, 
"What appears to have happened is that wage differentials between 
skilled and unskilled labor widened in the early years of the Depres 
sion." Margo further states, "The wage structure snapped back, how 
ever, and by 1939 it appears to have been little different from its 
counterpart in the late 1920s." Margo goes on to note that the Great 
Compression of the 1940s "produced a substantial narrowing in wage 
inequality."
Margo also examines self-employment during the Great Depression 
and concludes, "Although there is much more work to be done, clearly 
it seems that self-employment was an option for many of the jobless ..."
In the second chapter, Heim explores the effects of the Great 
Depression on different industries, regions, and nations. As Heim 
notes, "the impact of the Great Depression was highly uneven. . . 
Although one-quarter of the U.S. labor force was unemployed at the 
low point in 1933, those who kept their jobs saw their purchasing 
power increase as prices fell."
Heim examines the impacts of the Depression on different regions 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. She concludes that the 
Great Depression worsened the problems of the older industrial areas 
in the United Kingdom. In the United States, government policies that 
resulted from the Great Depression had positive long-run impacts on 
the South. Most important among these policies were the New Deal 
agricultural and minimum wage policies, which helped link southern 
labor markets with those in the rest of the U.S. economy.
Heim shows that in both the United Kingdom and the United 
States, some industries were much more affected than others. For 
example, Heim notes that shipbuilding in the United Kingdom fell by 
90 percent during the 1929-1932 period. However, during the same 
period, output in the United Kingdom actually rose in industries such as 
paper and printing, leather, and food (Aldcroft 1970). Heim states that 
in the United States, "Throughout the 1930s, the food, leather, petro 
leum, and tobacco products sectors were relatively 'depression-proof.'"
Heim notes that industrialization accelerated in many less-devel 
oped countries during the Great Depression and subsequent decades. 
She concludes that this industrialization resulted from the less-devel-
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oped countries being delinked from the international economy. This 
delinking caused countries in parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia 
to shift production away from exports such as agricultural products and 
minerals and toward production of manufactured goods.
Bernstein provides an interesting mix of economic history and his 
tory of economic thought in the third chapter. Bernstein views the 
Great Depression through the eyes of several authors who, over the 
years, have tried to explain the event. Bernstein's analysis contains a 
summary of the well-known views of such macroeconomists as Fried- 
man and Schwartz (1963), Keynes (1964), and Temin (1976). How 
ever, Bernstein's major contribution is an analysis of the views of 
economists who attempted to examine the Great Depression outside 
the realm of what we now consider standard macroeconomic theories. 
In this analysis, Bernstein draws on a rich body of economic theory.
Bernstein notes that Harris (1948) and Sweezy (1939, 1968) 
argued that the distribution of income had become increasingly skewed 
in the 1920s. This, they argued, decreased the average propensity to 
consume and reduced national income. Other economists, such as 
Kindleberger (1973) and Lewis (1950), "focused on a secular shift in 
the terms of trade between primary products and manufactured goods, 
due to the uneven development of the agricultural and industrial 
nations."
Bernstein also notes that industrial organization economists, such 
as Means and Berle (1968), "sought an explanation of the Depression 
in the increasing extent of imperfect competition in the American 
economy of the early 20th century." Schumpeter (1939, 1946), on the 
other hand, "held that the inter-war period was an era in which three 
major cycles of economic activity in the United States (and Europe) 
coincidentally reached their nadir." Bernstein goes on to discuss 
Steindl's (1945, 1966, 1976, 1984) ideas on economic maturity.
In the fourth chapter, Fackler reviews and tests theories of the 
propagation of the Great Depression. The money view, due to Fried- 
man and Schwartz (1963), argues that inappropriate monetary policy 
played a key role in the propagation of the Great Depression. The 
autonomous spending view of Temin (1976) argues that a fall in auton 
omous consumption was the major cause of the decline in output dur 
ing the Depression. Fackler also draws on the recent work of Romer 
(1988) who argues that "uncertainty effects due to stock market van-
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ability can explain most of the unusual behavior of consumer spending 
on durable and semidurable goods in the first year and a half of the 
Great Depression." Fackler also examines Bernanke's credit view and 
the debt-deflation hypothesis. As Fackler notes, "The credit view 
model demonstrates how a deflationary shock can disrupt the credit 
intermediation process and cause a sustained decline in output."
Fackler constructs an econometric model to examine the degree to 
which the various theories explain the path of output during the 
Depression. The model is an IS-LM, AD-AS model augmented to 
incorporate the various theories of the propagation mechanism. 1 Fack 
ler finds that for the entire Depression period, there is not "a single, 
dominant explanation of the Depression." However, shocks to the IS 
curve best capture the characteristic phases of the Great Depression. 
Furthermore, the credit view works well in explaining the fall in output 
over the period of the stock market crash and around the bank panics in 
the early 1930s.
In the fifth chapter, Wheelock maintains that the Great Depression 
caused lasting changes in monetary institutions that ultimately gave 
monetary policy an inflationary bias. 2 Wheelock goes on to argue that 
the Federal Reserve's inflationary policy led to the collapse of the Bret- 
ton Woods System and abandonment of international linkages alto 
gether. A key event in the collapse of the Bretton Woods System was 
President Nixon's 1971 decision to suspend the convertibility of the 
dollar into gold in response to the increasing balance of payments defi 
cit in the United States.
Wheelock outlines the institutional reforms, enacted during the 
Great Depression that have the most important consequences for 
present monetary policy. Wheelock notes that the most significant 
reforms were
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, which permitted the Federal 
Reserve to use government securities to back its note issues; 
suspension of the international gold standard by executive 
order on March 6, 1933 (ratified by Congress on March 9); the 
Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933, which, among other things, permitted the Federal 
Reserve to adjust commercial bank reserve requirements; the 
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, which authorized the president to 
fix the dollar price of gold and established the Treasury's
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Exchange Stabilization Fund; and the Banking Act of 1935, 
which markedly altered the structure of the Federal Reserve 
System and expanded the Fed's authority to adjust reserve 
requirements.
According to Wheelock, these reforms, together with the rise of 
Keynesian policymaking, led to the Fed's inflationary bias.
As Wheelock notes, permitting Federal Reserve notes to be backed 
by U.S. government securities enhanced the Federal Reserve's ability 
to monetize government debt and removed a major constraint on mon 
etary policy. Suspension of the gold standard made possible the rising 
balance of payments deficit, as well as Nixon's response to it.
In the final chapter, Cecchetti spells out lessons for current policy 
that can be gained from examination of monetary policy during the 
Great Depression. Cecchetti begins by examining four common 
beliefs associated with the Great Depression:
1. The Great Depression was caused by the stock market crash of 
1929.
2. The banking system of the 1920s was fundamentally unsound.
3. The fact that nominal interest rates were approaching zero 
meant that Federal Reserve policy was loose and ineffective.
4. Tariff wars were primarily responsible for the spread and depth 
of the Depression.
Cecchetti demonstrates the fallacious nature of these four state 
ments. Of particular interest is Cecchetti's discussion of the tightness 
of monetary policy during the Great Depression. He points out that 
nominal interest rates were low during the Depression, but that real 
interest rates were extremely high due to the nature of the period's 
deflation. If we consider real rates of interest, the Federal Reserve's 
monetary policy was, in fact, extremely tight.
Examination of the four fallacies leads Cecchetti to three lessons 
for current policy:
1. The central bank's function as the lender of last resort is of pri 
mary importance in the short-term stabilization of the financial 
system.
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2. Deflation is extremely costly.
3. A gold standard is very dangerous.
Margo, Heim, Bernstein, Fackler, Wheelock, and Cecchetti expand 
our understanding of an important period in economic history. The 
papers in this volume take fresh approaches to the study of the Great 
Depression, evidence that the search for the Holy Grail of economics 
remains productive and interesting.
These papers developed from lectures given at Western Michigan 
University as part of the 1996-1997 lecture series entitled "The Eco 
nomics of the Great Depression."
Notes
1. Shocks to the IS curve incorporate Temin's theory, in addition to capturing aspects 
of investment and shocks for the rest of the world.
2. In particular, an inflationary monetary policy emerged in the 1960s.
References
Aldcroft, Derek H. 1970. The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939. Lon 
don: B.T. Batsford.
Bernanke, Ben S. 1995. "The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A 
Comparative Approach." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (Febru 
ary): 1-28.
Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. A Monetary History of the 
United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Harris, Seymour. 1948. Saving American Capitalism: A Liberal Economic 
Program. New York: Knopf.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1964. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. The World in Depression: 1929-1939. Berke 
ley, California: University of California Press.
Lewis, W. Arthur. 1950. Economic Survey, 1919-1939. Philadelphia: Blakin- 
ston.
Margo, Robert A. 1988. "Interwar Unemployment in the United States: Evi 
dence from the 1940 Census Sample." In Interwar Unemployment in Inter-
The Economics of the Great Depression 7
national Perspective, B. Eichengreen and T. Hatton, eds. London: Kluwer, 
pp. 325-352.
1991. "The Microeconomics of Depression Unemployment." Journal
of Economic History 51(June): 333-341. 
——. 1993. "Employment and Unemployment in the 1930s." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 7(Spring): 41-59. 
Means, Gardiner C., and Adolf A. Berle. 1968. The Modern Corporation and
Private Property. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Romer, Christina D. 1988. The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great
Depression. Working Paper 2639, National Bureau of Economic Research,
June. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1939. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and
Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
——. 1946. "The Decade of the Twenties." American Economic Review
36(1): 1-10. 
Steindl, Josef. 1945. Small and Big Business: Economic Problems of the Size
of Firms. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.
——. 1966. "On Maturity in Capitalist Economies." In Problems of Eco 
nomic Dynamics and Planning: Essays in Honour ofMichal Kalecki. New 
York: Pergamon, pp. 423-432.
——. 1976. Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism. New York: 
Monthly Review Press.
——. 1984. "Reflections on the Present State of Economics." Banca Nazio-
nale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 148: 3-14. 
Sweezy, Paul M. 1939. "Demand under Conditions of Oligopoly." Journal of
Political Economy 47(4): 568-573. 
——. 1968. The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York: Monthly
Review Press. 
Temin, Peter. 1976. Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? New
York: W.W. Norton.





National Bureau of Economic Research
This essay surveys recent research on labor and labor markets dur 
ing the Great Depression. Fascinated by an economy in which unem 
ployment reached nearly a quarter of the labor force and unemployment 
rates hovered in double digits for a decade, economists have been 
studying the Great Depression ever since it occurred. For the most part, 
the perspective taken has been an aggregate one, as befits the most 
important macroeconomic event of the century. However, much of the 
most interesting current research has delved into the "black box" of 
aggregate statistics by examining microeconomic evidence. Such evi 
dence has highlighted important features of labor market behavior that 
were masked in aggregate data. It has also altered conventional inter 
pretations of various government policies adopted in the 1930s, such as 
work relief, that were aimed at combatting high unemployment. While 
my primary objective is to survey this research, I also attempt to add to 
it by presenting some preliminary findings on patterns of self-employ 
ment in the late 1930s.
LABOR AT THE MACRO LEVEL
Although this survey is centered on recent microeconomic 
research, it is appropriate to begin by reviewing some of the basic 
aggregate statistics. These are shown in Table 1, which gives two 
series of unemployment rates along with a "real wage" index.
The aggregate statistics tell a familiar story. According to the first 
unemployment series, labeled "Lebergott," unemployment rose to 
unprecedented levels between 1929 and 1933, peaking at nearly 25 
percent of the labor force. Moreover, the rate of unemployment
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SOURCE: Margo (1993), p. 43.
remained very high through the decade, although it did decline (except 
during the recession of 1938). On the eve of World War II, fully 14.6 
percent of the labor force was out of, and looking for, work. By Amer 
ican standards these rates are extraordinarily high, although recent 
experience in Western Europe (particularly Spain) makes them seem 
somewhat less unusual.
The second unemployment series, labeled "Darby," tells a rather 
different story. The run-up in unemployment between 1929 and 1932 
is still present, but the series diverge sharply afterwards. The Darby 
series is different because it considers anyone who had a "work-relief 
job as no different from anyone who had a regular job. This assump 
tion is certainly debatable (see, for example, Kesselman and Savin 
1978), and I will return to this point later.
Aside from the levels of unemployment, the duration of unemploy 
ment was also severe in the 1930s. Prior to the 1930s, the "incidence" 
of unemployment—the fraction of the nonfarm labor force experienc 
ing unemployment in a given year—was relatively high. Using census
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data for 1910, I have estimated that approximately 19 percent of the 
nonfarm labor force experienced unemployment during a year's time, 
compared with roughly 14 percent in the late 1970s (Margo 1990a). In 
1910 and in the late 1970s, the aggregate unemployment rate was 
approximately the same (4.8 percent). The implication is that the 
"duration" of unemployment was much briefer in 1910 than in the late 
1970s, while the probability of becoming unemployed was higher.
The probability of becoming unemployed was certainly very high 
for the average worker in the early 1930s, but what changed was the 
duration of unemployment. Many people who lost jobs in the 1930s 
remained unemployed for long periods of time. According to the Mas 
sachusetts state census of 1934, fully 63 percent of the currently unem 
ployed had been out of work for a year or longer (Margo 1991). These 
percentages fell as the decade progressed, but even in 1940, fully 41 
percent of unemployed adult males in the nonfarm labor force had 
been out of work for over a year. 1
Exactly why the average duration of unemployment increased in 
the 1930s is unclear, since the obvious institutional mechanisms that 
produce such outcomes today were not yet in place. For example, long- 
term unemployment is high in Europe today partly because European 
welfare states have a dizzying array of policies that subsidize it. 
"Insider-outsider" models, popular among neo-Keynesians, are diffi 
cult to apply to the 1930s because the internal labor markets that pro 
duce outsiders were largely (although not wholly) irrelevant. Later I 
will suggest that excess duration may have been an unintended by 
product of the New Deal, in particular, the work-relief programs.
The final column in Table 1 gives the standard "real wage" series 
for the 1930s—average hourly earnings of production workers in man 
ufacturing. In 1930, when unemployment was 8.7 percent, the index 
stood at 75.7 (relative to a base of 100 in 1940). In 1933, when unem 
ployment peaked at 24.9 percent, the index was higher—79.5 percent. 
Moreover, the unemployment rate understates the depressed level of 
labor utilization, since weekly hours of work also fell between 1929 
and 1933. After 1933, real wages continued to rise, despite double- 
digit unemployment. The total increase over the decade is about 25 
index points, pretty good performance in light of labor market condi 
tions.
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There are a number of possible interpretations of Table 1. Unless 
one is prepared to argue that labor supply schedules shifted inward 
from 1929 to 1933, it is difficult to come up with a convincing equilib 
rium explanation of why labor utilization fell but real wages 
increased. 2 Disequilibrium stories are easier to fashion. The first, and 
most common, is wage rigidity. Labor demand sloped downward, but 
for reasons that are not fully clear, wages were rigid downward, pro 
ducing unemployment. Some developments in modern macroeconom 
ics have filtered into this interpretation. Martin Baily (1983) argues 
that "aggressive" wage cutting would have lowered worker morale, 
even in the 1930s. Others, such as Richard Jensen (1989), suggest that 
firms had been adopting "efficiency-wage" policies for some time prior 
to the 1930s, and these mitigated against wage cuts. Peter Temin 
(1990) has pointed out that wages were apparently less rigid downward 
in Germany, and this may be a key reason why German employment 
rose smartly after the initial downturn in that country (although others 
attribute the recovery to Nazi tinkering with employment statistics). 
Anthony O'Brien (1989) suggests that business leaders in the early 
1930s firmly believed that wage cuts in the early 1920s had exacer 
bated the post-World War I recession, and therefore, they were reluc 
tant to cut wages in the 1930s.
Still others point the finger at the New Deal, specifically the 
National Recovery Act (or NRA). In an influential book, Michael 
Weinstein (1980) argues that the NRA substantially raised wages 
above what they would otherwise have been, particularly for unskilled 
labor (which dominates the series in Table 1). However, in a recent 
study that (in my opinion) took great care econometrically, Ben Ber- 
nanke (1986) found much smaller effects of the NRA. Bernanke's 
study is also noteworthy because it investigated the interaction between 
wage rigidity and "work-sharing." Work-sharing occurs when firms 
cut weekly (scheduled) hours instead of employment. Bernanke 
argues that, beyond a certain point, it paid to reduce hours more at the 
margin than employment. However, hours reductions came at a 
price—workers would accept further reductions in hours only if their 
hourly wages did not decline (since this would make their weekly earn 
ings fall less than their weekly hours).
An alternative explanation is that the wage series in the final col 
umn overstates the extent of rigidity. The idea here, which is familiar
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from recent studies of wage changes over the business cycle, is that the 
employed are not a random sample of the labor force (and are less so 
during downturns). In particular, if low-productivity (and hence low- 
wage) workers are laid off first, then the wages of employed workers 
may look more rigid downward than they actually are. Some evidence 
that this is the case has recently been put forth by Stanley Lebergott 
(1989). Lebergott has looked at wages at the firm level (General Elec 
tric and Westinghouse—both of which are included in the series), find 
ing that wages fell by 10 percent from 1929 to 1931 yet the industry 
average did not. In effect, Lebergott is arguing that the aggregate data 
are misleading about actual labor market outcomes in the 1930s, a 
point of view that is consistent with evidence on the heterogeneity of 
unemployment.
THE MICROECONOMICS OF 
DEPRESSION UNEMPLOYMENT
A great deal of research on the Depression by labor economists has 
proceeded as if the statistics in Table 1 applied to a representative 
worker, implying that the behavior of the representative worker tells us 
everything we need to know. This is more than a little odd because, 
even at its worst, 75 percent of the labor force was employed during the 
Depression—the average employed worker could not have been, 
almost by definition, the same as the average unemployed worker.
Heterogeneity has come back into fashion in macroeconomics. We 
know that heterogeneity can inform about the nature of both supply 
and demand in the labor market. Investigation of heterogeneity in the 
1930s is at an early stage, but it has proceeded far enough to report to a 
wider audience.
The heterogeneity of unemployment has received the most atten 
tion, primarily because of the availability of the 1940 public use micro- 
data sample (PUMS), a large random sample of the original responses 
given to census enumerators. The great advantage here is the availabil 
ity of individual level responses—we can, in other words, study what 
happened to individuals during the 1930s as individuals, not as repre-
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sentative "agents." It is true that 1940 is not 1933, but there are other 
sources—albeit none as good as the 1940 PUMS—to investigate.
The 1940 census is one of the great documents of American statis 
tical history. The census was the first to ask about many things, includ 
ing income, educational attainment, and weeks worked. It also 
included questions on unemployment that, because of various quirks, 
allow the investigation of many questions relating to the operation of 
the New Deal work-relief programs, a point that I will return to shortly.
Analysis of the 1940 PUMS reveals that the unemployed were dis 
proportionately young or older and tended to have fewer skills and less 
education than employed persons. These differences were starker 
comparing the employed with the long-term unemployed (those out of 
work for more than a year) or (in certain respects, such as race) with 
persons on work relief (Margo 1988, 1991). Although it is an over 
statement to claim that unemployment before the 1930s was "egalitar 
ian," it is true that the unemployed were less distinctive in their 
(observable) personal characteristics before, as opposed to after, the 
Great Depression (Margo 1990b).
One important implication of heterogeneity concerns wage rigid 
ity. The fact that the unemployed were a nonrandom sample of the 
labor force means that aggregate wage series, such as in Table 1, are 
biased. It is likely that the evolution of the characteristics of the unem 
ployed over the 1930s is such that the standard aggregate wage index 
overstates the degree of wage rigidity, although the extent of such over 
statement is open to question.
Although the 1940 PUMS is useful for examining the heterogene 
ity of unemployment, it is even more useful for what it reveals about 
New Deal work-relief programs. As the Depression unraveled, it 
became painfully evident that old-style "relief," primarily the work of 
private agencies and churches, was inadequate to deal with the volume 
of unemployment. As a result, public relief was expanded, and work 
relief—literally, the combination of welfare and work—became an 
important mode of delivering assistance to the unemployed. (Unem 
ployment insurance, another form of relief, was also adopted in the 
1930s, after several decades of relative inaction.) The best known 
work-relief program was that undertaken by the Work Projects Admin 
istration (WPA), although there were many others (such as the Civilian 
Conservation Corps [CCC]).
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By design, and also by a strange statistical quirk, the 1940 PUMS 
contains a great deal of information about work relief. I say, "by 
design," because the census permitted "work relief to be one of the 
answers to its question on labor force status. At the time, persons with 
work-relief jobs were counted as "unemployed," and this convention 
was accepted by Stanley Lebergott (1964) when he constructed his 
now-famous unemployment series. In an equally famous paper, 
Michael Darby (1976) argued that persons working for the WPA were, 
in fact, "employed." Treating them as such has a dramatic effect on the 
aggregate unemployment rate, as Table 1 demonstrates.
Like many questions in macroeconomics, deciding which of these 
two points of view is "right" is basically a theological matter. In a 
series of papers (Margo 1988, 1991, 1993), I have tried to redirect 
attention away from the metaphysical question of "who is employed" 
to a different question: Did the WPA affect labor supply (or labor 
demand)? The conventional wisdom among economists is that the 
unemployed of the 1930s were simply that—unemployed, with zero 
opportunity cost. Indeed, the very concept of the fiscal multiplier of 
Keynesian lore is predicated on the point of view that the opportunity 
cost of unemployed labor is zero.
The first piece of evidence I uncovered is more tantalizing than a 
"smoking gun." Table 2 shows the distribution of weeks of unemploy 
ment among those currently unemployed (but not on work relief) in 
March of 1940 (the census week) and the distribution of weeks of 
unemployment among those on work relief. Recall that the census 
(and later, Lebergott) considered those on work relief as unemployed, 
so they asked a question: When was your last private sector job of one 
month or more? Note that the two distributions differ quite radically, 
in that persons on work relief were vastly more likely to have been out 
of work for over a year.
By itself this is not a particularly novel finding. The WPA knew 
that its "workers" were disproportionately the long-term unemployed. 
However, there are two interpretations of this result. The first, a benign 
one for the "zero opportunity" cost model, is that work relief was a 
"last resort," chosen after an exhaustive but fruitless search for a real 
job. The second, potentially not so benign, is that people remained 
with the WPA for a long time.
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a PEW = public emergency work relief.
Because of a quirk it is possible to use the 1940 PUMS to see 
which interpretation is correct. The census asked people how many 
weeks they worked in 1939, treating weeks with the WPA the same as 
weeks in a regular job. Thus, for example, it is possible to find people 
in the 1940 census who were (a) on work relief in March of 1940, and 
(b) reported that they had been unemployed for 65 weeks (all of 1939 
and the first quarter of 1940) but who had worked 39 to 52 weeks in 
1939. These are people who could only have been "employed" on 
work relief (assuming they answered the census questions correctly), 
essentially full time.
As it happens, approximately 50 percent of all persons on work 
relief in March of 1940 and "unemployed" 65 weeks or more actually 
worked 39 weeks or more in 1939. It is but a small step to infer that 
full-time employment on work relief reduced job search activity and 
that, perhaps more controversially, work relief was "preferred" to the 
next best alternative.
Why might work relief have been preferred? First, while work- 
relief jobs were low-paying, there were private sector workers making 
less per hour. The exact percentages are hard to determine, but 25 per 
cent is a good round number (Finegan and Margo 1994, p. 67). Sec 
ond, and perhaps more important, work relief was a pretty steady job. 
This seems surprising, because the WPA was always ending projects, 
and turnover from project employment was always quite high. But 
project employment was not the same as WPA employment, as some
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workers simply rolled over into a new project, albeit with a few weeks 
of vacation.
Some "smoking gun" evidence that work relief affected labor sup 
ply directly is provided in a paper by T. Aldrich Finegan and myself 
(1994), which reexamines an old chestnut of labor economics—the 
famous debate between W.S. Woytinsky and Clarence Long over the 
relative sizes of the added-worker and discouraged-worker effects in 
the late 1930s. The added-worker effect is the idea that other family 
members have an incentive to seek employment when the head of the 
household becomes unemployed. The discouraged-worker effect is the 
idea that persons without jobs are discouraged from looking for work 
when the unemployment rate is high. Woytinsky (1942) believed that 
there were large numbers of added workers who would withdraw from 
the labor force once conditions improved. Long (1958) thought Woy 
tinsky was wrong and had a table from the published 1940 census to 
prove it, or so he thought. The table showed the labor force participa 
tion rates of married women cross-classified by their husband's 
employment status. If Woytinsky was right, reasoned Long, the labor 
force participation rate of women with unemployed husbands should 
exceed the participation rate of women with employed husbands. In 
fact, according to Long's table, there was no such difference in 1940— 
if anything, the participation rate of women with unemployed hus 
bands was slightly lower than the participation rate of women with 
employed husbands. The added-worker effect, in other words, 
appeared to be negative.
Subsequent generations of labor economists (including Professor 
Finegan) were taught that Long was right. However, Long was wrong, 
and for an interesting reason: the WPA actually reduced the incentive 
for "secondary" workers to enter the labor force.
Table 3 gives the labor force participation rate of married women 
by their husband's employment status, as computed from the 1940 
PUMS. Note that, if the husband was on work relief, the labor force 
participation rate was very low (about 6.6 percent), while if the hus 
band had a regular job, the participation rate was 16.1 percent. How 
ever, if the husband was unemployed but not on work relief, the 
participation rate was 22.8 percent—a clear added-worker effect.
The table from the published 1940 census that convinced Long 
was quite different from the evidence in Table 3, in that Long's table
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Table 3 Labor Force Participation Rates of Married Women, by 
Husband *s Employment Status, March 1940
% of wives in labor force 
in 1940 who were
Husband's status
Employed in 1940
On PEW in 1940
Unemployed in 1940
OnPEWinl939d
Not on PEW in 1939
Out of labor force
Total











































SOURCE: Finegan and Margo (1994, p. 71).
a N is the sample size.
b LFPR is the labor force participation rate, the proportion of women in the sample who
were employed, on public emergency work relief (PEW), or unemployed, during the
census week (March 24-30, 1940).
c "Employed" means employed in a private sector or non-PEW job. 
d "On PEW in 1939" identifies husbands who were unemployed in the census week and
who held a PEW job at some time in 1939.
lumped unemployed husbands and husbands with work-relief jobs 
together in a single category. (We know this from a note in very tiny 
print elsewhere in the volume that Long cited.) If we replicate the cen 
sus procedure in Table 3, the labor force participation rate of married 
women with unemployed husbands (now counting the ones with work- 
relief jobs as unemployed) is 14.9 percent. As far as Finegan and I 
know, Long's mistake was inadvertent—he had no way of knowing of 
the association between work relief and the added-worker effect.
Why would the WPA have inhibited the added-worker effect? Fin 
egan and I think eligibility requirements are the key. Not just any- 
unemployed worker was eligible for a work-relief job; the family had 
to pass a means test, and the earnings of other family members (to 
varying degrees) were counted. Although wages on WPA projects 
were relatively low, they were better than what many married women
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could command in the labor market. Thus for many couples, a job with 
the WPA for the husband with his wife at home was better than no job 
and his wife working. We reinforce this conclusion in our paper by 
showing that labor force participation by married women jumped when 
their husbands left work relief but had not found a regular job by the 
census week.
Finegan and I think the importance of this work is not the resolu 
tion of a crusty old debate between two deceased labor economists, but 
rather that, even under extremely trying macroeconomic circum 
stances, incentives "mattered." Had the WPA been smaller, it is possi 
ble that the unemployment rate among adult males would have been 
higher, but our results suggest that more married women would have 
entered the labor force. In designing welfare programs, there is always 
a tradeoff between the desire to help those in need and the desire to 
minimize deadweight loss. The architects of Roosevelt's New Deal 
could not avoid this tradeoff any more than their modern day counter 
parts have been able to do under much less trying macroeconomic cir 
cumstances.
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND 
THE GREAT COMPRESSION
One of the central policy issues of the last 25 years has been the 
surge in wage inequality. Simply put, the earnings of college graduates 
relative to high school graduates are far higher today than they were ca. 
1970. Wage differences within labor market groups—for example, the 
dispersion in wages among college graduates—are also much higher. 
The increase in wage inequality has taken place against a backdrop of 
very little aggregate real wage growth, so that for some population 
groups (such as the bottom 40 percent of high school graduates), real 
wages are lower today than in the early 1970s.
Much has been made by the popular media (not to mention in the 
political arena) of the alleged uniqueness of this recent episode in the 
history of American inequality. It is believed that the long-run trend in 
wage inequality—"long-run" here meaning since the turn of the 20th 
century—has been distinctly downward, and recent changes are a
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reversal of that trend. In particular, the benchmark most in use is in 
equality in the period 1950 to 1970.
Until recently it was widely believed that the Great Depression 
helped produce a more egalitarian income distribution (Williamson and 
Lindert 1980). The Great Depression was a great "leveller"—that is, 
the distribution of income became much more equal in the 1930s, con 
tinued to do so in the 1940s, and then stayed that way for some time. 
Recent research on American wage history, however, has modified this 
view (Goldin and Margo 1992).
Exactly what happened to the distribution of wages in the 1930s is 
still in the process of reconstruction. What appears to have happened is 
that wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor widened in 
the early years of the Depression. The extent of widening was consid 
erably greater in the case of weekly wages than hourly wages, because 
there were substantial declines in weekly hours worked in the early 
1930s, and the decline in weekly hours was greater among the 
unskilled. The wage structure snapped back, however, and by 1939 it 
appears to have been little different from its counterpart in the late 
1920s. This is a little surprising, since unemployment was far higher in 
1939 than in 1929. As already mentioned, unemployment in the 1930s 
was far worse among the less-skilled and less-educated. We might 
have expected the vast reserve army of unemployed and underem 
ployed among the less-skilled and less-educated to have bid down their 
relative wages, but it did not happen, perhaps because various New 
Deal policies (such as work relief) propped up wages in the lower tail 
of the distribution.
If the Great Depression did not usher in any vast changes in wage 
distributions, what did? The answer: the "Great Compression," which 
occurred in the 1940s and produced a substantial narrowing in wage 
inequality.
What is remarkable about the Great Compression is that the quan 
titative dimensions of change were nearly the mirror image of recent 
experience. The gap between the 10th and 90th percentiles in weekly 
wages declined by nearly 25 percent between 1940 and 1950, approxi 
mately the same percentage as the increase that occurred between 1970 
and 1985. The narrowing in wage inequality took place at both tails of 
the wage distribution. The gap between the median wage and the 90th 
percentile fell by 14 percent, and the gap between the 10th percentile
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and the median decreased by 11 percent. Consistent with these 
changes, the earnings of skilled and educated workers fell relative to 
the earnings of less-skilled and less-educated workers between 1940 
and 1950. Relative to the nonfarm average, the weekly earnings of 
white-collar workers declined between 1940 and 1950, while the rela 
tive earnings of factory operatives, personal service workers, and 
unskilled laborers increased.
Like the surge in earnings inequality that has occurred recently, the 
Great Compression was not solely, or even mostly, a narrowing of 
wage differentials between groups. Wage compression also occurred 
within groups, as defined by educational attainment, labor market 
experience, and occupation. One (very important) point of difference 
between the Great Compression and recent experience is that during 
the 1940s, real wages for everybody rose substantially. Redistribution 
was not achieved at the expense of declining real wages for some occu 
pation or educational group, as is the case recently: rising inequality in 
the past 20 years has occurred against a backdrop of stagnant or barely 
rising real wages for the average worker. The increased dispersal of 
wages around the average implies that some groups have gained pur 
chasing power in absolute terms, while others have lost absolutely. 
From a political economy perspective, redistribution is less a "prob 
lem" when living standards are generally rising than when they are not.
Although their relative significance is a matter of debate, the fac 
tors behind the Great Compression are not difficult to identify. Some 
portion of the Compression occurred early in the decade as a direct 
result of wartime shifts in labor demand and of government regulation 
of the wartime economy. Various bits of data suggest that the indus 
tries that expanded output during World War II were disproportionately 
employers of less-skilled and less-educated labor. Federal government 
policy also played a role. The National War Labor Board (NWLB), 
established in 1942, was responsible for approving all wage increases. 
Given the volume of cases under its purview, the NWLB reached deci 
sions using various rules of thumb, several of which undeniably com 
pressed the wage structure at its left tail. 3
World War II eventually ended and the NWLB went out of busi 
ness. With respect to the immediate postwar period, three factors main 
taining wage compression were an unexpectedly large increase in the 
relative supply of educated workers (partly a consequence of the GI Bill
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of Rights, which subsidized college attendance by veterans); increases 
in the level and coverage of the federal minimum wage; and a robust 
union movement. Only the latter two factors can be traced to the Great 
Depression: the federal minimum wage was first enacted in the 1930s, 
and the Wagner Act enhanced the ability of unions to organize.
The Great Compression was not to last much past 1950. By the 
early 1950s, there is evidence of a shift in relative demand towards bet 
ter-educated workers. By 1960, the Great Compression had been 
partly reversed, evidently because the increase in relative supply of 
educated labor in the 1950s simply did not keep pace with the increase 
in relative demand. Still, the wage distribution on the eve of the 
Kennedy administration was far more equal than it had been 30 years 
earlier or than it would become a quarter century later.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN THE 1930s
All of the research I have reviewed thus far is of the published vari 
ety. I would like to take a few moments to talk about some work in 
progress involving self-employment in the 1930s.
One of Herbert Hoover's more infamous quotes concerned the 
unemployed. In the early 1930s, Hoover remarked that "[m]any 
(unemployed) persons [have] left their jobs for the more profitable one 
of selling apples on streetcorners."4 If selling apples was so profitable, 
why create make-work government jobs when the unemployed could, 
so to speak, do it on their own?
The self-employment option is an interesting one, since it is, 
apparently, always available. If the unemployed choose to look for a 
job with someone else, as opposed to self-employment, it is hard to 
argue that unemployment is "involuntary" because the self-employed 
are, by definition, employed. For most of the 20th century, self- 
employment was in decline in the United States, although in recent 
decades it has been on the upswing. During the recent recession, self- 
employment was widely reported on in the press, as downsized manag 
ers, frustrated by their lack of success in the conventional job market, 
hung shingles outside their bedrooms and called themselves "consult 
ants."



























Table 4 Aggregate Nonfarm Table 4 shows the aggregate non- 
Self-Employment farm self-employment rate in the 
Rate ( % ) United States—that is, the num 
ber of self-employed in the non- 
farm sector as a fraction of the 
total nonfarm labor force—over 
the 1930s, with 1920 and 1950 as 
benchmarks. It is traditional to 
look at the nonfarm labor force, 
since the great majority of farm 
labor was self-employed and the 
farm labor force has been declin 
ing in proportion for two centu 
ries. Note that the self-employ 
ment rate fell in the early 1930s 
and was otherwise stable during 
the decade. On the basis of the 
aggregate data, it does not appear 
that self-employment was much 
of an option at all for the unem 
ployed.
However, the aggregate self-employment rate is a function of an 
entry "hazard" rate and an exit "hazard" rate. The entry hazard is the 
probability of entering self-employment from some other labor market 
status, while the exit hazard is the probability of leaving self-employ 
ment (the business goes bust, for example). These flows could have 
been rather substantial and yet the aggregate self-employment rate 
quite stable.
Table 5 provides some preliminary evidence on the flow into self- 
employment. It is based on the 1940 PUMS: the sample consists of non- 
farm adult men, ages 30^-9, who did no work (for pay or profit) in 1939 
but who were in the labor force in March of 1940 (there are a few other 
restrictions on the sample). The table shows what these men were doing 
during the census week, one possibility being self-employment. Not 
very surprisingly, the majority were unemployed as of the census date. 
As already suggested, flows into work relief were relatively small. The 
big surprise is the relative importance of self-employment, which cap 
tured a bigger share of the flow into employment than wage and salary
SOURCE: Lebergott (1964, Tables A-3 
and A-4).
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Table 5 Self-Employment in the Late 1930s3
i ——— N ——— \ % of total
Self-employment, total
Proprietors, etc.
Proprietors in wholesale-retail trade
Work relief














SOURCE: 50 percent random sample of the 1940 PUMS.
a Sample consists of males, ages 30-^9 who did no work in 1939 but who were in the
labor force in March of 1940. Farm workers are excluded, as are professionals and
unpaid family labor. 
b Percentages among self-employed (e.g., proprietors in wholesale-retail trade account
for 38.4 percent = 170/443, of all self-employed).
work. (I note, in passing, that the absolute percentages would decline if 
the sample were expanded to include persons out of the labor force, but 
not the relative shares.) Furthermore, fully half of the flow into self- 
employment was accounted for by "proprietors" in general, and nearly 
40 percent by proprietors in wholesale and retail trade (of which food 
dealers were by far the biggest category). Although there is much more 
work to be done, clearly it seems that self-employment was an option for 
many of the jobless, as Hoover seemed to think.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by mentioning a few other topics that I have not 
had space to cover. I have skipped over the effects of the Great Depres 
sion on women and African Americans, but these were certainly sub 
stantial. Claudia Goldin (1990) has demonstrated that "marriage 
bars"—employment policies adopted by firms and governments that 
restricted job opportunities for married women—became more preva 
lent in the 1930s. We know from the work of James Smith (1984; see 
also Margo 1990c and Sundstrom 1992) that the Depression derailed
The Economics of the Great Depression 25
economic progress for African Americans; the black-to-white income 
ratio in 1940 was no higher than in 1930. Other important topics not 
addressed concern the impact of the Depression on the subsequent eco 
nomic behavior of those who lived through it (such as savings rates and 
labor supply at older ages), and the political economy of New Deal 
labor legislation.
I have also highlighted the 1940 PUMS in this lecture. There are, 
however, many untapped data sources from the 1930s, some of which 
refer to individuals, others that shed light on geographic variation in 
labor market outcomes, which was also considerable. There is much 
still to learn about labor and labor markets in the 1930s and, fortu 
nately, a good deal of microeconomic evidence to guide our analysis.
Notes
1. "Out of work" here, as is traditional, counts those with work-relief jobs as unem 
ployed. If persons on relief are counted as employed, the percentage falls to 32 
percent (see Margo 1991).
2. One (rather far-fetched) argument goes as follows. Suppose that workers rationally 
expected that demand for their labor would rise substantially in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s with the onset of World War II. Then, more leisure would presumably 
be desired early in the 1930s—an intertemporal substitution effect. For the argu 
ment to make any sense, one would have to believe that World War II would have 
occurred even if the Great Depression had not. Alternatively, if one believes that 
real interest rates were expected to increase in the early 1930s (relative to the rate 
of time preference), one could also rationalize an inward shift in labor supply (as 
the outcome of a dynamic optimization on the part of workers).
3. For example, employers could raise wages to 40 cents per hour without NWLB 
approval; occupational wage "brackets" were established in each region, and 
wages could be increased to the lower end of the bracket. Exceptions to wage 
controls were frequently granted if the NWLB judged that the employer in ques 
tion was previously paying "substandard" wages.
4. Hoover is quoted in Schlesinger, Jr. (1957, p. 241).
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2 Uneven Impacts 
of the Great Depression
Industries, Regions, and Nations
Carol E. Heim 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
The Great Depression of the 1930s brought hardship and suffering 
to many in the United States and in other countries around the world. 
The impact of the Great Depression was highly uneven, however. 
Although one-quarter of the U.S. labor force was unemployed at the 
low point in 1933, those who kept their jobs saw their purchasing 
power increase as prices fell. Statistical averages of economic perfor 
mance conceal a wide variety of experiences for individuals and firms, 
as well as for larger aggregates. 1
In this essay, I examine uneven impacts of the Depression on 
industries, regions, and nations. In discussing industries and regions, I 
compare the United States and the United Kingdom; in discussing 
nations, I examine less-developed economies in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia. Even during the depths of the Depression, some industries 
prospered. Regions differed both in the severity of the downturn and in 
the speed of recovery from it. Government policies created in response 
to the Depression treated geographic areas differently. New concepts 
of regions and experiences of regional planning also emerged.
In the United Kingdom, the Depression worsened the difficulties of 
problem regions, which were older industrial areas, and policy did little 
to help. In the United States, by contrast, government policies had pos 
itive (although largely unintended) long-run effects on its major prob 
lem region, the low-income, less-developed South. As Wright (1986) 
argued, these policies eventually linked the previously isolated south 
ern labor market with the national labor market and stimulated devel 
opment. In the international sphere, some less-developed nations also 
benefited from the Depression, at least in the sense of more rapid 
industrialization in the short to medium run. But for these countries, it
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was delinking from a larger economy—the international economy— 
rather than linking, that helped. Import substitution increased, and as 
countries became delinked, some pursued more independent monetary 
and fiscal policies.
My aim here is not to reinterpret the Depression as an unambigu 
ously positive historical event. If some industries or regions were 
doing better than the national average, that also means some were 
doing even worse. What I want to emphasize is that any major eco 
nomic change, or policy, affects economic actors and areas differen 
tially. Rarely, if ever, does it make sense simply to say that such a 
change or policy is good or bad for "the economy" as a whole. Wall 
Street often reacts negatively to "good" news of lower unemployment 
rates; such rates cause some to fear inflation. Similarly, the question of 
whether or not immigration is "good" for the United States does not 
have a simple answer. Even an episode as apparently straightforward 
as the Great Depression proves to have a complicated mix of effects.
INDUSTRIES
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, some sectors and 
industries were much harder hit than others. The United Kingdom saw 
industrial production as a whole, as well as the transport and com 
munication sector, decline during 1929-1932, but output rose slightly in 
services and distribution. Shipbuilding fell by 90 percent, mechanical 
engineering by 36 percent, and ferrous and nonferrous metals by 
approximately 28 percent, a much steeper decline than the 11 percent 
drop for all industry. Above-average declines also occurred in the drink, 
vehicles, mining, timber, precision instruments, building, and metal 
goods industries. Many of the industries with large declines were cap 
ital goods industries and/or were export-sensitive industries. Textiles, 
although a major export industry, saw relatively little change during 
1929-1932, as did clothing, chemicals, and tobacco. Output actually 
increased in paper and printing, leather, food, and gas, water, and elec 
tricity, at rates of 5 to 11 percent (Aldcroft 1970, pp. 42, 48-49). 
Employment and investment also rose in some industries even during 
the worst years of the Depression (Beck 1951; Feinstein 1965).
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From the perspective of business firms, profitability is a key indica 
tor of health and is essential for long-run survival. As with output, 
employment, and investment, profitability during the Depression var 
ied widely among industries. Twenty-one of 78 trade groups had prof 
its in 1932 that were equal to or greater than their profits in 1927, and 
in 4, profits fell less than 10 percent. The largest percentage increases 
were in telephones, grain milling, and electricity; profits in public 
amusements rose 24 percent. At the other extreme, in six trade groups 
profits fell more than 60 percent. For half of the trade groups, the drop 
was 20-50 percent (Worswick and Tipping 1967, pp. 64-68). Esti 
mates of annual profit rates for major manufacturing industry groups 
also showed wide variation during 1929-1932 (Hart 1968, p. 274).
The Depression hit the United Kingdom against a backdrop of 
longer-run decline and expansion of different industries. The major 
declining industries were the 19th century export staples of coal, iron 
and steel, shipbuilding, and textiles, which were regionally concen 
trated in the North and West. These industries already were in diffi 
culty in the 1920s as international competition intensified, but many 
industry leaders were convinced that their earlier good fortunes would 
return. The Depression finally quashed some of those hopes. By 1932, 
the Lancashire Industrial Development Council magnanimously 
announced that
now that some other countries have taken a part of the respon 
sibility for supplying the world with cotton goods, Lancashire 
is able to turn with a freer mind to the development of those 
other industries which the mighty importance of the cotton 
trade tended for a long time to overshadow. (Lancashire Indus 
trial Development Council 1932, p. 50)
Expansion was occurring in the inter-war years in a range of "other 
industries": new manufacturing industries such as motor vehicles, elec 
trical products, and rayon; diverse types of light manufacturing; and 
services. The percentage of English households owning a car rose 
steadily from 1924-1938, though at a less rapid pace during 1929— 
1933 (Bowden and Turner 1993, p. 245). Unfortunately, as we shall 
see below, the older industrial regions most in need of these expanding 
industries in the 1930s were not very successful in attracting them. 
The Lancashire textile region did better than the heavy industrial
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regions in Wales, Scotland, and northern England, partly because Lan 
cashire contained the second largest center of population and purchas 
ing power in England (Manchester/Liverpool).
Electricity is a good example of an industry that could thrive in the 
midst of depression. Output in the electrical engineering industry 
(including supply) dipped slightly in 1931, but mainly due to exports; 
growth in the home market was rapid (Catterall 1979, p. 253). Invest 
ment in electricity supply peaked in 1932, with expansion due to strong 
industrial and consumer demand and to technical economies leading to 
lower charges. Heavy capital outlays were needed in part because of 
deficiencies in electricity supply resulting from earlier delays and diffi 
culties (Feinstein 1965, p. 46). Consumer demand for new electrical 
appliances such as cookers, irons, vacuum cleaners, wash-boilers, 
washing machines, refrigerators, and radios remained strong in the 
1930s (Aldcroft 1970, p. 195).
It was somewhat paradoxical that the growth of demand and output 
for electrical consumer durables should be so strong when unemploy 
ment was so high. In noting the paradox, Catterall (1979, p. 272) 
described the inter-war period as "years in which Britain began to enter 
Rostow's 'Age of High Mass Consumption' in the midst of an age of 
mass unemployment." George Orwell had observed in 1937 that the 
consumption of cheap luxuries, particularly movies and mass-pro 
duced clothes, increased during depression.
You may have three halfpence in your pocket and not a pros 
pect in the world, and only the corner of a leaky bedroom to go 
home to; but in your new clothes you can stand on the street 
corner, indulging in a private daydream of yourself as Clark 
Gable or Greta Garbo, which compensates you for a great deal. 
(Orwell 1958, p. 88)
Gambling, "the cheapest of all luxuries," rose almost to the status of a 
major industry. Many were underfed, but everyone in England had 
access to a radio. Orwell concluded (p. 90) that "it is quite likely that 
fish and chips, art-silk stockings, tinned salmon, cut-price chocolate 
(five two-ounce bars for sixpence), the movies, the radio, strong tea 
and the Football Pools have between them averted revolution."
Recovery came more quickly in the United Kingdom than in the 
United States, where the Depression dragged on through the 1930s.
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Bernstein (1987) sought to explain the delayed recovery in the United 
States by examining varying experiences of different industries. 
Focusing on manufacturing, he argued that delay was due to a combi 
nation of financial disruption and long-run trends in the structure of 
consumption and production. Dynamic industries could be found even 
in the worst years of the Depression, but taken together they were not 
yet large enough in the national economy to pull it into recovery. 
Szostak (1995) made a similar argument, claiming that there were too 
few growing industries. He emphasized the problem of market satura 
tion and the lack of new product technology in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. Szostak's study included nonmanufacturing; government was 
the only major sector to show an employment increase even during 
1929-1933.2
While most manufacturing industries lost employment, the bever 
ages sector did show an increase in employment during 1929-1933, as 
did rayon, buttons, corsets, and several industries in the foods sector 
(Fabricant 1942, pp. 264-332). Physical output rose in beet sugar, but 
ter, cane sugar, chocolate, liquors (distilled, malt, and vinous), malt, 
corsets, knit outerwear, rayon, collapsible tubes, and mechanical 
refrigerators. By 1935 it also had risen in radios, washing and ironing 
machines, and a variety of other industries (Fabricant 1940, pp. 382- 
602).
Throughout the 1930s, the food, leather, petroleum, and tobacco 
products sectors were relatively "depression-proof." Innovations in 
canning had become operational, and during the Depression house 
holds favored canned foods for their low prices and high nutritional 
value. The cigarette industry soared after a slight drop in 1932 (Bern 
stein 1987, pp. 53, 61-63, 70-72). Other individual industries also 
showed increases in output and employment (Fabricant 1940, pp. 382- 
602; Fabricant 1942, pp. 123-128, 264-332). Consumer credit facili 
tated purchases of consumer durables, as it did in the United Kingdom. 
Many households, however, cut back on purchases of consumer dura 
bles during the Depression (Olney 1991; Bowden and Turner 1993; 
Bowden and Offer 1994).
The aggregate net income of U.S. corporations declined drastically 
from 1929 to 1932 but, as in the United Kingdom, not all businesses 
suffered losses. In 1932, very large U.S. corporations still were mak 
ing profits. Among seven broad industry groups, all were profitable in
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1929 and 1930 except trade. But by 1931 and 1932, only public utili 
ties and transportation had positive profits; that group was joined by 
manufacturing in 1933. Within manufacturing, profit rates varied 
widely. Even in 1932, three manufacturing subgroups were profitable: 
tobacco products (13.1 percent), chemicals and allied products (0.4 
percent), and foods and beverages (0.3 percent). At the other extreme 
were forest products (-10.3 percent), textiles and products (-8.0 per 
cent), and leather and products (-6.6 percent) (Fabricant 1935, pp. 3—4; 
Crum 1939, pp. 17, 45).
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, then, there 
were industries that were expanding and profitable during the worst 
years of the Depression, and there were even more such industries later 
in the 1930s. Changes in long-run patterns of consumption favored 
some of the same industries in both countries. There also were impor 
tant differences. Building, for example, played a much more positive 
role in the United Kingdom than in the United States, where employ 
ment by construction contractors fell by 50 percent between 1928 and 
1933 (Jaeger 1972, p. 139). Traditional light manufacturing industries 
that were adopting mass production methods somewhat later than in 
the United States were also expanding rapidly in the United Kingdom 
during the 1930s.
REGIONS
In the case of the United Kingdom, a focus on industries in the 
1930s leads naturally into a discussion of regions. Many regions were 
highly specialized, and the fortunes of their leading industries were 
important determinants of their economic performance and welfare 
(Hatton 1986). This link was less close in the United States (and also 
less close in the United Kingdom later in the 20th century). In this sec 
tion I examine short- and long-run impacts of the Depression on 
regions in both countries.
While both countries had problem regions, these were of different 
types. Problem regions in the United Kingdom—older industrial 
regions—were not helped significantly by the Depression or by eco 
nomic policies of the 1930s. In the United States, the Depression ulti-
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mately did improve the economic position of its main problem 
region—the low-income South. However, this was an unintended 
long-run result of New Deal policies; in the short run, such policies 
favored the richer regions.
The 19th century export industries in the United Kingdom had 
concentrated in northern and western regions. Coal, iron and steel 
products, and shipbuilding were found in South Wales, Mid-Scotland, 
Northumberland and Durham, and West Cumberland. The cotton tex 
tile industry clustered in Lancashire. These regions already were 
declining in the 1920s, and the Depression hit them especially hard. 
The unemployment rate in Jarrow, a northeastern shipbuilding town, 
was over 80 percent in 1932-1933 (Wilkinson 1939, p. 192). As we 
saw above, there were expanding industries and services in the United 
Kingdom in the 1930s, but they did not locate primarily in these older 
industrial regions. Instead, they concentrated in the South and Mid 
lands, which were relatively prosperous throughout the inter-war years.
One might expect that unemployment would lower wages and 
attract new industry to depressed regions. Recent research suggests 
that local wages do influence business location (Bartik 1991, pp. 49- 
52). However, depressed industrial regions might be unattractive to 
business for other reasons even if wages did fall. Historically, 
resources (especially labor) often were not reallocated from old to new 
uses within a region. Instead, old resources remained unused, and 
growing industries incorporated new resources, often in new locations. 
In the United Kingdom, employers expressed a clear preference in the 
1930s for labor without previous employment experience (Great Brit 
ain, Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Indus 
trial Population 1937-39, p. 504).
Many of the expanding industries hired large numbers of young 
persons and women, rather than the older men being displaced from 
coal, iron and steel, and shipbuilding. Expanding industries also 
sought proximity to the market and concentrated in the South (near 
London). Young persons and women were readily available there 
(Heim 1984b). Norman Tebbit, Minister of Employment in the 
Thatcher government, observed in 1981 (a time of high unemploy 
ment) that during the 1930s, his father "got on his bike and looked for 
work" (Tebbit 1988, p. 187). But even if they had headed for the South 
in the 1930s, many of the unemployed would not have been hired.
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During a time of general depression, there was little need to look to 
the older industrial areas for labor. Moreover, even if macroeconomic 
policy had succeeded in lowering unemployment and tightening labor 
markets in prosperous areas in the 1930s, organizational structures of 
firms in the South and Midlands were not yet sufficiently developed to 
manage distant branch plants in northern and western regions (Heim 
1983). (By the 1960s this pattern had emerged, and in the 1980s Japa 
nese firms investing in the United Kingdom located branch plants in 
northern and western regions, as well as in the new towns. Despite the 
availability of unemployed workers in the older regions, new labor 
often was hired instead. Workers without a history of trade union 
activism were preferred, and Japanese firms insisted upon a nonadver- 
sarial role for unions when they did accept them [Oliver and Wilkinson 
1992, pp. 46, 186, 226, 247, 278-280].)3
The United Kingdom did not succeed in devising effective regional 
policy during the 1930s. After short-lived efforts to transfer workers 
out of depressed regions, programs were established to finance new 
industries there. The Bank of England, however, disliked these initia 
tives and sought to keep them just large enough to forestall more far- 
reaching government intervention on behalf of the depressed regions 
(Heim 1984a). Compared with governments in many other countries, 
however, inter-war U.K. governments were not highly interventionist 
on a regional or national scale. While limited public works spending 
was undertaken, and there were some efforts to stimulate rationaliza 
tion and elimination of excess capacity in older industries, there was no 
equivalent to the U.S. New Deal with its wide range of spending and 
regulatory policies (Garside 1990).
U.K. macroeconomic policies since World War I had been oriented 
more toward defending the pound, protecting the gold standard, and 
limiting Treasury spending, rather than toward promoting domestic 
industry (Lewis 1949; Eichengreen 1992). What finally helped the 
declining regions in the late 1930s was rearmament and war, which 
increased employment in older industries such as iron and steel, coal, 
and shipbuilding (Thomas 1983). However, longer-run effects of the 
war and postwar military spending favored other regions. Research 
and development facilities in the research-intensive industries stimu 
lated by the war, such as electronics, chemicals, and aircraft, tended to 
locate in the South near London (Heim 1987).
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As a consequence of the Depression itself and the lack of effective 
policy response, unemployment differentials among regions in the 
United Kingdom widened. Taking the two extremes, in 1929 the 
unemployment rate in Wales was 18.2 percent, and in London and the 
South East, 4.5 percent. The difference between these two regions 
peaked in 1933, when unemployment was 34.1 percent in Wales and 
10.7 percent in London and the South East. For Inner Regions (the 
South and Midlands) versus Outer Regions (Northern England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland), the difference in unemployment rates 
widened from 1929-1931, dropped slightly in 1932 and was fairly 
steady to 1935, then dropped further to 1937. It widened again with 
the 1938 recession, before dropping in the war boom to about the same 
gap as in 1929 (Beck 1951, Table 18 and p. 36; see also Garside 1990, 
p. 10).<
Recession in the 1970s and 1980s similarly increased unemploy 
ment differences among regions in the United Kingdom (Martin 1989, 
pp. 31-34; Champion and Townsend 1990, pp. 131-132). Gaps also 
widened in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) between 1975 and 
1986. The South East, East Anglia, and the South West all saw their 
per capita GDP rise relative to the U.K. average, whereas that ratio fell 
for northern and western regions, and also for the West Midlands auto 
mobile region, which had become a declining rather than a prosperous 
region (Martin 1989, p. 40). This experience was shared by European 
regions generally: disparities in GDP per head widened slightly during 
the slow growth years in the first half of the 1980s, before narrowing in 
the second half of the decade and leveling off at the beginning of the 
1990s (European Commission 1994, p. 37).
Did depression and recession lead to divergence (greater inequal 
ity) of per capita incomes in the United States? At the state level, the 
evidence is somewhat mixed. Divergence among states, measured by 
the standard deviation of the log of per capita income for states, or by 
the coefficient of variation of state per capita income, increased both 
during prosperous years of the 1920s and in the first years of the 
Depression (through 1932). The remainder of the 1930s saw conver 
gence, which continued until 1978. Divergence occurred again from 
1978-1988, after which convergence resumed (Barro and Sala-i-Mar- 
tin 1991; Wheelock and Coughlin 1993; Sherwood-Call 1996). (Note 
that the 1920s and 1980s, when geographic disparities widened, also
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were times of increases in other kinds of inequality, such as income 
distribution.)
Unlike what happened in the United Kingdom, in the United States 
in the 1930s the main problem region improved its position relative to 
other parts of the country. This region was the low-income, less-indus 
trialized South, a very different type of region from the older industrial 
regions of the United Kingdom. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt still 
could refer to the South in 1938 as the nation's number one economic 
problem (Schulman 1991, p. 3), the Southeast's share of total personal 
income rose from 11.15 percent in 1930 to 13.23 percent in 1940, and 
the Southwest's share rose from 4.75 to 5.21 percent (Perloff et al. 
1960, p. 274). 5 Installed horsepower increased most rapidly in the 
Southeast and Southwest during 1929-1939, in the latter case at more 
than twice the national rate (Wardwell 1951, p. 91). Throughout the 
nation nominal per capita incomes fell in this decade, but the total per 
centage change during 1929-1939 was lower in the Southeast than in 
any other region and was also low in the Southwest (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1995, p. 11). The South's relative improvement was 
even stronger in the 1940s.
The sharpest drops in real per capita income during 1929-1933 
were in the Northwest, Central, and Far West regions; the smallest drop 
was in New England. The Southeast and Southwest regions, where 
income fell by 24 and 29 percent, did well compared with the U.S. 
average of 28 percent. The 10 states with the smallest income declines 
(12 to 23 percent) were North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hamp 
shire, Maine, Virginia, Rhode Island, Georgia, Maryland, Massachu 
setts, and Connecticut; the District of Columbia saw an 18 percent drop 
(Hurwitz and Stallings 1957, pp. 248-249).6
The employment picture for southern regions also was positive. 
The total employment index for the South Atlantic region was the best 
in the nation in 1933 at 88.3, when national employment stood at 78.4. 
The worst-off region in that year was East North Central at 69.5. The 
other southern regions, East South Central and West South Central, 
were below the national average in 1933, but along with the South 
Atlantic region made a very strong recovery later in the 1930s (Wallis 
1989, pp. 53, 56-64).
Some regional and local differences in income and employment 
were rooted in industrial structure, though it may have been less impor-
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tant than in the United Kingdom. In 1939, Fortune magazine reported 
being told in Houston, home to a booming oil industry, that "this is the 
city that never knew the depression" ("Texas" 1939, p. 87). Tobacco 
manufacture, an industry discussed above as one of the most prosper 
ous throughout the Depression, helps to explain the performance of 
some southern states. California benefited from motion pictures, citrus 
fruit, and later airplanes, while mountain states declined along with the 
mining and lumber industries (Szostak 1995, p. 307).
Wallis (1989) argued that the South's strong performance during 
the Depression cannot be fully explained by the industrial composition 
of employment. It did not simply result from the South having its 
employment concentrated in industries that saw relatively small 
employment declines during the Depression. Nor were certain institu 
tional changes associated with the New Deal (the Social Security and 
National Labor Relations Acts) primarily responsible. He concluded 
(p. 62) that "regional differences remain an important and unexplained 
part of the employment experience."
In their working paper on manufacturing employment change dur 
ing 1929-1937, Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997) sought to control 
for both industry and region. They argued that industry effects were 
important in some regions, especially during 1929-1933. For exam 
ple, the East South Central, Pacific, and Mountain regions, which had 
heavy concentrations of manufacturing employment in the lumber 
products industry, were hit hard when construction collapsed. Simi 
larly, the automobile industry had a negative impact in the East North 
Central region. But Rosenbloom and Sundstrom argued that region, 
rather than industry, effects were primarily responsible for the rela 
tively good performance of the South Atlantic and West South Central 
regions during 1929-1937. Their view was that in these regions, 
strong regional trends in manufacturing employment growth overcame 
negative industry composition effects. More research remains to be 
done to clarify the reasons for the relatively favorable performance of 
southern regions during the Depression.
Might the New Deal have benefited the South in other ways 
besides the changes associated with the Social Security and National 
Labor Relations Acts? Earlier research showed that, at least in the short 
run, southern states were not disproportionately favored by New Deal 
spending. Despite the aim of reform (which might be taken to include
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the raising of incomes in the poorest states), New Deal expenditures 
per capita were highest in wealthy western states (Arrington 1969). 
Relief and recovery, a restoration of income to (unequal) pre-Depres 
sion levels, and improvement of national assets such as land and high 
way systems, appear to have been primary motives. Expenditures 
favored states with the sharpest drops in per capita income during 
1929-1933 (Reading 1973).
Wright (1974) concluded that southern states received less New 
Deal spending because they were perceived to be safely in the Demo 
cratic camp, whereas western states had exhibited much more 
variability in their voting behavior. Spending patterns of the New 
Deal did succeed in affecting the vote. Subsequent tests by Wallis 
(1987, 1998) confirmed the importance of both economic and politi 
cal factors for the distribution of spending. Demand-side as well as 
supply-side considerations mattered: southern (and New England) 
states were less receptive than western states to federal programs 
(Reading 1973, pp. 804-805). The southern states were concerned 
about the potential threat to low wages and labor discipline (Wright 
1986, p. 260). They also may have feared that unwelcome interven 
tion (for example, on policies relating to racial matters) would accom 
pany the funds.
The New Deal did create bodies that advanced notions of regional 
administration and planning, and ideas of a "new regionalism" (as 
opposed to the "old sectionalism") flourished in the 1930s. One part of 
the South—the Tennessee River basin—was a major site of such initia 
tives. Created in 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was a 
government agency with many attributes of a private corporation. 
Working with seven state governments and many more local ones, it 
embarked on the nation's first comprehensive regional development 
program (Wecter 1975, pp. 154-177).
TVA had broad powers in navigation and flood control, hydroelec 
tric power generation, land-use planning, and reforestation. It was 
highly successful for its first 20 years. After the 1950s, criticism 
mounted as socioeconomic gains slowed and TVA shifted from dams 
to strip-mined (and nonunion) coal and nuclear power, leading to con 
cerns about environmental degradation. Much of the Tennessee River 
basin was still poor enough to be included in the Appalachian Regional 
Commission region in the 1960s (Raitz and Ulack 1984, pp. 347-349).
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Even if New Deal expenditures did not favor southern states gener 
ally, the long-run impact of New Deal policies promoted southern 
industrialization. Wright argued in Old South, New South (1986) that 
two policies adopted during the Depression ultimately ended the isola 
tion of the southern labor market and linked it with the national labor 
market. When the South experienced severe dislocation, unemploy 
ment, and underemployment as a result of these policies, its leaders 
began to welcome capital and people from outside that would help to 
develop the region. The policies that set this process in motion were 
New Deal agricultural policies and minimum wage legislation.
Agricultural policies created incentives for landowners to elimi 
nate sharecropping, the system of farm production in the South that 
involved working on an owner's land and dividing the crop with the 
owner. Under the New Deal, landowners received payments for limit 
ing their production of agricultural goods; the hope was to increase 
prices of those products and thus farmers' incomes. However, if a 
landowner had sharecroppers or other tenants, the payments had to be 
shared with them. As a result, many landowners decided to dispense 
with their sharecroppers and other tenants and hire wage-labor instead. 
Displaced sharecroppers migrated to northern cities in large numbers 
in the 1940s and 1950s, when mechanization also reduced the need for 
labor on farms.
Minimum wage legislation, which applied in all states, also 
brought the South into a unified national labor market. The immediate 
impact of federal policies on southern blacks was negative. But the 
combined effect of these policies, and the resulting migration flows, 
was
the final disappearance of the plantation regime . . . Having lit 
tle of the old low-wage economy to protect, southern property 
owners opened their doors wholeheartedly to outside flows of 
capital, government funding, and highly paid labor. (Wright 
1986, p. 15)
Initially they pressed for the South's "fair share" of military spend 
ing in the 1940s. The East South Central and West South Central 
regions did receive a larger share of wartime manufacturing facilities 
than their share of pre-war facilities, although the textile states of the 
South Atlantic region did not fare as well (U.S. War Production Board
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1945, p. 36). Industrial development promotions exploded after the 
war, and especially after 1950 (Wright 1986, pp. 257-264). The South 
also benefited from spending on highways and from the federal home 
mortgage loan programs that had originated in 1933 and that stimu 
lated city- and suburb-building after World War II. By 1990, per capita 
incomes in the South still were below the national average, but consid 
erable progress had been made toward closing the gap (Heim, forth 
coming).
In the United States, then, unlike the United Kingdom, policies 
adopted in response to the Depression did have a positive long-run 
impact on economic performance in the nation's problem region. The 
problem regions were of different types: in the United States, a low- 
income agricultural area, and in the United Kingdom, older industrial 
areas. The U.S. West, a less-developed region—although not one per 
ceived as a problem region—also saw its development hastened by the 
water projects of the 1930s. The policies adopted in the United States 
(with the exception of the TVA programs) did not have as their explicit 
goal the development of lagging or newer regions. Nonetheless, in the 
case of the South, the linkage with national labor markets that resulted 
from New Deal agricultural and minimum wage policies did ultimately 
promote industrialization.
NATIONS
A fascinating contrast is presented by certain less-developed 
nations during the Depression and subsequent decades. Their industri 
alization also accelerated, but as a result of delinking from a larger 
economy—in this case, the international economy—rather than 
becoming more closely linked with it. During the Depression, export 
earnings for many countries dried up, and capital inflows from more- 
developed countries such as the United States were curtailed drasti 
cally. In parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia (as, well as in some 
Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, and in Australia), 
emphasis shifted away from exports of primary products (such as agri 
cultural products and minerals) and toward more import-substituting 
production of manufactured goods.
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The idea that the Depression had promoted industrialization in 
Latin America was advanced by structuralists (Prebisch 1962; Furtado 
1963), writers in the dependency school (Frank 1967), and others (Lee 
1969; Diaz Alejandro 1970; Fishlow 1972; Thorp 1984). Diaz Alejan- 
dro (1984) provided a useful survey of the issues. The international 
shocks of the Depression pushed countries in Latin America toward 
policy experimentation. Some countries were questioning the "rules of 
the game" as early as 1930. Commitments to the gold standard and to 
balancing national budgets were no longer seen as a necessary or desir 
able means of attempting to ensure national prosperity. The gold stan 
dard regime of the 19th and early 20th centuries had always worked 
less well as a stabilizing force for the periphery of the world economy, 
including Latin America, than it had for the more-developed countries 
of the center. Defending the gold standard became even less a priority 
under the pressures of the Depression (Eichengreen 1992, pp. 54-65).
Being delinked from the world economy, and from institutions 
such as the gold standard, allowed a different set of domestic policies 
to be pursued that were favorable to industrialization. Not all countries 
were able to take this path. Diaz Alejandro suggested that among Latin 
American republics with nominal sovereignty, largeness (as in the case 
of Brazil) and a relatively autonomous public sector (as in Costa Rica 
or Uruguay) led to more favorable performance. Smaller countries 
such as Honduras and highly dependent governments such as Cuba 
were less able to experiment with unorthodox policies. He noted that 
"paradoxically, some clear-cut colonies in the Caribbean appear to 
have performed better than Cuba or the Dominican Republic" (Diaz 
Alejandro 1984, p. 18).
What were these policies? They included balance-of-payment pol 
icies, monetary and fiscal policies, and other policies promoting struc 
tural change and reform. As export values fell and capital inflows 
turned negative, gold and foreign exchange flowed out of Latin Ameri 
can countries. Some responded by abandoning the effort to maintain 
the gold parities of the gold-exchange standard, thereby avoiding the 
difficult deflationary process that was part of the classical adjustment 
mechanism. Instead they devalued their exchange rates. By 1930- 
1934, real import-exchange rates with respect to the dollar had depreci 
ated between 30 and 90 percent, as compared to 1925-1929, in seven 
Latin American countries (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 22-26).
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Imports also were discouraged by higher tariffs and by quantitative 
restrictions, such as import or exchange controls. Several countries 
(Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Cuba) used delinquency on 
their international debt payments to alleviate balance-of-payments dif 
ficulties (Maddison 1985, pp. 23-32). U.S. tolerance of partial or total 
defaults by Brazil contrasted with British insistence on repayment by 
both Brazil and Argentina. This tolerance was especially important for 
Brazil, which had a more binding foreign-exchange constraint than 
Argentina in the 1930s (Abreu 1984, pp. 150-152). Other outward 
flows were limited by Latin American authorities: importers seeking to 
settle their short-term debts, and foreign companies wanting to remit 
profits abroad, had to wait to obtain the necessary foreign exchange 
(Dfaz Alejandro 1984, p. 27).
Latin American countries also had serious debt problems in the 
1980s, following the difficult years in the world economy after 1973 
and the recession of 1980-1982. Again, many debts were rescheduled. 
In this debt crisis, unlike that of the 1930s, the International Monetary 
Fund acted as a "system manager," providing emergency credit and 
pressuring other creditors into helping. But it also imposed strict con 
ditions on domestic policy, including budgetary restrictions and other 
deflationary measures that increased unemployment (Maddison 1985, 
pp. 45-66).
In the 1930s, Latin American governments could, and did, engage 
in more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. The policies gener 
ally were not motivated by a conscious and deliberate program, but 
together they contributed to the maintenance of aggregate demand. 
Real money supplies increased in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Uruguay. Central banks found creative ways to issue 
domestic currency and increase credit in their economies. Banks gen 
erally were not allowed to fail, in sharp contrast to the situation in the 
United States (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 29-31). Increases in the 
money supply were facilitated by greater leniency in terms of bank 
reserves (Twomey 1983, p. 243).
Similarly, fiscal policy helped to maintain aggregate demand. 
Brazil's policy after 1932 was deliberately expansionary, with 
planned deficits resulting from conscious additional expenditure. 
Government support for the coffee sector, through export taxes and 
acquisition of coffee, also helped to hold up that sector's income
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(Fishlow 1972, pp. 328-330). In other countries, despite declara 
tions by policymakers that they sought to balance their budgets, 
"efforts to reduce the deficit induced by the decline in foreign trade 
and output were tempered by either common sense or the sheer 
inability to cut expenditures and raise taxes fast enough" (Diaz Ale- 
jandro 1984, p. 34). Regional or local governments sometimes took 
the lead in expansionary fiscal policies, as in Colombia where the role 
of central government was smaller than elsewhere in Latin America 
(Maddison 1985, pp. 28-29).
Finally, Latin American governments also engaged in other struc 
tural and reform policies that included wage flexibility and moderation, 
land reform, price regulation for rural products and public utilities, 
strengthening of credit institutions, and large public works programs 
(Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 36-37). In Mexico, for example, agrarian 
reform hastened a transfer of resources to the modern sector by 
increasing uncertainty about returns to investment in agriculture. Pub 
lic outlays for road construction reduced transport costs and enlarged 
the available market (Cardenas 1984, p. 233).
The outcome of this policy experimentation was growth rates of 
gross domestic product (GDP) during 1929-1939 that were steadier 
and higher for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico than for the 
United States and Canada. (Since population grew more rapidly in 
Latin America, the disparity in real per capita income growth was not 
as great.) More impressive than the growth rates was the extent of 
structural change and industrialization. There was substantial move 
ment from activities oriented toward export markets to those involving 
domestic sales. As import substitution surged, manufacturing grew 
much faster than GDP. Manufacturing growth rates during 1929-1939 
ranged from over 3 percent per year in Argentina to over 8 percent per 
year in Colombia, while remaining near zero in the United States and 
Canada (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 38^4).
Africa also provides examples of the Depression stimulating struc 
tural change and industrial development. Egypt was hard hit by the fall 
in the price of cotton, its major export. The resulting drop in the coun 
try's capacity to import created incentives for domestic manufacturing 
(Lee 1969, p. 152). By 1939, Egypt was meeting most of its local 
demand for simple products such as refined sugar, alcohol, cigarettes, 
soap, shoes, cement, and matches (Owen 1989, p. 142). Rather than
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exporting almost all its cotton, Egypt began to use it in its own facto 
ries, and investment funds shifted from export-oriented agriculture 
toward industry generally (Lee 1969, p. 153).
The Egyptian government protected industry by tariffs, which 
were revised after a treaty with Italy expired in 1930. Tariffs were 
especially important in blocking textile imports from Japan, India, and 
Italy, which were less expensive than products made from Egyptian 
cotton. By 1939, textile imports, which were 40 percent of the value of 
all imports in 1920, had fallen to 16.5 percent. The government aided 
industry in other ways as well, such as purchasing locally made cement 
for public construction projects. Industrial growth was not the sole 
focus; Egyptian leaders also sought to maintain a high level of cotton 
exports (Tignor 1984, pp. 106-146).
Other parts of Africa under colonial control had relatively little of 
the independence in setting policy that Diaz Alejandro identified as 
being important in successful Latin American cases (though some 
colonial powers, particularly the Belgians, were more attuned to the 
needs of industry than others). The Depression still had some positive 
impacts on industrialization. Clarence-Smith (1989, p. 195) argued 
that in the colonies of equatorial and central Africa, the main contribu 
tion of the 1930s was the strong signal it provided to private industrial 
ists about the potential of the home market and about the types of 
industries most suitable for the region.
Industries manufacturing cheap products for the African mass con 
sumer market did well even in the worst years of the early 1930s and 
fared better than industries producing for European settlers in many 
areas. Settler purchasing power fell; many settlers were heavily in debt 
and were hurt by deflation. In some places their numbers declined. 
Import substitution in the African market proceeded in soap and tex 
tiles and in some intermediate goods such as cement. The overall level 
of industrialization in equatorial and central Africa did not rise dramat 
ically in the 1930s, though the experiences of that decade did help to 
lay the groundwork for more rapid growth in Angola in the 1940s 
(Clarence-Smith 1989, pp. 170, 188-196). 7
In Asia as well, there was less policy autonomy than in Latin 
America during the Depression. Colonies were less able to impose 
trade and exchange controls, to engage in expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies that would generate some inflation, or to default on
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debts. As in Africa, some colonial governments were more develop- 
mentalist than others. The Japanese practiced what Maddison called 
"military developmentalism" in Korea and Taiwan, which included 
encouraging some industrialization. Korean heavy industry provided 
intermediate products to Japan, and Taiwan produced fertilizers, tex 
tiles, metals, and chemicals. The British and Dutch followed more 
orthodox policies in their colonies (India, Indonesia), defending over 
valued currencies and pursuing deflationary policies (Maddison 1985, 
pp. 22, 33^3).
The Depression did, nonetheless, stimulate industrialization in 
some parts of India such as Madras, as the terms of trade moved to 
favor industry over agriculture and rural moneylenders sought new 
avenues for their funds. Investments were made in sugar refineries, 
cotton textile mills, cement, and electricity supply, as well as in banks, 
insurance companies, and the film industry. Record numbers of joint 
stock companies were registered in 1933-1937 (Baker 1978, pp. 238- 
242).
Japan grew very rapidly during the 1930s, and in this case, being 
linked to the world economy was crucial. Japanese exports rose by 70 
percent between 1929 and 1937, at a time when France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States all saw their exports fall. But 
Japanese export success in this period was based partly on an earlier 
phase of delinking and import substitution. During World War I, 
developed economies such as Britain were unable to supply manufac 
tured goods, and Japan began producing textiles both for the local 
market and for other Asian countries. Military spending in the 1930s 
also stimulated the growth of Japan's heavy industry (Maddison 1969, 
pp. 35-39).
China was at the other end of the spectrum during the Depression 
and was perhaps best described as "unlinked" rather than "delinked." 
The Chinese economy was so underdeveloped and internally oriented 
that it was largely immune to the shocks of the Depression. Myers 
(1989, pp. 256-259) summarized data showing that GDP grew in real 
terms at 1.55 percent per year during 1931-1936, and growth in manu 
facturing was considerably higher, at 2.11 percent. Some industries in 
the modern sector outpaced their Western counterparts. Coal produc 
tion in modern mines grew at 7.81 percent per year (this figure includes 
Manchuria, which had been seized by Japan in 1931-1932). Growth
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also was especially rapid in modern banking, electrical power, and 
postal services.
By the mid 1930s, China was engaging in relatively expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies, had increased tariffs, and was continuing 
the debt default and readjustment it had begun in the 1920s (Maddison 
1985, pp. 33-34). Internal trade boomed, much of the urban sector 
flourished, and new consumer goods became available. Rural distress 
occurred, but bad harvests were a major cause. Myers (1989, p. 274) 
concluded that "China simply did not experience any national eco 
nomic depression as the world depression deepened."
The import-substituting industrialization pursued by many less- 
developed countries during the Depression had its flaws. In Egypt, for 
example, locally produced goods were almost invariably more expen 
sive than those of foreign producers (Owen 1989, p. 142). But as Mad 
dison (1985, p. 23) argued, "In the conditions of the 1930s, the verdict 
must be in favor of the import substitution policies, for openness to the 
world economy of the type Cuba was compelled to follow meant large- 
scale unemployment of productive resources." He quickly went on to 
assert that in the longer run these measures, which continued in the 
1940s and 1950s, were a hindrance to growth.
By the 1970s, many critics were pointing to undesirable effects of 
import substitution policies and associated protectionist measures. 
They cited price distortions, resource misallocation, lack of competi 
tion in the industrial sector, and an anti-export bias. Movement away 
from inward-looking policies, initiated by Brazil, had begun in the 
1960s. Other countries followed in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly 
following the second oil shock and the debt crisis (Corbo 1992). Long- 
lasting negative impacts on growth from some of the inward-looking 
policies first adopted during the Depression recently were estimated by 
Taylor (1998). However, when comparing countries in Latin Amer 
ica's Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) 
with other Latin American countries, Taylor (1996) noted that the "big 
push" into manufacturing also may have generated dynamic externali 
ties with long-run benefits for at least some parts of Latin America. 8-9
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CONCLUSION
Like most episodes in economic history, the Depression of the 
1930s had winners and losers. In both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, certain industries flourished. Some of these industries pro 
duced the cheap luxuries that made the Depression more tolerable for 
those at the bottom of the income scale, as well as other new consumer 
goods (such as electrical appliances) whose use continued to grow 
even during these years of economic difficulty. However, while there 
were growth industries in both countries in the 1930s, these industries 
did not necessarily locate in the regions that most needed them. This 
was especially true in the United Kingdom, where expanding indus 
tries and services concentrated in the prosperous South and Midlands 
rather than in the older industrial areas of the North and West.
In the United States, it was the South—a poor, less-developed 
region—that had been the main problem region. The South was hit 
less hard than other U.S. regions by the Depression and recovered 
more quickly, for reasons that still are not fully understood. Short-run 
impacts of the New Deal were not responsible. New Deal spending 
went disproportionately to wealthy western states, where voting pat 
terns were less reliably Democratic than those of the South and where 
there had been especially sharp drops in income in 1929-1933. But in 
the longer run, New Deal agricultural and minimum wage policies 
broke down the isolation of the southern labor market and linked it to 
the national labor market. Without the remains of a plantation econ 
omy to protect, the South became more open to economic develop 
ment, especially after 1950.
Elsewhere in the world, the Depression of the 1930s had more 
immediate effects in stimulating industrialization. In these cases 
delinking, rather than linking, was what helped. As their export reve 
nues fell and capital inflows dried up, less-developed countries found 
themselves less able to import. Several of the larger, more independent 
countries in Latin America began experimenting with unorthodox, 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies that cushioned the effects of 
the Depression. They also instituted policies that encouraged more 
domestic manufacturing. There was less scope for this response in 
Africa and Asia, where colonial control remained stronger. Egypt did
50 Heim
follow a similar path of import substitution, and the Depression also 
created new awareness of the potential of African consumer markets in 
equatorial and central Africa.
It is interesting to speculate as to why, for the U.S. South, the 
Depression had positive effects through linking the South with a larger 
economy, whereas for less-developed countries it was delinking that 
proved beneficial. Delinking, of course, is not usually an option for 
regions in the same sense as for nations, although Jane Jacobs (1984) 
did argue that if it were possible there would be advantages to cities 
and their regions becoming independent sovereignties, issuing their 
own currencies and conducting their own policies. Perhaps part of the 
reason for the difference between the U.S. South and less-developed 
countries is that it was labor markets that were linked in the U.S. case. 
Is linking labor markets more beneficial than linking product and capi 
tal markets? Would less-developed countries have been better off in 
the 1930s and later decades if international barriers to migration had 
not been erected in the 1920s and more migration to richer countries 
had been possible (similar to the migration of displaced sharecroppers 
to the U.S. North)?
International labor markets were more linked, and migration wide 
spread, in the earlier period from 1870-1914. A group of scholars has 
argued that certain European areas with large outmigrations (Ireland, 
Sweden, and Italy) were better off as a result; the departure of the mov 
ers raised wages, reduced unemployment, and eroded poverty at home 
(Boyer, Hatton, and O'Rourke, 1994; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1995; 
Williamson 1996; Taylor and Williamson 1997). However, southern 
Italy remained a less-developed region in the later 20th century. There 
also may be difficulties in applying these arguments to less-developed 
countries with very large populations, such as China or India.
Moreover, the U.S. South benefited from the outflow of labor 
partly because what followed were inflows of capital and skills. Would 
many less-developed nations or regions in the 1930s and later decades 
have seen similar inflows, on terms that would be beneficial to devel 
opment, if their labor markets were more linked to international ones? 
And did they have institutional and political structures that would have 
allowed them to use such inflows effectively?
The timing of the linking or delinking also may be important for 
either regions or nations. Although stimulated by Depression-era poli-
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cies, the actual linking of the U.S. South with the national economy 
came during the prosperous 1940s and 1950s. Clearly there are many 
questions that remain to be answered. My hope is that this consider 
ation of the uneven impacts of the Great Depression on industries, 
regions, and nations will have illustrated the complexity of that experi 
ence and will stimulate further thought about its consequences.
Notes
I thank Michael Bernstein, Carmen Diana Deere, Michael Edelstein, Susan Helper, 
Jane Humphries, Leonce Ndikumana, John Wallis, Jeffrey Williamson, and Gavin 
Wright for helpful discussions and suggestions for sources of information for this 
chapter. The chapter was revised slightly before publication to incorporate papers that 
were not available when it was presented in the public lecture series on which this book 
is based.
1. For individuals, experiences differed by race, age, gender, and other dimensions 
(Eichengreen and Hatton 1988, pp. 29-35 in the editors' introduction and chap 
ters by individual authors; Szostak 1995, pp. 308-309). See Bresnahan and Raff 
(1991) on differences among U.S. firms in the motor vehicles industry during the 
Depression.
2. On the debate over the role of new industries in pulling the United Kingdom out 
of depression, see Buxton (1975) and von Tunzelmann (1982).
3. There is evidence of a preference for greenfield sites and new labor in the recent 
location of Japanese auto transplants in the United States. Locations in or near the 
Midwest were chosen partly for proximity to other automotive firms and supplier 
networks. But the transplants often avoided large, older urban centers and hired 
rural workers, some of whom maintained connections to farms (Bingham and 
Eberts 1990, pp. 317-320; Mair, Florida, and Kenney 1988; Helper 1991; King- 
solver 1992). For example, Japanese automotive facilities located in the 1980s "in 
the exurban counties around Dayton and Columbus" (Blair and Fichtenbaum 
1990, p. 152). Smith and Florida (1994) sought to challenge this view, at least for 
Japanese-affiliated establishments in auto-related activities such as components, 
steel, finishing and processing, and rubber and tire manufacturing (i.e., not auto 
assembly establishments). There may be problems in their analysis arising from 
correlation between their population and population density variables.
4. Unemployment differentials among regions widened in some other countries as 
well. As in the United Kingdom, the absolute gap in unemployment rates 
increased by more than the ratio of rates in high- and low-unemployment areas 
(see the editors' introduction in Eichengreen and Hatton [1988, pp. 30-31]).
5. U.S. regions are defined differently by different authors. See the appendix for 
lists of states included in regions discussed in this paper.
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6. Not all southern states did well. In the Southeast the range was from 12 percent 
(North and South Carolina) to 34 percent (Arkansas). In the Southwest it was 27 
percent (Texas) to 40 percent (Arizona) (Hurwitz and Stallings 1957, pp. 248- 
249).
7. Interestingly, the food, beverage, and tobacco industries, which were relatively 
prosperous in the United States and the United Kingdom, fared rather badly. They 
were more closely tied to the settler market (Clarence-Smith 1989, pp. 194-195).
8. The section in Taylor (1996) comparing Latin America's Southern Cone and other 
Latin American countries was omitted in Taylor (1998), which focused exclu 
sively on the costs of inward-looking policies. The results in Taylor (1996) do, 
however, suggest variation in the experience of Latin American countries with 
such policies. All experienced costs, but some also may have experienced bene 
fits. It stands to reason that the larger Southern Cone countries, which embarked 
most strongly upon import-substituting industrialization, would reap the greatest 
benefits from the dynamic externalities that a long tradition of writers on eco 
nomic growth have emphasized.
9. The question of whether any of the policies pursued by governments of less- 
developed countries during the Depression would have been appropriate in the 
1970s to 1990s is a complicated one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Not all 
accept the idea that export-led industrialization was by the 1980s a universally 
desirable alternative to approaches maintaining some emphasis on domestic mar 
kets, nor do all accept a view of the state as primarily the problem rather than a 
part of the solution in less-developed countries. Fishlow (1990) argued that while 
more attention to market signals was appropriate, the degree of emphasis on liber 
alization and the invisible hand of the market that accompanied debt assistance 
plans of the 1980s went too far in denying a positive developmental role for the 
state. Earlier he suggested that even the import substitution of the 1930s to 1950s 
in Brazil might have suffered from an excessive reliance on the market, as it did 
not result in an articulated development bloc (Fishlow 1972, pp. 355-356). See 
Shapiro and Taylor (1990) for a survey on the role of the state and different devel 
opmental strategies. They noted that some successful export promotion strategies 
depended upon a previous phase of import substitution. Maddison (1985) and 
Thorp (1984, pp. 13-14) discussed comparisons between the 1930s and the 1970s 
and 1980s.
Appendix 
Definitions of Selected U.S. Regions









Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin
California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia
Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
Southwest:
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
Louisiana is included in the Southeast in Perloff et al.'s discussion on p. 274. 
Later in the book it is included in the Southwest, due to the growth of the 
petroleum industry and oil-using industries in more recent decades.
Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997)
U.S. Census Divisions
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
California, Oregon, Washington (Alaska and Hawaii 
were included in this division from 1960 on)
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, 
West Virginia
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
East North Central: 






Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (cont.)
In the U.S. Census, the South includes the South Atlantic, East South Central, 
and West South Central divisions.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1995)
Southeast: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
Southwest: Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
U.S. War Production Board (1945)
Regions are not defined on pp. 35-36, but appear to be U.S. Census Divisions, 
as for Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997).
Wallis (1989)
U.S. Census Divisions, as for Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997). 
Wardwell (1951)
Southeast: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia
Southwest: Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
Wright (1986)
South: At most, 11 states: 1) the Deep South states of
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina; 2) broadened by the addition of Arkansas, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee; 3) plus the "swing" 
states of Florida, Texas, and Virginia, which 
sometimes are dropped. For example, for aggregates 
such as land-labor ratios, including Texas would cause 
problems; for migration, Florida would be the problem 
state.
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3 The Great Depression as a 
Historical Problem
Michael A. Bernstein 
University of California, San Diego
It is now over a half-century since the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the most severe and protracted economic crisis in American his 
tory. To this day, there exists no general agreement about its causes, 
although there tends to be a consensus about its consequences. Those 
who at the time argued that the Depression was symptomatic of a pro 
found weakness in the mechanisms of capitalism were only briefly 
heard. After World War II, their views appeared hysterical and exag 
gerated, as the industrialized nations (the United States most prominent 
among them) sustained dramatic rates of growth and as the economics 
profession became increasingly preoccupied with the development of 
Keynesian theory and the management of the mixed economy. As a 
consequence, the economic slump of the inter-war period came to be 
viewed as a policy problem rather than as an outgrowth of fundamental 
tendencies in capitalist development. Within that new context, a debate 
persisted for a few years, but it too eventually subsided. The presump 
tion was that the Great Depression could never be repeated owing to 
the increasing sophistication of economic analysis and policy formula 
tion. Indeed, the belief became commonplace that the business cycle 
was "tamed" and "obsolete."
The erratic performance of the American economy since the early 
1970s has made this notion itself seemingly obsolete. Serious ques 
tions have been raised concerning the political obstacles to the effec 
tive management of cyclical instability and, as well, our skill in 
diagnosing and correcting economic maladies. Indeed, entirely new 
varieties of economic thinking have emerged, which have argued that 
the government cannot alter levels of real output (let alone rates of 
increase in output) except under exceptional circumstances that involve 
the execution of consistently inaccurate (or irrational) forecasts by eco-
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nomic agents and/or the implementation of fiscal and monetary poli 
cies without the anticipation of the private sector. The confidence of 
the Keynesian Revolution has been shaken. A new "classicism" has 
come to prominence in economic thought.
In this climate of economic opinion, it is important to note that the 
optimism of the post-World War II era regarding the mixed economy 
and the new economics of Keynesianism had emerged at a time of dra 
matic reconstruction in the world economy and concomitant prosperity 
in the American. Such hope had been absent in the decade of the Great 
Depression; even during the war years there had been great apprehen 
sion that a return to depression would come close on the heels of vic 
tory. But the high growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s obscured the 
pre-war debates and dissolved for the moment any fears of a return to 
hard times.
Yet the concerns and misgivings of the depression and war years, 
far from being resolved, simply faded from view. While it has by now 
long been fashionable to claim that "Keynes is dead," and that alto 
gether novel approaches to economic policy formulation must be 
developed, it has nevertheless been deemed passe to engage with the 
ideas and theses of an older generation of economists who struggled to 
understand strange and devastating events at a time when orthodox the 
ories and remedies no longer sufficed. Indeed, the vast majority of 
contemporary economists have grown decidedly hostile to arguments 
concerning the Great Depression that have not focused on the short run 
or on policy failure. In this respect they have avoided the structural, 
institutional, and long-run perspectives—more characteristic of their 
forebears—that sought to situate the great economic crisis of the inter- 
war years within a historical framework that spanned several decades 
or more. By so doing, they have lost an appreciation not simply of 
some possible causes of the Great Depression itself, but also of the 
subsequent development and performance of the American economy 
since mid-century. It is for this reason that I seek, through a reassess 
ment of particular aspects of these older analytical approaches, to per 
suade you of the usefulness and insight afforded by an understanding 
of "The Great Depression as a Historical Problem."
The older literature concerning the Great Depression in the United 
States may be broadly classified into three categories. The first argued 
that the severity and length of the downturn was the direct result of the
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collapse of financial markets that began in 1929. The main emphasis 
of such work concerned the causes of the 1929 crash and those factors 
that amplified its impact. The second concluded that the economic 
calamity of the 1930s was the direct result of poorly formulated and 
politically distorted actions undertaken by the government. The third 
category took a broader perspective and attempted to analyze the 
Depression in a long-run context. It suggested that whatever the ori 
gins of the slump, the reasons for its unparalleled length and severity 
predated and transcended the events of the last quarter of 1929. To this 
third category of analysis I shall devote most of my attention—but first 
I would like to survey the general arguments characteristic of those 
economists who focused on short-run dynamics and policy failure.
All short-run analyses of the Great Depression shared a common 
attribute. They focused on the immediate causes and impacts of the 
stock market collapse in 1929, and they asserted that the precipitous 
devaluation of wealth and the disruption of the banking system occa 
sioned by it explained the intensity of the crisis. The "business confi 
dence" thesis was perhaps the best example of this school of thought. 
It held that regardless of the mechanisms that caused the collapse, the 
dramatic slide of the stock market created intensely pessimistic expec 
tations in the business community. The shock to confidence was so 
severe and unexpected that a dramatic panic took hold, stifling invest 
ment and thereby a full recovery. 1
A more comprehensive formulation of the short-run argument 
directly confronted the question of why financial markets collapsed. 
Looking to the political and institutional distortions created by the 
Treaty of Versailles, some writers (such as Irving Fisher, Lionel Rob- 
bins, and Jacob Viner) argued that the Depression was the inevitable 
consequence of the chaotic and unstable credit structure of the 1920s. 
World finances, of course, were significantly destabilized by the provi 
sions of the Versailles Treaty itself. The principal irritant consisted of a 
dangerous circle of obligations and risks in which (as epitomized by 
the Dawes Plan of 1924) the United States lent funds to Great Britain, 
France, and Germany, while German reparations were needed to allow 
the Allies to liquidate their American debts. By 1928, American banks 
were already quite wary of the situation. Yet their predictable and 
understandable response, cutting back on loans to European govern 
ments, merely made the situation worse. Moreover, the demise of the
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gold standard in international trade, and the demands by France and 
the United States that Germany make her reparations payments in gold 
rather than in the export of goods and services, created a net gold flow 
into the United States that led to a veritable explosion of credit. 
Extremely unstable credit arrangements thereby emerged in the 1920s, 
especially in mortgage markets. Given the relatively unregulated envi 
ronment at the time, many banks were committed to questionable loan 
contracts. Once the crash came, the collapse of the banking system 
was quick to follow. Thus, excessive credit and speculation coupled 
with a weak banking network caused the Great Depression. 2
Another version of the short-run argument concerned the immedi 
ate effects of the crash on consumer wealth and spending. The severity 
of the downturn, it was argued, resulted in a drastic devaluation of con 
sumer wealth and incomes. The large stress placed on the capital mar 
kets and the lack of consumer confidence in banks ensured that 
effective demand could not be bolstered by increased credit. The large 
decreases in purchasing power, which emerged directly from the crash, 
left the economy saddled with excess capacity and inadequate 
demand. 3
None of these short-run arguments were completely convincing or 
satisfying. Inasmuch as the business confidence thesis was subjective, 
it was virtually impossible to evaluate in the light of historical evi 
dence. This weakness was perhaps best exemplified by the claim of 
Gustav Cassel who, in focusing on psychological factors in the slump, 
argued that "American puritanism stands out as perhaps the most 
important [example] . . . the stock exchange speculation of 1928-29 
was regarded as particularly sinful behavior which had to get its pun 
ishment." There was also the major theoretical objection to notions 
like these that they mistook effect for cause, given that the objective 
circumstances of the 1930s may have generated the subjective 
responses of pessimism and panic. Such theories could not, therefore, 
occupy a central place in explanations of the Depression. 4
The excessive credit and speculation argument was frequently 
rejected on the grounds that it abstracted too boldly from real rather 
than monetary events in the inter-war economy. Indeed, business cycle 
indicators turned down before the stock market crashed; indices of 
industrial production started to fall by the summer of 1929, and a soft 
ness in construction activity was apparent in 1928. Such critics as John
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Kenneth Galbraith held that "cause and effect run from the economy to 
the stock market, never the reverse. Had the economy been fundamen 
tally sound in 1929 the effect of the great stock market crash might 
have been small . . . the shock to confidence and the loss of spending 
by those who were caught in the market might soon have worn off." 5
As for the wealth and spending hypothesis, the evidence did not 
provide a compelling proof. The dramatic decline in consumption 
expenditures after 1929 may have been due to the wealth effects of the 
stock market debacle; it may have arisen once expectations had been 
dampened by the events after 1929; or it may have been an outgrowth 
of a declining trend in construction activity and in farm incomes during 
the 1920s. But even recent econometric investigations have been inca 
pable of unambiguously explaining a large portion of the decline in 
spending. We can speak of an autonomous drop, but we cannot say for 
sure why it happened.6
Another approach to understanding the Depression evaluated the 
extent to which the slump was the result of systematic policy errors. 
Inadequate theory and misleading information, as well as political 
pressures, it was argued, distorted the policymaking process. Such 
investigators as Melvin Brockie, Kenneth Roose, and Sumner Slichter 
maintained that from 1932 onwards the American economy showed a 
great potential for recovery, only to be set back profoundly by the 1936 
recession. They found that monetary conditions were not a factor inso 
far as the data showed low short-term interest rates, a strong bond mar 
ket, and a high incidence of excess reserves. It was the impact of the 
New Deal, they asserted, which was responsible for negating whatever 
monetary stimulus did exist because of the tendency of the Industrial 
Codes to raise labor costs and material input prices. The rhetoric and 
ideology of the Roosevelt administration may have also played a role 
by jeopardizing the confidence of the business community. 7 Not sur 
prisingly, several investigators (as well as journalists and pundits) 
labeled the downturn of 1936-37 the "Roosevelt Recession."
The monetarist criticism of New Deal policy, originally posed by 
Clark Warburton but most persuasively presented by Milton Friedman 
and Anna Schwartz, focused on the impact of the external dollar drain 
generated by Great Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931 
and the internal drain created by the crash itself. To the extent that the 
Federal Reserve Board failed to understand the links between bank
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failures, runs on deposits, and the international pressure on the dollar, 
it also failed to recognize the inappropriateness of the classical policy 
response undertaken—the raising of discount rates. 8
It was not solely criticisms of actual government policy in which 
these writers indulged to explain the Depression's unusual severity. In 
some cases they also criticized the government for not doing enough. 
They maintained that the private sector moved too quickly in the mid 
1930s in raising prices. As a result, by 1937 consumers showed an 
increasing resistance to higher prices, owing to their desire to liquidate 
the large debt incurred earlier in the decade and to maintain their sav 
ings in uncertain times. The average propensity to consume subse 
quently fell and a recession took hold. 9 Pro-competitive policies 
presumably were the solution, but government action (such as the cre 
ation of the Temporary National Economic Committee to Investigate 
the Concentration of Economic Power) was too little, too late, and 
often inspired more by political than economic concerns.
The notion that the Great Depression was essentially an outgrowth 
of policy failures was problematic at best. To be sure, one could with 
the benefit of hindsight engage in some forceful criticism of economic 
policy during the 1930s, but it seems that was and is a futile exercise. 
After all, in many respects the Roosevelt administration (especially the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) did what many of 
its predecessors had done in the face of a cyclical downturn. One must 
ask, therefore, how government officials suddenly became so inept in 
the inter-war period. Moreover, the question remains: why were tradi 
tional policies that had seemingly worked in the past and that repre 
sented a theoretical consensus among generations of economists 
suddenly so perverse in the 1930s? What had changed in the structure 
and operation of the national economy in the inter-war period that 
made orthodox economic theory and policy inadequate?
While concern with the problem of economic instability has punc 
tuated the history of economic thought for several centuries, it is hardly 
surprising that the Great Depression of the 20th century inspired a vast 
literature on the issue of investment failure and the maladjustment of 
investment plans. 10 In particular, the persistence of the Depression and 
the over-a-decade-long weakening of economic performance that it 
caused prompted several investigators to formulate a "stagnation the 
sis" concerning mature capitalist economies; it is within this context
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that we can assess the work of those who regarded the crisis of the 
1930s as a secular phenomenon. To their investigations, I now turn.
The literature that focused on long-run factors in the American 
Depression was distinctive in holding that the New York stock mar 
ket crash of 1929 was less important than certain developments in the 
economy that had deleterious impacts throughout the inter-war 
period. Some authors—for example, Seymour Harris and Paul 
Sweezy—argued that during the 1920s the distribution of national 
income became increasingly skewed, lowering the economy's aggre 
gate average propensity to consume. Others, such as Charles Kindle- 
berger, W. Arthur Lewis, and Vladimir Timoshenko, focused on a 
secular shift in the terms of trade between primary products and man 
ufactured goods, due to the uneven development of the agricultural 
and industrial nations. This change in the terms of trade, they argued, 
created a credit crisis in world markets when bad crop yields obtained 
in 1929 and 1930. At the same time that agricultural economies were 
losing revenue because of poor harvests and declining world demand, 
the developed economies were contracting credit for the developing 
nations and imposing massive trade restrictions such as America's 
Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. As the agricultural nations went into a 
slump, the industrialized countries (most notably the United States) 
lost a major market for their output. Hence, the downturn of 1929 
became more and more severe. 11
Industrial organization economists, Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means most prominent among them, sought an explanation of the 
Depression in the increasing extent of imperfect competition in the 
American economy of the early 20th century. 12 Downward inflexibility 
of prices after the crash of 1929, caused by the concentrated structure 
of American industry and the impact of labor unions, intensified the 
effective demand problem and prevented the price system from reach 
ing a new equilibrium at full employment. On the one side, "sticky 
prices" further limited the already-constrained purchasing power of 
consumers. On the other, to the extent that noncompetitive pricing pre 
dominated in the capital goods sector, producers were less willing to 
buy new plant and equipment. Excessive real wages, helped up by 
union pressure and New Deal policy, further contributed to persistent 
disequilibrium in labor markets. Price inflexibility thus inhibited the 
recovery of both final product demand and investment demand. 13
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There were several weaknesses in all these theories. Those authors 
who focused on an increasingly unequal distribution of income or on 
administered pricing did not marshal unambiguous evidence to make 
their case, nor did they specify precisely how such factors came to life 
in the inter-war economy. While Berle and Means claimed to have 
demonstrated a relative price inflexibility in concentrated economic 
sectors during the 1930s, their critics were unconvinced. Insofar as the 
aggregate price-level fell by one-third in the early 1930s, they argued, 
how inflexible could the general price system have been? The sticky 
prices thesis also relied on an assumption of perfect competition in all 
markets other than those where the imperfections existed. If this 
assumption were relaxed, the thesis did not hold. As Michal Kalecki 
pointed out, if "sticky wages" were responsible for the length of the 
Depression, it followed that a reduction in wages would have elimi 
nated the persistent disequilibrium. If, however, there were imperfec 
tions in product markets as well, a reduction in nominal wages would 
have lowered real wages, thereby exacerbating the effective demand 
crisis. Only if price adjustments were general and were followed 
instantaneously by increased investment would the sticky prices thesis 
concerning the 1930s hold. 14
The terms-of-trade argument similarly had a major flaw. The major 
weaknesses in the American economy of the inter-war period were 
domestic, and the collapse of demand on the part of primary product- 
exporting nations was not highly relevant. America's dependence on 
foreign markets was not significant in the inter-war years. During the 
1920s, exports as a share of the nation's gross national product had 
annually averaged only a bit over 5 percent. A fall in export demand 
then could not have played a major role in worsening or prolonging the 
Great Depression. 15
Continued research on secular mechanisms in the Great Depres 
sion necessarily relied upon the work of Joseph Schumpeter on cycli 
cal processes in modern economies. Schumpeter held that the inter- 
war period was an era in which three major cycles of economic activity 
in the United States (and Europe) coincidentally reached their nadir. 16 
These cycles were 1) the Kondratieff, a wave of 50 or more years asso 
ciated with the introduction and dispersion of major inventions; 2) the 
Juglar, a wave of approximately 10 years' duration that appeared to be
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linked with population movements; and 3) the Kitchin, a wave of about 
40 months' length that had the appearance of a typical inventory cycle.
Schumpeter's efforts were paralleled by those of Simon Kuznets 
and, more recently, Moses Abramovitz and Richard Easterlin. Kuznets 
was successful in documenting the existence of waves of some 15 to 20 
years in length. These periodic swings, according to Abramovitz, dem 
onstrated that in the United States and other industrialized countries 
"development during the 19th and early 20th centuries took the form of 
a series of surges in the growth of output and in capital and labor 
resources followed by periods of retarded growth." Significantly, 
"each period of retardation in the rate of growth of output. . . culmi 
nated in a protracted depression or in a period of stagnation in which 
business cycle recoveries were disappointing, failing to lift the econ 
omy to a condition of full employment or doing so only transiently." 17
Most, if not all, of the "Kuznets Cycle" literature was concerned 
with the explicit dating of the long swings that appeared in the data. It 
seemed clear that these swings involved changes in resource endow 
ments (including the size of population) and alterations in the intensity 
of resource utilization. 18 The specific behavioral mechanisms that 
could account for the Kuznets phenomenon (and its precise manifesta 
tion in the United States in the 1930s) were necessarily the focus of 
continued debate. It is in this context that we can understand the large 
literature on "secular stagnation."
Broadly speaking, the so-called stagnation theorists of this century 
grouped into those who evinced a "Schumpeterian pessimism" about 
the declining incidence of innovations and new technologies, and those 
who shared a "Keynes-Hansen pessimism" concerning the shrinkage 
of investment outlets owing to a decline in the rate of population 
growth. 19 Both groups agreed that stagnation or, as it was sometimes 
called, economic maturity involved a "decrease of the rate of growth of 
heavy industries and of building activity . . . [and] the slowing down of 
the rate of growth of the total quantity of production, of employment, 
and usually of population. It [also involved] the rising relative impor 
tance of consumer goods." They also believed that "the appearance of 
industrial maturity raisefd] profound questions concerning the ability 
of an enterprise system to produce a progressive evolution of the econ 
omy . . "20
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The "Keynes-Hansen" pessimism held that as population growth 
fell off and as major markets in housing, clothing, food, and services 
consequently contracted, outlets for new investment were quickly lim 
ited to those created by the introduction of new technology or new 
products. To the extent that recovery from a depression required 
investment outlays above and beyond the level of depreciation allow 
ances, an upturn would be dependent on the availability, in an adequate 
volume, of opportunities in new industries and processes. If these were 
not forthcoming, as some stagnation theorists believed was true of the 
1930s, the only avenue out of the slump would be deficit spending to 
augment consumer purchasing power. But political barriers to such 
government action in the thirties left many economies mired in an 
environment of excess capacity and inadequate demand. Needless to 
say, contrary to popular perceptions, it was not the New Deal that dem 
onstrated the efficacy of restitutive fiscal spending, but rather World 
War II. While hardly inspired by specific economic concerns, Presi 
dent Franklin Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy" nevertheless con 
tained rather vivid policy lessons for economists, politicians, gov 
ernment officials, and the public at large. 21
There was a serious inadequacy in the arguments concerning eco 
nomic maturity and population growth. The theory conflated popula 
tion with effective demand. As one critic put it,
[i]t is sometimes maintained that the increase in population 
encourages investment because the entrepreneurs anticipate a 
broadening market. What is important, however, in this con 
text is not the increase in population but in purchasing power. 
The increase in the number of paupers does not broaden the 
market. For instance, increased population does not mean nec 
essarily a higher demand for houses: without an increase in the 
purchasing power the result may well be crowding of more 
people into the existing dwelling space. 22
"There is no rigid physical relation," another commentator declared, 
"between the number of families in the country and the amount and 
value of the housing they will pay to occupy. Demand depends not 
only on their number, but their incomes."23 A more systematic theory 
had to argue that, for secular reasons, the purchasing power of the pop 
ulation, rather than the size of the population itself, fell in advanced 
capitalist systems.
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Much like the population theory, the variant of the stagnation the 
ory that focused on the decline of innovation and technical change as a 
factor in the distress of the 1930s embodied many inconsistencies and 
questionable assertions. The lower rate of technical change and the 
decline in the number of major innovations, which were posited as a 
primary cause of the inability of the economy to recover in the course 
of the Great Depression, were deemed to be exogenous factors derived 
from the state of technical knowledge at the time. 24 Little justification 
of this position was offered. Furthermore, meager attention was given 
to a seeming contradiction in the argument. If during the 1930s little 
technical change took place, why did not the eventual reduction in the 
amount of capital equipment available (owing to firm exits and the 
periodic obsolescence of plant) result in a revival of capital goods out 
put?25
There was one further objection to the technology argument that 
was apparent to some of the stagnation theorists themselves. There 
was an implicit assumption that new innovations were always of the 
capital-using type; thus, had innovation occurred in the 1930s, net 
investment demand would have absorbed large capital outlays, thereby 
generating a robust upturn. But if innovations were capital-saving, this 
argument foundered. Heavy investment in earlier stages of economic 
growth (in, for example, railroads, motor cars, and housing) may have 
given way (in later periods) to newer forms of investment in manage 
rial technique and information processing. These latter innovations 
may not have absorbed very large amounts of investment expenditure 
at all. While they may have therefore improved the organization and 
efficiency of production, their impact on aggregate spending would not 
have been adequate to the task of systematic recovery. As Alvin 
Hansen succinctly put it in 1941, "[t]he transformation of a rural econ 
omy into a capitalistic one is something distinctly different from the 
further evolution of a society which has already reached the status of a 
fully-developed machine technique."26
It was the Austrian economist Josef Steindl who provided the most 
sophisticated version of the economy maturity idea. Not surprisingly, 
he did so in part by explicitly situating the Great Depression in the 
United States within a long-term development framework. His work 
linked economic stagnation directly with the behavior of capitalist 
enterprise, thereby avoiding the mechanistic qualities of many of the
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stagnation arguments as well as their frequent appeals to exogenous 
factors. Steindl's version of the maturity thesis was that long-run ten 
dencies toward capital concentration, inherent in capitalist develop 
ment over time, led to a lethargic attitude towards competition and 
investment. 27 Specifically, the emergence of concentrated markets 
made difficult, and in some cases impossible, the expulsion of excess 
capacity required for revival after a trough.
Steindl argued that in any given industry there existed a hierarchy 
of firms based upon the relative level of prime production costs. Such 
a hierarchy existed because firms would have grown at different rates, 
entered the industry at varying times, and therefore installed equipment 
of assorted degrees of cost-effectiveness given their past profit perfor 
mance (and their differential access to outside funds). The gross mar 
gin, £„ for the zth firm, therefore, could be expressed as:
where PI was the firm's output price, 7Z the level of output, and where 
w, LI, and MJ were respectively the wage rate, the size of the hired labor 
force, and the level of materials costs facing the firm. (Steindl 
assumed, at least initially, that the wage rate was not employer-spe 
cific.) This gross margin, Steindl held, was the fundamental competi 
tive resource of the firm. It provided internal funds for investment and 
the securing of outside loans. For Steindl it was obvious that the mag 
nitude of a firm's internal funds was often directly proportional to its 
ability to secure credit by means of bond sales, equity issues, and bank 
loans. This was primarily due, in his view, to the "good will" that was 
commonly associated with firm size. Larger firms clearly had access to 
funds (both internal and external) far in excess of those for smaller 
firms.
In addition, a larger gross margin would enable a firm to initiate 
sales and advertising efforts and quality campaigns (and, attendant 
upon this, product differentiation) that could possibly allow it to appro 
priate other (less powerful) firms' markets. Most important, the gross 
margin could provide the means with which a firm might innovate and 
apply technically superior methods to production. The resultant sav 
ings in costs would be the basis of price cuts to drive competitors out of
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the market. Smaller firms that could not introduce these superior tech 
niques would thereby experience a shrinkage in profit margins result 
ing from the price war. The inability of these firms to employ new 
techniques might simply be due to the fact that they could not pay the 
price to install them. In fact, to the extent that patent laws existed, they 
might not have the funds for research and development efforts to 
deploy new methods themselves.
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the competitive process 
of which Steindl conceived. The ray VR expresses the cost hierarchy of 
the industry, with the most inefficient firms at the higher point of the 
ordinate—their output is lower, in keeping with the notion of their min 
imal share of the market. Assuming that a standard mark-up pricing 
rule is used in the industry, VW describes a gradient of prices that 
expresses the differences in costs incurred by the various firms. Trian 
gle RVW is thus the gross margin of the total industry. The hierarchy of 
profit margins becomes immediately apparent. The firms with the 
larger margins (owing to lower costs) have larger shares of the market 
by assumption. Assume that demand increases in the industry, with the 
leading firms expanding output to S' from S. Their large margins allow 
for the introduction of cost-cutting techniques at R'. Should the result 
ing increase in profit margins cause the leading firms to accumulate 
such that then" rate of expansion rises above the market rate, a price cut 
ensues in the struggle for a greater share of the market. At the new 
(lower) price level FN, the least efficient firms are forced out due to the 
excess of their production costs over the market price. Producers TH 
are thus eliminated.
Consider a situation where the market in question is more concen 
trated than in the foregoing case. Presumably, the cost differentials 
among firms are less severe insofar as, over time, a small number of 
firms have become dominant by means of similar technology, sales 
efforts, and so on. Thus, the spectrum of costs structures is now V'R\ 
not VR'. This being the case, the expulsion of a certain number of firms 
from the industry by a competitive drive for market share requires a 
larger price reduction than in the first case. The price level FN, suffi 
cient to expel producers TH before, now threatens the economic exist 
ence of no one. To expel firms TH, at this point, would require a 
further cut in the price level to F'N'. The unwillingness to engage in 
more severe price cutting of this kind stems from the fact that large
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SOURCE: Steindl (1976), p. 44 (Figure 3).
reductions in price can invite retaliation that may generate a downward 
spiral of the price structure in general. In other words, there is the risk 
that the market, to use modern business parlance, may be "spoiled."28
Price inflexibility in concentrated industries is intensified during 
depressions, and this has an important impact on the response of firms 
to economic fluctuations. The net revenue of firms tends to be so jeop 
ardized in a slump that strategies of price reduction are viewed as 
unfeasible. There may even be incentives to raise prices in order to 
compensate for the reduction in the volume of sales—resulting in what 
James Tobin once named, during the celebrated 1962 confrontation of 
the Kennedy administration with the national steel industry, the
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"Blough Effect." 29 For a given industry, therefore, the impact of a 
decline in the rate of growth (i.e., the aggregate rate of capital accumu 
lation) will depend on the extent to which the industry is concentrated. 
In a sector where the squeezing out of competitors is relatively easy, 
large declines in demand will result in the reduction of profit margins 
(for each firm) as prices are cut. By contrast, in a concentrated market, 
profit margins will tend to be inelastic in the face of reductions in 
demand.
At the macroeconomic level, the implications of inelastic profit 
margins for cyclical performance are most profound. Insofar as price 
reductions do not obtain in the event of a decline in the rate of growth, 
the necessary adjustment of sectoral rates of expansion to the aggregate 
rate will require reductions in the rate of capacity utilization. When 
viewed in terms of the sector as a whole, if prices are fixed, output 
must fall to bring gross margins down. If industrial structure were 
more competitive, excess capacity would not result from a decline in 
the accumulation rate; rather, prices would fall.
Reductions in capacity utilization imply not only declines in 
national income but also increases in unemployment. In the presence 
of underutilized capacity, firms will be increasingly disinclined to 
undertake any net investment. A cumulative process is thereby estab 
lished wherein a decline in the rate of growth, by generating reductions 
in the rate of capacity utilization, will lead to a further decline in the 
rate of expansion as net investment is reduced. Individual firms, by 
believing (in another striking example of the "fallacy of composition") 
that decreases in their own investment will alleviate their own burden 
of excess capacity, merely intensify the problem economy-wide. The 
greater the proportion of the nation's industry that is highly concen 
trated, the greater the tendency for a cyclical downturn to develop into 
a progressive (and seemingly endless) decline.
A further consequence of the existence of highly concentrated sec 
tors in the national economy is the impact it has on effective demand. 
The higher profit margins secured by large firms are indicative of an 
increasingly skewed distribution of output that, when combined with 
the reluctance of firms to invest (or otherwise spend) their revenues, 
generates a rising aggregate marginal propensity to save. Declining 
effective demand is combined with rising excess capacity when a 
slump occurs. The potential for recovery, barring the intervention of
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exogenous shocks, government spending, or the penetration of foreign 
markets, is therefore greatly lessened.
What is central to Steindl's thesis is the conception of long-term 
alterations in industrial structure that make the economy as a whole 
more incapable both of recovering from cyclical instability and of gen 
erating continued growth. The emergence of oligopolistic market 
structure is taken to be inherent in the process of capitalist develop 
ment insofar as that process is coterminous with the development of 
large-scale manufacturing techniques and of financial concentration. 
Economic maturity and the threat of stagnation result because the 
growing incidence of "[oligopoly brings about a maldistribution of 
funds by shifting profits to those industries that are reluctant to use 
them."30 In order to escape stagnation, capital must be redistributed 
either to more competitive sectors or new industries, although such 
shifts can only proceed (given the difficulties of obtaining technical 
knowledge and good will in new product lines) with considerable time 
lags.
Indeed, during the Great Depression, some members of 
Roosevelt's "Brain Trust," such as Rexford Tugwell, argued forcefully 
for the imposition of an "undistributed profits tax" to prevent the accu 
mulation of corporate surpluses and to stop the privilege firms had 
always enjoyed of investing their surpluses at will. The incentive of 
the tax, it was claimed, would lead firms to issue more of their sur 
pluses in the form of productive investment commitments or in the 
form of dividends. There would thus obtain either direct productive 
expenditure, through firm-level investment or the allocation of funds to 
stockholders that would then be subject to the discipline of private cap 
ital markets. As a result, the mobilization of capital resources would 
be more efficient and more likely to generate recovery. Embedded in 
the Revenue Act of 1936, the undistributed profits tax proved to be one 
of the most unpopular and controversial pieces of legislation to emerge 
from the New Deal; it was repealed in 1938. 31
Interestingly enough, no clear relationship exists between stagna 
tion and concentration in American industry during the Great Depres 
sion. By applying a static conception of market structure, investigators 
have tended to focus on the number of firms in an industry as the pri 
mary determinant of a sector's competitiveness. The difficulty lies in 
the fact that cross-section data on firm numbers provide no information
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concerning those differentials in costs that are the basis of pricing strat 
egies. Given large disparities in techniques and costs, it is possible that 
a small number of enterprises may, over time, engage in large amounts 
of competition. Conversely, a sector with a large number of identical 
firms may prove to be quite lethargic, given the absence of cost differ 
entials that can be competitively exploited. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the historical record of the 1930s seemingly does not give Steindl's 
argument unqualified support.
As I demonstrated in my 1987 book, The Great Depression: 
Delayed Recovery and Economic Change in America, 1929-1939, 
some highly concentrated industries were relatively vibrant during the 
decade, while others less so appeared virtually moribund. 32 In addi 
tion, the data on sectoral shares of wages in the value added, which 
Steindl cited as indices of competitiveness, were similarly mislead 
ing. 33 A rising (falling) trend in the wage-share may not necessarily 
indicate a competitive decline (noncompetitive rise) in the industry's 
gross margin, but rather may demonstrate changes in the labor inten 
sity of that sector's technology over time. Clearly, the evidence con 
cerning market structure was a frail reed upon which Steindl attempted 
to base his theory. Whether a given industry is dynamic or not involves 
several issues that are not directly linked with numbers of firms or the 
extent of capital concentration—issues having to do with the industry's 
position in the economy's input-output matrix, the durability of its out 
put, and the relative maturity of the industry with respect to the shifting 
composition of the economy as a whole.
The weaknesses in Steindl's analysis do not, of course, obscure the 
importance of his contribution to an understanding of the Great 
Depression in particular and of maturity in capitalist economies in gen 
eral. That importance derives from the fact that Steindl attempted to 
situate the decade of the 1930s within a larger historical framework. In 
this context, he could view the Great Depression as the outcome of an 
interaction between cyclical forces dating from 1929 and tendencies of 
long-run development spanning a half-century or more. In short, he 
was thus able to understand the Great Depression as a historical prob 
lem.
Steindl's conception of long-term capitalist development was obvi 
ously embedded within a theoretical tradition linked with the work of 
the classical economic theorists—Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and
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Karl Marx. That tradition posited the concentration of capital as the 
major expression of secular growth. To attempt to grasp capitalist 
development in terms of the increasing concentration of capital, as the 
classical theorists and Steindl did, it was necessary to locate the pri 
mary determinants of growth in the production process itself—i.e., in 
the firm. Changes in the role of markets—markets being defined as 
both loci of purchasing power and as collections of needs for specific 
kinds of goods—had no place in the theory. 34
Conceptually, capitalist economies may avoid (and, in the latter 
half of this century, have avoided) tendencies toward stagnation 
through exogenous stimuli such as war, territorial expansion, interna 
tional monetary networks that privilege some industrial systems rela 
tive to others, and of course through product innovation and technical 
change. Indeed, it is this last potential avenue for expansion that has 
been both common in fact and most germane to the extension of the 
neo-Keynesian, neo-Marxian, and neo-Ricardian theoretical frame 
works. Even so, such compositional transformations in modern econo 
mies occasion a great deal of instability and unpredictability in 
performance.
Secular changes in the growth performance and potential of vari 
ous industries must offset declines in certain groups with rises in oth 
ers. The chance that such changes in sectoral performance will 
proceed smoothly is small, and economic history provides ample testi 
mony to this fact. 35 While the possibility of terminal stagnation has not 
been realized in advanced capitalist states, economic performance in 
those economies throughout the last four decades of this century has 
nevertheless been erratic at times and often premised more on external 
developments than internal mechanisms of recovery and expansion.
Secular transitions in development involve the decline of old 
industries and the rise of new ones. These alterations in the composi 
tion of national output tend to be discontinuous and disruptive, not 
because of imperfections in markets but rather because of forces inher 
ent in the accumulation of capital over time. First, the ongoing expan 
sion of the capitalist economy is coterminous with the advance of 
scientific and technical knowledge, which transforms production tech 
niques, cost structures, and the availability of raw materials, and which 
creates entirely new inputs and outputs. Consider, for example, the 
emergence of fossil fuels, the replacement of natural fibers with syn-
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thetics, and the rise of internal combustion as a means of locomotion. 
Entire industries are made obsolete or virtually so, while new ones are 
created. Second, the structural milieu in which product and technical 
changes take place is itself a product of economic growth.
Concentration of capital may lead to unequal access to investment 
funds, which obstructs further the possibility of easy transitions in 
industrial activity. Because of their past record of profitability, large 
enterprises have higher credit ratings and easier access to credit facili 
ties, and they are able to put up larger collateral for a loan. Equity 
issues by such firms are more readily financed and sold, and such firms 
can avoid takeovers more easily than small firms. Large firms, too, 
may have commonalities of interest with financial institutions through 
interlocking directorates. All these factors may impede the flow of 
capital out of old and into new sectors, thereby making shortfalls in 
aggregate economic performance much worse.
Compositional and structural change in economies may also pre 
cipitate serious unemployment problems that interfere with the 
achievement of full capacity output. New industries may have differ 
ing capital intensities and skill requirements, relative to older sectors, 
that complicate (or possibly even prevent) the absorption of unem 
ployed workers. The problem may be twofold: newer industries may 
not grow fast enough to provide employment opportunities for those 
laid off in older sectors; but even if higher growth rates are achieved, 
the newer industries may require different amounts and altogether dif 
ferent kinds of labor for their production. Structural unemployment 
may be the troubling and persistent consequence. These were, in fact, 
many of the specific findings of my research on the Great Depression 
reported over the past decade.
Finally, changes in the relationship of a national economy to the 
world economic system may also be responsible for wide fluctuations 
in macroeconomic behavior. A resurgence of competition from other 
national systems previously excluded from or inadequately prepared 
for international commerce may seriously affect the fortunes of domes 
tic industries grown used to protected or exclusive markets. Transfor 
mations in international currency systems, whereby a nation's 
monetary unit that had previously served as numeraire and means of 
international clearance is rapidly integrated into a general floating cur 
rency system, will also profoundly change the performance character-
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istics of that economy. Inflationary pressures at home now may 
translate into an export boom as a currency is devalued, while defla 
tionary patterns may yield an upswing in imports to the detriment of 
domestic producers. Policy flexibility and independence may also be 
constrained as a nation's economy becomes more open to economies 
elsewhere. Domestic changes in fiscal and monetary policy will now 
have international trade consequences as well. Modulations of interest 
rates, for example, will affect the flow of capital across national bor 
ders as investors compare rates of return in various nations. Interest 
ingly enough, Keynes himself suggested to Roy Harrod in 1942 that 
"the whole management of the domestic economy depends upon being 
free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to the 
rates prevailing elsewhere in the world. Capital control is a corollary 
to this."36
National economic performance may also, in a mature setting, 
require increasing involvement of the state itself. Maintaining suffi 
cient outlets for net investment expenditure might possibly involve def 
icit spending to bolster effective demand, direct government purchases 
of goods and services (particularly of public goods such as infrastruc 
ture and military and law-enforcement equipment), and government 
oversight of the penetration of foreign markets. These efforts might 
conceivably be paralleled by rising outlays by private firms on sales 
efforts, distribution mechanisms, and various means to enhance con 
sumer credit. 37 While for most neoclassical economic theorists, fiscal 
and monetary mechanisms stand as instruments of periodic counter 
cyclical policy, for neo-Keynesian, neo-Marxian, and neo-Ricardian 
economists, governmental involvement in mature economies is a per 
manent (and ever-increasing) feature of modern industrial states.
Steindl had, of course, focused his work on the inter-war economic 
crisis of the 1930s. His central theses regarding maturity and stagna 
tion in advanced capitalist economies seemed particularly compelling 
when viewed in terms of the long-run historical experience of the Great 
Depression. Yet both the postwar record, at least in the case of the 
United States, and some of the theoretical lacunae in his earlier claims 
led Steindl to modify some of the arguments of his 1952 book. With 
the 1976 republication of his Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism, Steindl allowed that technical innovation, product develop 
ment, public spending, and research and development initiatives might
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provide the means to escape from investment inertia. Even so, he was 
extremely concerned that most accumulation strategies in mature capi 
talist nations would be focused on military-industrial activity and war 
itself. Using both public and private investment funds for other pur 
poses, while obviously desirable, would be "exceedingly hard" given 
"the workings of political institutions."38
The wisdom (not to mention the prescience) of Steindl's 1976 
observations is made apparent as soon as one surveys the more recent 
evolution of American capitalism. American accumulation in the latter 
half of this century has, on the one side, confirmed many of Steindl's 
suppositions regarding expansion in advanced industrial states. On the 
other, it has demonstrated both the unique and abiding flexibility of 
capitalism in the face of contradictory tendencies toward underutiliza- 
tion and the importance (even at times the possible centrality) of politi 
cal and social forces often understood by economists to be exogenous. 
In all these respects, contemporary history portrays the conceptual 
power and importance of what Steindl had to say when he first exam 
ined the crisis of the 1930s. But it also reminds us of the unyielding 
impacts of contingency and human agency in economic performance 
over time.
World War II had achieved in the United States, of course, what the 
New Deal could not—economic recovery. With the start of war in 
Europe, the unemployment rate had already begun to fall, so that by the 
time of the Japanese naval offensive at Pearl Harbor, only 7 percent of 
the labor force remained idle. American entry into the war brought 
almost instantaneous resolution of the persistent economic difficulties 
of the inter-war years. Between 1939 and 1944, the national product, 
measured in current dollars, increased by almost 125 percent, ulti 
mately rising to $212 billion by 1945.
Yet as World War II came to a close, many economists and busi 
ness people worried about the possibility of a drop in the level of pros 
perity and employment to one far below that of the war. But these 
apprehensions proved to be unwarranted. 39 By 1946, gross national 
product fell less than the postwar reduction in government spending; 
unemployment did not even reach 4 percent; consumer spending did 
not fall at all, and eventually rose dramatically. Although recessions 
occurred between 1945 and the mid 1970s, most of them lasted only 
about a year or less, and none of them remotely approached the sever-
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ity of the Great Depression of the 1930s. During these three decades, 
American output steadily increased, with only minor setbacks. 
According to the Federal Reserve Board's index, manufacturing pro 
duction doubled between 1945 and 1965, and tripled between 1945 
and 1976.
Such robust economic performance is hardly surprising in war 
time—especially when conflict is global and, with a few exceptions, 
kept outside of national boundaries. What is most striking about the 
American economic experience linked with World War II was the 
enduring growth and prosperity of the postwar years. Consumption 
and investment behavior played a major part in this great prosperity of 
the late 1940s and 1950s. As soon as Germany and Japan had surren 
dered, private and foreign investment in the United States rose quickly. 
On the domestic side, reconversion was itself an investment stimulus. 
Modernization and deferred replacement projects required renewed 
and large deployments of funds. Profound scarcities of consumer 
goods, the production of which had been long postponed by wartime 
mobilization needs, necessitated major retooling and expansion efforts. 
Even fear of potentially high inflation, emerging in the wake of the dis 
mantling of the price and wage controls of the war years, prompted 
many firms to move forward the date of ambitious and long-term 
investment projects. On the foreign side, both individuals and govern 
ments were eager to find a refuge for capital that had been in virtual 
hiding during the war itself. Along with a jump in domestic invest 
ment, therefore, a large capital inflow began in late 1945 and early 
1946.
Domestic consumption was the second major component of post 
war growth. Bridled demand and high household savings due to war 
time shortages, rationing, and controls, coupled with the generous 
wage rates of the high-capacity war economy, all contributed to a dra 
matic growth in consumer spending at war's end. The jump in dispos 
able income was bolstered by the rapid reduction in wartime surtaxes 
and excises. And the baby boom of the wartime generation expressed 
itself economically in high levels of demand for significant items like 
appliances, automobiles, and housing. G.I. Bill benefits additionally 
served to increase the demand for housing and such things as educa 
tional services, with associated impacts on construction and other 
industrial sectors.
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Foreign demand for American exports grew rapidly in the immedi 
ate postwar years. In part, the needs of devastated areas could only be 
met by the one industrial base that had been nearly untouched by war- 
related destruction. Explicit policy commitments to the rebuilding of 
allied and occupied territories, such as the Marshall Plan in Europe, 
also served to increase the foreign market for the output of American 
industry. Even so, one of the most significant contexts within which 
the impressive postwar growth of the American economy took place 
was the unique and special set of arrangements developed for interna 
tional trade at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.
When the allied nation's financial ministers gathered at Bretton 
Woods in New Hampshire just before the war's end, they were con 
cerned to reconfigure world trade and financial flows such that the dis 
putes so characteristic of the inter-war years of 1919-1939 could be 
avoided and stability maintained. Along with the creation of an Inter 
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of an Interna 
tional Monetary Fund, the conference decided to establish fixed 
exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and all other internationally 
traded currencies. The value of the dollar itself was set in terms of 
gold at $35 per ounce. This installed a benchmark against which the 
value of all other currencies was measured. As the American economy 
was, by far, the most powerful at the time, it seemed prudent and 
indeed necessary that its currency play such a central international role.
American postwar prosperity and the benefits of world economic 
leadership continued throughout most of the 1950s. The added fiscal 
stimulus of the Korean War also helped to maintain the high levels of 
growth and employment characteristic of the decade. Republican Pres 
ident Dwight Eisenhower, carrying on in the tradition of his Demo 
cratic predecessor Harry Truman, repeatedly committed his admin 
istration to the practice of compensatory demand management. But the 
prosperity of the 1950s, while robust and impressive, nevertheless 
weakened by 1957. This set the stage for the arrival of a new brand of 
economics in Washington, explicitly (and self-consciously) imbued 
with the doctrines of Keynesianism.
From the "New Frontier" policies of John Kennedy, to the "Great 
Society" agenda of his successor Lyndon Johnson, through the declara 
tion of a "New Federalism" by Richard Nixon, there ensued an era of 
sustained central government intervention in the nation's economic
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life. The self-assurance of many (but not all) of the "new" economists 
of the early 1960s that the goal of achieving simultaneously acceptable 
levels of unemployment and inflation could be realized has more 
recently been shattered. But throughout the 1960s and much of the 
1970s, and for some even during the 1980s, the perceived obligation of 
government to secure overall economic stability was not seriously 
questioned and remained one of the more important changes of 20th- 
century American economic history.
Historical specificity notwithstanding, American economic perfor 
mance in the latter half of this century appears to conform in many 
major respects to the general analytical propositions derived from a 
secular analysis of inter-war economics. The ability to forestall and/or 
overcome tendencies toward economic stagnation has depended upon a 
varied and uncommon set of circumstances both global and domestic 
in their genesis and impact. But a continuation of such a charmed 
existence is apparently no longer possible. Josef Steindl himself noted, 
in 1976, that "the cheerful extroverted era of [postwar] growth has 
apparently come to an end." He held that the reasons for this were "the 
reduction of tension between the superpowers . . . the increase in ten 
sion within the capitalist countries . . . and . . . the emergence of envi 
ronment, raw material, and energy problems . . ." And, in words that 
today seem as apposite as they did over 20 years ago, Steindl noted that
the political and psychological basis of the postwar boom has been 
sapped by such developments as these: public spending ... [has] 
decreased . . . the competition in technology . . . and education 
unleashed by Sputnik has flagged; the development in these fields 
has been dominated instead by [an] internal reaction against intel 
lectuals and youth... the cooperation between the capitalist pow 
ers has broken down . . . [and] the internal stresses of groups 
contending for shares in the national income have shown them 
selves [to be] inflationary.40
In the midst of a return to the weak and intermittent growth of ear 
lier decades of this century, there has also obtained an altogether reac 
tionary (re)orientation of fiscal and monetary policy. A resurgence of 
general equilibrium approaches to cyclical phenomena has prompted 
the formulation of a "new classical macroeconomics" and the rise of a 
"rational expectations school."41 These intellectual developments, 
linked with political events having to do with the backlash against the
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progressive politics and redistributive programs of the New Frontier 
and the Great Society, eliminated Keynesian thinking from the formu 
lation of responses to contemporary economic problems. Thus, we 
have the more recent attempts to balance fiscal expenditures (and, until 
recently, tighten monetary variables) in the face of unemployment and 
shortfalls in national product. In other words, we witness an attempt to 
embrace what Keynes once derisively called "the Treasury View."42
There is, of course, a major difference between past decades and 
today in this regard, at least in the United States. Timid countercyclical 
policy in the inter-war period was to some extent the result of igno 
rance and misplaced confidence in old remedies. Today, slow-growth 
policies are derived from the politics of reaction and resentment—a 
politics arrayed against the reformist agendas and civil rights initiatives 
of the 1960s. Whatever its social and cultural roots, this revanchist 
spirit has grounded its appeal, to a broad segment of the American 
electorate, in the pessimism and antagonism attendant upon erratic 
economic growth since the oil price shocks and hyperinflation of the 
1970s. As the macroeconomic "pie" has grown more slowly and less 
consistently, distributional struggles—often deployed along racial, eth 
nic, and gender lines—have become more intense. Insofar as the 
national economy falls short of a full-employment approximation of 
potential output, the justifications for reversing the distributional gains 
of the activist fiscal policies of the 1960s gain ever greater force. To 
put it in the words of Josef Steindl once again, contemporary "argu 
ments against full employment have got the upper hand in the councils 
of the powers, and thus we witness stagnation not as an incomprehensi 
ble fate, as in the 1930s, but stagnation as a policy."43 The ironies and 
the poignancy of this state of contemporary affairs are made strikingly 
clear as soon as we reflect upon the Great Depression as a significant 
and coherent historical problem.44
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39. In fact, it was this dramatic postwar economic performance, one that seemingly 
belied the stagnation theories of the inter-war years, that in part prompted 
Steindl to open the new introduction to the 1976 edition of Maturity and Stagna 
tion with the observation that "[t]he first (1952) edition of this book appeared at 
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40. From Steindl (1976, pp. xvi-xvii).
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Steindl (1984).
42. The "Treasury View," that fiscal spending could not lower unemployment, 
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ist policy. See Bernstein (1987, p. 218).
43. From Steindl (1976, p. xvii). On the political constraints within which counter 
cyclical policy is often formulated, see the pathbreaking essay of Kalecki (1972). 
Also of interest in this regard are Nordhaus (1975) and Fair (1978).
44. With apologies to my friend and colleague Arno J. Mayer (1975).
90 Bernstein
References
Abramovitz, Moses. 1961. "The Nature and Significance of Kuznets Cycles." 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 9: 225-248.
Aldcroft, Derek H. 1977. From Versailles To Wall Street: 1919-1929. Lon 
don: Alien Lane.
Backman, Jules. 1939. "Price Inflexibility and Changes in Production." 
American Economic Review 29: 48CM186.
Bernstein, Michael A. 1982. Long-Term Economic Growth and the Problem 
of Recovery in American Manufacturing: A Study of the Great Depression 
in the United States, 1929-1939. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University.
——. 1985. "Explaining America's Greatest Depression: A Reconsideration 
of an Older Literature." Rivista di Storia Economica 2 (second series): 
155-174.
1987. The Great Depression: Delayed Recovery and Economic
Change in America, 1929-1939. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Brockie, Melvin. 1950. "Theories of the 1937-38 Crisis and Depression."
Economic Journal 60: 292-310. 
Cassel, Gustav. 1932. The Crisis in the World's Monetary System. Oxford,
England: Clarendon Press.
Crotty, J.R. 1983. "On Keynes and Capital Flight." Journal of Economic Lit 
erature 21: 59-65. 
Dahmen, Erik. [trans., A. Leijonhufvud]. 1970. Entrepreneurial Activity and
the Development of Swedish Industry: 1919-1939. Homewood, Illinois:
Irwin. 
Easterlin, Richard A. 1968. Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings in
Economic Growth: The American Experience. New York: National Bureau
of Economic Research. 
Erickson, E.A. 1972. "The Great Crash of October, 1929." In The Great
Depression Revisited: Essays on the Economics of the Thirties, H. van der
Wee, ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Fair, Ray. 1978. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President."
Review of Economics and Statistics 60: 158—173. 
Fellner, William. 1941. "The Technological Argument of the Stagnation
Thesis." Quarterly Journal of Economics 55: 638-651. 
——. 1954. "Full Use or Underutilization: Appraisal of Long-Run Factors
Other Than Defense." American Economic Review 44: 423-433. 
Fisher, Irving. 1930. The Stock Market Crash—And After. New York: Mac-
millan.
The Economics of the Great Depression 91
——. 1932. Booms and Depressions: Some First Principles. New York:
Adelphi. 
Friedman, Milton, and Anna Schwartz. 1963. A Monetary History of the
United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1972. The Great Crash. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Hansen, Alvin H. 1939. "Economic Progress and Declining Population
Growth." American Economic Review 29: 1-15.
——. 1941. Full Recovery or Stagnation? New York: Norton.
Harris, Seymour. 1948. Saving American Capitalism: A Liberal Economic
Program. New York: Knopf. 
Kalecki, Michal. 1943. Studies in Economic Dynamics. London: Alien &
Unwin.
——. 1962. "Observations on the Theory of Growth." Economic Journal 72: 
134-153.
———. 1968. Theory of Economic Dynamics: An Essay on Cyclical and Long- 
Run Changes in Capitalist Economy. New York: Monthly Review Press.
———. 1969. Studies in the Theory of Business Cycles, 1933-39. New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley.
——. 1971. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy, 
2933-1970. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
1972. "Political Aspects of Full Employment." In The Last Phase in
the Transformation of Capitalism, Michal Kalecki, ed. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, pp. 75-83.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1933. "National Self-Sufficiency." Yale Review 22: 
755-769.
———. 1937. "Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population." 
Eugenics Review 29: 13-17.
———. 1980. Activities 1940-1944: Shaping the Post-War World; The Clear 
ing Union. In The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 25, D.
Moggridge, ed. New York: Macmillan.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. The World in Depression: 1929-1939. Berke 
ley, California: University of California Press. 
Kuznets, Simon. 1958. "Long Swings in the Growth of Population and in
Related Economic Variables." Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society 102: 25-52. 
Lewis, W. Arthur. 1950. Economic Survey, 1919-1939. Philadelphia: Blaki-
ston. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1975. "An Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle."
Journal of Political Economy 83: 1113-1144.
92 Bernstein
———. 1977. "Understanding Business Cycles." In Stabilization of the 
Domestic and International Economy, K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer, eds. 
New York: North-Holland, pp. 7-29.
Mayer, Arno J. 1975. "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem." 
Journal of Modern History 47: 409^-36.
McLaughlin, G.E., and R.J. Watkins. 1939. "The Problem of Industrial 
Growth in a Mature Economy." American Economic Review 29: 1-14.
Means, Gardiner C. 1935. "Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a Sta 
bilizing Monetary Policy." Journal of the American Statistical Association 
30: 401-413.
Means, Gardiner C., and Adolf A. Berle. 1968. The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Mishkin, F.S. 1978. "The Household Balance Sheet and the Great Depres 
sion." Journal of Economic History 38: 918—937.
Moore, G.H. 1950. Statistical Indications of Cyclical Revivals and Reces 
sions. Occasional Paper 31, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Morgan, J.J.B. 1935. "Manic-Depressive Psychoses of Business." Psycholog 
ical Review 42: 91-93, 98-107.
Nordhaus, William. 1975. "The Political Business Cycle." Review of Eco 
nomic Studies 42: 169-190.
Noyes, C.R. 1930. "The Gold Inflation in the United States, 1921-1929." 
American Economic Review 20: 181-198.
Persons, C.E. 1930. "Credit Expansion, 1920 to 1929, and its Lessons." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 45: 94-130.
Reynolds, Lloyd G. 1939. "Producers' Goods Prices in Expansion and 
Decline." Journal of the American Statistical Association 34: 32-40.
Robbins, Lionel. 1934. The Great Depression. New York: Macmillan.
Roepke, Wilhelm. 1936. Crises and Cycles. London: Hodge.
Roose, Kenneth D. 1948. "The Recession of 1937-38." Journal of Political 
Economy 56: 239-248.
——. 1954. The Economics of Recession and Revival: An Interpretation of
1937-38. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1939. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and
Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
——. 1946. "The Decade of the Twenties." American Economic Review 36:
1-10. 
Sirkin, G. 1975. "The Stock Market of 1929 Revisited: A Note." Business
History Review 49: 223-231. 
Slichter, Sumner. 1938. "The Downturn of 1937." Review of Economics and
Statistics 20: 103-115.
The Economics of the Great Depression 93
Steindl, Josef. 1945. Small and Big Business: Economic Problems of the Size 
of Firms. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.
——. 1966. "On Maturity in Capitalist Economies." In Problems of Eco 
nomic Dynamics and Planning: Essays in Honour ofMichal Kalecki. New 
York: Pergamon, pp. 423-432.
——. 1976. Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism. New York: 
Monthly Review Press.
——. 1984. "Reflections on the Present State of Economics." Banca Nazio-
nale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 148: 3-14. 
Svennilson, Ingvar. 1954. Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy.
Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
Sweezy, Paul M. 1939. "Demand under Conditions of Oligopoly." Journal of
Political Economy 47: 568-573.
——. 1940. "Population Growth and Investment Opportunity." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 55: 64—79.
——. 1968. The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York: Monthly
Review Press.
Temin, Peter. 1976. Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? New 
York: Norton.
Terborgh, George. 1945. The Bogey of Economic Maturity. Chicago: Machin 
ery and Allied Products Institute.
Thorp, W.L., and W.F. Crowder. 1941. "Concentration and Product Charac 
teristics as Factors in Price-Quantity Behavior." American Economic 
Review 30: 390-408.
Timoshenko, Vladimir P. 1933. World Agriculture and the Depression, Mich 
igan Business Studies 5. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press.
Tobin, James. 1975. "The Wage-Price Mechanism." In Consumption and 
Econometrics, vol. 2 of Essays in Economics, James Tobin, ed. New York: 
North-Holland, 17-32.
United States Department of Commerce. 1975. Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1970. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern 
ment Printing Office.
Viner, Jacob. 1936. "Recent Legislation and the Banking Situation." Ameri 
can Economic Review 26: 106-107.
Warburton, Clark. 1944. "Monetary Expansion and the Inflationary Gap." 
American Economic Review 34: 303-327.
——. 1945a. "Monetary Theory, Full Production, and the Great Depression." 
Econometrica 13: 114-128.
——. 1945b. "The Volume of Money and the Price Level between the World
Wars." Journal of Political Economy 53: 150-163.
94 Bernstein
——. 1946. "Quantity and Frequency of Use of Money in the United States, 
1919-45." Journal of Political Economy 54: 436-450.
Weinstein, Michael. 1980. Recovery and Redistribution under the NIRA. 
New York: North-Holland.
Williamson, J. 1985. "On the System in Bretton Woods." American Eco 
nomic Review 75: 74—79.
4 Propagation of the Depression
Theories and Evidence
James S. Fackler 
University of Kentucky
Despite the fact that it has been more than six decades since the 
onset of the Great Depression, the factors involved in propagating this 
dramatic decline in economic activity remain subjects of debate and 
interest. My objective is 1) to review the received wisdom on how the 
Great Depression evolved through time, and 2) to reintroduce into the 
discussion one of the original theories of the Depression that has been 
subjected to relatively little empirical analysis, the debt-deflation 
hypothesis. 1
Let me emphasize that my objective is to discuss the "propagation 
mechanism" operative in the early 1930s rather than to try to isolate the 
initiating factor(s) for the Great Depression. I omit lengthy discussion 
of the initial impulse only to keep the current discussion manageable 
and not because it is inherently less interesting or important.
Until fairly recently, the received wisdom on the propagation 
mechanism included two schools of thought. The first, developed by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and now called the "money view" 
explanation, argues that inappropriate monetary policy caused what 
otherwise would have been a (perhaps severe) recession to become the 
Great Depression. The second, derived from Temin (1976), argues that 
the impetus for the Depression was the autonomous behavior of con 
sumption.
Recently, a new view of the Depression has emerged. Bernanke 
(1983) has augmented the money view analysis with what is now 
called the "credit view." The credit-view model demonstrates how a 
deflationary shock can disrupt the credit intermediation process and 
cause a sustained decline in output. Specifically, deflation lowers the 
net worth of borrowers by raising their real indebtedness. If the defla 
tion is sufficiently severe, debtor insolvency jeopardizes the financial 
condition of creditors (banks), increasing the fragility of the credit
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intermediation process. If bank failures result, local "information cap 
ital" on the quality of borrowers is lost, raising the cost of credit inter 
mediation and lowering economic efficiency. 2
THE BEHAVIOR OF OUTPUT
Figure 1 shows the behavior of output (measured as monthly levels 
of industrial production) over most of the inter-war period. This longer 
period provides a background against which to evaluate the time period 
of interest for present purposes, August 1929 to March 1933. As is evi 
dent, industrial production declined precipitously over this three-and- 
a-half-year period. Whatever the initial impulse, the objective here is 
to describe and evaluate the dynamics (i.e., the propagation mecha 
nism) in the economy that caused this impulse to have its prolonged 
effect.
The path of output displayed in Figure 1 suppresses potentially 
important parts of the story. Specifically, the focus is on the behavior 
of a single, aggregate measure of output. An expanded analysis would 
also investigate the interactions among the components of this single 
measure of output; that is, attention would be paid to the "comove- 
ment" of output across sectors of the economy. For example, interest 
ing elements of the story revolve around the agricultural and housing 
sectors. Unfortunately, time does not permit detailed analysis of sec 
toral interactions.
THEORIES OF THE PROPAGATION MECHANISM
The Money View
One time-honored interpretation of the decline in output that began 
in the fall of 1929 is the money view of Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963). Their argument proceeds by first building a statistical case, 
using roughly a century's worth of data, that changes in the money 
stock cause subsequent changes in output. Second, beginning in late
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Figure 1 Industrial Production Index, January 1921 to December 1937 
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1929 and accelerating in late 1930, declines in the money supply 
occurred due to what they referred to as the "inept" response of offi 
cials of the Federal Reserve System to the emerging crisis (Figure 2). 3 
The Friedman-Schwartz argument is that the Depression was both 
deeper and more prolonged than need be due to this inappropriate 
monetary policy.4 Finally, a contributing factor was the fall in wealth 
of both bank shareholders and depositors associated with widespread 
bank failures. Among other effects, these wealth shocks likely contrib 
uted to falling demands for consumption goods, further contributing to 
the downward spiral in production.
While the sharp decline in output certainly accompanies the dra 
matic fall in the money stock, a deeper look at the data suggests that 
the links between money and output may be decidedly more complex. 
In particular, the stock of money in the economy is the result of inter 
actions among the Federal Reserve, the banking sector, and the non- 
bank public. The Fed sets the quantity of base money (5) in the 
economy. The banking system and the nonbank public then use this
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monetary base to produce the money supply (Ml). A "bare bones" 
expression of this relationship is the money multiplier model:
Ml =m*B, 
where the money multiplier is
m = (1 + c)l(rd + e + c)
with rd being the required reserve ratio for demand deposits, with c 
being the ratio of currency to demand deposits (C/D) held by the pub 
lic, and with e being the ratio of excess reserves to demand deposit lia 
bilities (ER/D) held by banks. Note that the money supply is 
determined in part by Fed policy that sets the required reserve ratio and 
the monetary base, in part by banks as they choose the quantity of 
excess reserves to hold relative to deposit liabilities, and in part by the 
nonbank public as it chooses the level of currency to hold relative to 
deposits.
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The money multiplier model suggests an investigation of the base 
and the multiplier separately. Figure 3 shows the behavior of the base 
over the inter-war period. Notice in particular the modest (relative to 
the decline in money) decline in the base over the 1928-1930 period. 
Figure 4 shows the money multiplier, m, which declined dramatically 
over the first three years of the Depression. This decline was driven by 
a rising excess reserve ratio, as banks struggled to maintain liquidity in 
the face of the possibility of bank runs, and by a rising currency- 
deposit ratio, as the nonbank public, fearing instability of the banking 
system in general and the possibility of the failure of their own banks 
in particular, preferred to hold currency rather than deposits. 5
Do Figures 3 and 4 mean that the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis, 
that the fall in the money stock was due to inept policy, is incorrect? 
Not necessarily, since the rises in the ratios of currency and excess 
reserves to deposits may reflect a lack of public confidence in Fed pol 
icies. The Fed, after all, could have chosen to flood the financial mar 
ket with money, though perhaps at the cost of giving up alternative 
policy goals.
The initial impression from Figures 2 to 4 is that the Friedman- 
Schwartz money view certainly appears consistent with the data. But 
since advanced economies are complex, other hypotheses may also be 
supported by the data as well. We now turn to two popular alternatives.
Autonomous Spending Shocks
The second of the time-honored hypotheses about the propagation 
mechanism is due to Temin (1976), who argued that the impetus for the 
Depression was the autonomous behavior of consumption. In his view, 
the Depression began as a recession, which was brought about by a 
variety of factors. First, there was an oversupply in the housing mar 
ket. Second, financial markets were uneasy because of the stock mar 
ket boom and the Federal Reserve's efforts to burst this speculative 
bubble. These forces led to a fall in income. The stock market crash in 
October 1929 was an additional major force leading to the economic 
collapse. In Temin's view, the crash propagated its deflationary effect 
through consumption, which was in part depressed due to the decline 
in consumer wealth and an increase in consumer leverage. 6 But even 
after considering the magnitudes of the negative effects of lower
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wealth, increased leverage, potentially pessimistic expectations, and 
deflationary shocks from the agricultural sector of the United States, 
there is still a large portion of the fall in consumption in 1929 that 
Temin considered unexplained or "autonomous." He states (Temin 
1976, p. 83): "It is somewhat unsatisfactory to say that the Depression 
was started by an unexplained event, but this alternative is preferable to 
statements that are inconsistent with the data." Thus, he claimed that 
nonmonetary and nonfinancial forces played the primary causal role in 
the Depression.7
In contrast to Friedman and Schwartz, Temin views the behavior of 
money as responding to, but not causing, the economic decline; for 
Temin, money is a passive, endogenous variable. Specifically, he 
argues that "there is no evidence of any effective deflationary pressure 
from the banking system between the stock market crash in October 
1929 and the British abandonment of the gold standard in September 
1931" (Temin 1976, p. 169). Temin reached this conclusion because 
short-term interest rates fell, contrary to what would be expected dur 
ing a period of monetary stringency. He argued further that the 
approximate constancy of the real money supply throughout this period 
hardly signals that contractionary movements in output are the 
response to monetary tightening. 8
Romer (1988) has recently revisited the issue of the aberrant 
behavior of consumption in the early stages of the Depression. Consis 
tent with the results of Mishkin (1978) and Temin, Romer argues that 
neither wealth nor income effects can account for all of the fall in con 
sumption. Rather, her hypothesis is that the drop in consumption was 
the result of increased uncertainty during 1929. 9
She concludes that "uncertainty effects due to stock market vari 
ability can explain most of the unusual behavior of consumer spending 
on durable and semidurable goods in the first year and a half of the 
Great Depression" (p. 29). That is, the stock market crash made con 
sumers sufficiently uncertain of the future to induce them to decrease 
their consumption, and thus provided an impetus for the initial fall in 
economic activity in 1929 that marked the beginning of the Depres 
sion. She also provides contemporary accounts from business fore 
casters that suggest the uncertainty persisted well into 1930. 10
Romer's analysis suggests that a substantial portion of the drop in 
consumption was due to increasing uncertainty about the state of the
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economy. Further, this decline in consumption may account for some 
of what Temin viewed as "autonomous." For the consumption expla 
nation of the propagation mechanism to be plausible, some type of 
proxy showing increased consumer uncertainty should be available. 
Figure 5 shows a measure of uncertainty: changes in the 12-month 
moving variance of stock prices. As expected, near the end of 1929, 
these changes become much more pronounced. Further, the plausibil 
ity of the argument that consumption declines were the primary driving 
force for the tailspin in output in the early 1930s would be enhanced 
with evidence that monetary policy was not unusually restrictive. Fol 
lowing Temin's argument, Figure 6 shows the interest yield on Trea 
sury securities maturing in three to six months, and at first glance it 
provides support for Temin's claim that monetary policy was not 
"tight" at the outset of the Depression. Specifically, after the rise in 
rates engineered in 1928 by Fed officials concerned with stock market 
speculation, rates began to fall well in advance of the outset of the 
downturn and continued to fall through the middle of 1931. 11 Taken 
together, the casual evidence in Figures 5 and 6 does not obviously dis 
count the hypothesis that consumption shocks played an important role 
in the decline in output.
Debt-Deflation and the Credit View
The debt-deflation hypothesis originated with Fisher (1933), who 
argued that there are two dominant factors that account for the "great" 
booms and depressions: overindebtedness and deflation. To see the 
mechanics by which debt-deflation operates, consider first some initial 
level of nominal debt. A "small" negative price shock raises the real 
obligation of the debtor. At the same time, the creditor is being repaid 
in dollars with higher real value. Under the usual assumption that dis 
tributional effects are at most of second-order importance, little macro- 
economic effect is predicted. Next, assume an initial state of 
overindebtedness. A sufficiently large price decline forces debtors into 
insolvency; nominal incomes fall along with prices, so that not only 
does the real value of the debt obligation rise, the ability to service the 
debt declines. In the event of bankruptcy of the debtor, the creditor (a 
bank, for example), ends up owning the asset. The bank, with a given 
level of nominal liabilities (deposits), finds itself in possession of
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Figure 5 Change in the 12-Month Moving Variance of Stock Prices, 
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assets whose prices are falling and which are costly to sell. The 
decline in prices may lower the nominal value of (illiquid) assets below 
this nominal value of liabilities, forcing insolvency onto the bank as 
well. As banks find their balance sheets becoming increasingly precar 
ious, they may respond by raising the fraction of their assets held in the 
form of "safe" assets (excess reserves and government securities), low 
ering funds available for loans. Further, as bank balance sheets deteri 
orate, concerned depositors may withdraw funds from the bank, 
increasing its vulnerability to a "run." Thus, "excessive" debt com 
bined with deflation may both lower wealth and jeopardize the credit 
intermediation process, contributing to a downward spiral in output 
and prices. If a bank fails, information capital in the form of special 
ized knowledge about borrowers by local creditors is lost. 12
If debt-deflation is to explain at least part of the path of output dur 
ing the Depression, then two important conditions would need to hold. 
First, there should be evidence of overindebtedness, so that price 
declines can have the potential of raising real obligations enough to 
cause a wave of bankruptcies. Second, there should be evidence that a 
major part of the deflation of the early 1930s was unanticipated at the 
time agents assumed debt, either in the open market or in the form of 
bank loans. 13
Was there an "excessive" debt build-up prior to the onset of the 
Depression? This is a difficult question to assess. Fisher recognized 
the complexity of the issue when he noted that overindebtedness is 
always measured relative to a variable such as wealth or income and 
that overindebtedness depends in part on the maturity structure of the 
debt. Further, the assessment may be complicated when relative mea 
sures give conflicting evidence on a debt build-up. 14 Some evidence 
does support the existence of a relatively large rise in debt. First, 
according to Clark (1933), in the early 1930s the ratio of debt service 
to national income rose from 9 percent in 1929 to 20 percent in 1932- 
1933. Second, Persons (1930) reported that urban real estate debt rose 
by nearly 150 percent between 1920 and 1929, from about $11 billion 
to $27 billion. Further, he notes that the $16 billion increase exceeds 
by $5 billion "the entire debt of this character amassed in all the earlier 
years of our urban development." Third, issuance of corporate bonds 
and notes rose from $26 billion in 1920 to $47 billion in 1928.
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The second issue, whether there was unanticipated deflation, has 
been the subject of recent literature, which is currently divided regard 
ing whether the deflation was anticipated or not. The data on whole 
sale and consumer prices are plotted in Figures 7 and 8. Note that 
there was some precedent for deflation, as the data for 1921 show; 
agents would not need long memories to allow for the expectation of 
deflation. However, prices for most of the decade appear stationary, 
albeit with some variability. The most recent data, for agents assessing 
price trends as the end of the decade of the 1920s approached, may 
have suggested continued price stability.
Hamilton (1987, 1992) and Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro (1988) 
present empirical evidence consistent with the view that the deflation 
was unanticipated. However, Cecchetti (1992) critiques Hamilton's 
findings and concludes that once deflation started, people expected it to 
continue. Nelson (1991) presents an extensive and detailed examina 
tion of the statements of business commentators from April 1929 
through December 1930. He concludes that the business press antici 
pated deflation.
While the debt-deflation mechanism can explain a decline in out 
put over the course of a business cycle, can it alone account for the 
massive decline in output experienced in the 1930s? Using the debt- 
deflation hypothesis as a point of departure, Bernanke (1983) presented 
a new explanation of the experience of the U.S. economy in the early 
1930s. In Bernanke's credit-view theory, credit became unavailable for 
all but the very safest loan prospects, and that disrupted economic 
activity by eliminating sources of financing for both investment and 
production. Once the combination of overindebtedness and deflation 
raised problems of debtor insolvency, "the disruption of the financial 
sector by the banking and debt crises raised the real cost of intermedia 
tion between lenders and certain classes of borrowers" (p. 263). Banks 
became unwilling to loan to all but the most creditworthy customers, 
effectively forcing borrowers without access to other sources of credit 
to lower their levels of economic activity. As banks (and other credi 
tors) engage in a "flight to safety," lending only to the safest prospects 
and not at all to others, the interest rate spread between "risky" and 
"safe" loans will widen substantially. This implication is supported in 
the data, as demonstrated in Figure 9, where the spread more than tri 
pled in the early 1930s.
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Figure 7 Wholesale Price Index, January 1921 to December 1937 
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Figure 8 U.S. Cost of Living Index, January 1921 to December 1937 
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Figure 9 Baa Interest Rate Minus Government Bond Interest Rate, 
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In the money view, it is the liability side of the balance sheet of the 
banking system, reflecting the quantity of money, that determines eco 
nomic activity and prices. The asset side, and in particular how bank 
portfolios are allocated between securities and loans, is irrelevant to 
economic outcomes. In the credit view, banks are important not only 
because their liabilities serve as the medium of exchange, but also 
because banks specialize in lending to agents who would find open- 
market borrowing prohibitively expensive. Thus, a monetary policy 
that lowers reserves works not only because of the upward pressure on 
interest rates, as argued by money-view proponents, but also because 
some borrowers do not have alternative sources of funds as bank lend 
ing declines; if bank loans fall, some agents cannot obtain funds else 
where. The corresponding decline in spending then complements the 
interest-rate effect of the restrictive monetary policy.
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HOW IMPORTANT IS EACH THEORY OF THE 
PROPAGATION MECHANISM?
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the various 
hypotheses that purport to explain the downward spiral in output are 
not only plausible, but appear consistent with a casual look at the data. 
Let me caution, however, that we need not necessarily look at these 
hypotheses as competing with one another. One theory may explain 
events over one time period (for example, consumption shocks may 
explain events just after the stock market crash) and another over the 
next time period (for example, credit shocks may explain events subse 
quent to bank panics). And some may complement each other during a 
given period (such as debt-deflation and disruptions to the credit inter 
mediation process). The results of a more sophisticated analysis are 
now examined in the hope that they will allow at least tentative 
answers to the question posed in the title of this section. 15
I have analyzed a model of the U.S. macroeconomy for the inter- 
war period that incorporates each of the hypotheses outlined in the pre 
vious section. As indicated in the introduction, I ignore explicit con 
sideration of international events. Viewing the U.S. experience in 
isolation, while perhaps controversial to some, has as an important pre 
cedent recent work by Romer (1993). She argues that, at least until the 
fall of 1931, domestic factors were the cause of the drop in U.S. output, 
rather than international constraints. 16 In particular, Federal Reserve 
policy decisions (from the tightening in 1928 to curb what was seen as 
excessive stock market speculation to the failure to counteract banking 
panics in 1930 and in both the spring and fall of 1931), rather than 
international events, were likely of primary importance in explaining 
the drop in U.S. production.
Monthly data over the period from January 1921 to December 
1937 are used so as to study the Depression era in the broader context 
of the inter-war period. The data employed are the rate on U.S. gov 
ernment bonds, the Ml measure of money, industrial output, the 
wholesale price index, bank loans made for purposes other than securi 
ties purchases, the spread between the Baa bond rate and the govern 
ment bond rate, the real liabilities of failing banks, and the par value of 
outstanding bonds.
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While most of these data are well known and require no additional 
discussion, the loan series and the bond series require some comment. 
The loan data represent total loans by banks in 101 leading cities net of 
loans made by banks on securities. By netting out loans made on secu 
rities, the resulting loan series should correspond closely to loans made 
for commercial and industrial purposes, the relevant concept for an 
evaluation of the credit view of policy. 17 Note that it is not possible to 
derive a consistent net loan series after 1937, which thus determines 
the ending point for the sample.
The outstanding bond series is intended to represent indebtedness 
of borrowers with access to open-market sources of finance. This 
series is derived by Hickman (1953) and represents the stock of out 
standing corporate bonds of railroads, public utilities, and industrial 
firms. The basic data were annual, with monthly data derived by Hick 
man by adjusting the data for which the month of issue was known so 
that their sum equaled the annual total. Since the months of issue of 
about 95 percent of total par amounts are known, the monthly data 
should be accurate. In addition, Hickman provides a detailed compari 
son of this debt series with those available from other major sources, 
including the Commercial and Financial Chronicle and the Journal of 
Commerce. He is able to reconcile his data with that contained in these 
alternative sources, so that Hickman's degree of confidence in these 
data is high; see Appendix C in Hickman (1953) for detail.
The final data issues of importance relate to the interest rates 
series. First, the government bond rate represents a "safe" interest rate 
on U.S. bonds with 12 or more years to maturity or call date. Second, 
the interest rate spread is intended to proxy for the difference between 
the loan rate at banks for bank-constrained borrowers and a safe market 
rate. Note, however, that the Baa rate corresponds to borrowers who 
have access to open market sources of funds, so that the spread is far 
from a perfect measure of the concept it is intended to measure. How 
ever, due to problems associated with adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and credit rationing, the spread between the loan rate series on bank 
lending and the safe government bond rate may not adequately mea 
sure the premium required by banks to lend to "good" risks. Bernanke 
(1983) represents a precedent for using the interest rate spread em 
ployed here.
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The model estimated and analyzed is a variant of a standard text 
book aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) presentation 
of the macro economy. Underlying the AD schedule are augmented 
versions of the IS and the LM schedules. The usual specifications are 
augmented to account for the market for bank loans and for the volume 
of open-market credit. The IS curve represents, inter alia, the behavior 
of consumption and investment decisions. 18 The IS curve includes as 
arguments bank loans, real open-market debt obligations, and the inter 
est rate spread; these variables are intended to capture the debt-defla 
tion/credit-view impacts on the demand for goods and services. The 
money demand equation underlying the LM schedule includes deposits 
in failing banks as a variable that represents portfolio shifts undertaken 
by agents in response to bank failures or panics. That is, the money 
demand equation includes a proxy for shifts between deposits and cur 
rency that alters the money multiplier, as in the money view. The 
money supply equation underlying the LM schedule includes real 
open-market obligations, bank loans, and the interest rate spread. 
These variables are intended to capture the effects of changes in the 
credit intermediation process on the supply of money, as in the credit 
view. The money supply curve also includes deposits in failing banks 
in an effort to account for the effect of bank failures, as a proxy for the 
excess reserve ratio on the money supply, as in the money view. The 
financial sector is completed with demand and supply equations for 
bank loans, as well as equations explaining bank failures as depending 
on financial distress, as in the credit view, and the volume of open-mar 
ket credit. Finally, a relatively simple aggregate supply curve is speci 
fied; its distinguishing feature is the inclusion of deposits in failing 
banks as an explanatory variable to take into account the effect of a 
decline in working capital on production.
The model described above is analyzed in the following way. Each 
variable in the model contains two parts: a systematic or predictable 
component and a random component or error term. The systematic 
component can be thought of as the "predicted" or "forecast" part of 
the variable; this component represents the "best information" the 
agent has about the future path of the variable, given the model struc 
ture. The random component represents the deviation between the 
actual data and the systematic or forecast component. 19 Finally, the 
model is dynamic, so that random shocks to a variable one period can
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alter the path of other variables over time. By way of terminology, 
breaking down output into its systematic and random components is 
referred to as a "historical decomposition."
As an example of the general procedure outlined in the previous 
paragraph, consider industrial production ("output"). At a point in 
time, output can be forecast into the future; this is the systematic com 
ponent. The error in the forecast—the difference between the forecast 
and the actual path of output—is due to unforeseen shocks in the econ 
omy; this is the random component. This forecast error in output can 
be the result of a variety of shocks to other variables in the economy. 
For example, if banks unexpectedly alter their lending preferences and 
stop lending to some firms, as in the credit view, then output may fall 
relative to the forecast level if firms cannot obtain enough working cap 
ital to finance production. Or, if consumers unexpectedly slow their 
purchases, firms may reduce production to avoid unwanted inventory 
build-up. In general, shocks to all variables can have some effect on 
output.
To see the relative importance of various factors for the path of 
output, begin by considering Figure 10, which shows the forecast or 
"base projection" of industrial production, a 95 percent confidence 
band around the base projection, and the actual path of this measure of 
output. Given the model parameters, the base projection represents the 
path for industrial production that would have been predicted in a fore 
cast made at the beginning of October 1929. Visually, the base projec 
tion completely fails to capture any of the general pattern of actual 
movements in industrial production. Statistically, for the entire period, 
the root mean squared error (RMSE) between the base projection and 
actual industrial production is 40.8 (Table 1).
The remaining figures present two types of visual evidence on the 
difference between the base projection and the actual behavior of out 
put. First, the figures provide a way to see whether the error compo 
nent in some particular variable explains the difference between the 
base projection of output and its actual level. Second, the figures allow 
us to form impressions on whether these errors help reproduce the 
"characteristic phases" (i.e., the turning points and rates of growth) of 
actual output during various subperiods, even in the absence of closing 
the gap between the forecast and the actual path of industrial produc 
tion. The major phases of interest begin with the period between Octo-
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Figure 10 Industrial Production Index, October 1929 to December 1933 
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ber 1929 and January 1931 when the U.S. economy went into a deep, 
but not historically unprecedented, recession. From February 1931 
through May 1931, the economy flattened out. Then output went into a 
tailspin from June 1931 through July 1932. There was an incipient 
recovery from August 1932 until October 1932, which was followed by 
a collapse that hit the bottom in March 1933. The remainder of 1933 
displayed a sharp "spike," in that a rapid recovery began in April, 
peaked in July, and declined to the end of the year.
Figure 11 shows the contribution to the base projection of the 
errors to the money stock, and so approximately corresponds to the 
money view advanced by Friedman and Schwartz. This figure sug 
gests that the money supply shocks contributed to declines in output 
throughout 1930 and again in late 1931. With the exception of a slight 
uptick in output in early 1930 rather than a relatively flat path for actual 
output, these patterns are not obviously at odds with the tightening of 
policy in the late 1920s and the panics in the early 1930s. However, 
accounting for the money stock errors does little to close the gap 
between actual output and its forecast path. A quantitative assessment 
of the role of money supply shocks in determining the path of output is 
presented in Table 1, where the RMSE of the base projection plus the 
contribution of money is 35.7 for the entire period, a reduction of 12.5 
percent from the base projection of industrial production alone. Note, 
however, that for the initial stages of the Depression, i.e., the period 
from the stock market crash through September 1931, the percentage 
improvement in the RMSE is about 20 percent (an RMSE of 19.4 vs. 
24.1).
Figure 12 shows the contribution to the base projection of shocks 
to the IS curve. Note that while this figure is in the spirit of Temin, the 
factors underlying this chart are much broader than those in his origi 
nal hypothesis. In particular, the shocks underlying the IS curve 
include, in addition to consumption shocks, shocks to investment and 
shocks from elsewhere in the world. 20 With this caveat, it should none 
theless be noted that the IS shocks underlying the early months in Fig 
ure 12 are unlikely to be due to exports; exports rose by about 3 percent 
between 1928 and 1929, and real exports were a relatively small frac 
tion of GNP. As is evident from Figure 12, over the first several 
months after the stock market crash, IS shocks roughly mimic the mon 
etary shocks displayed in Figure 11, showing an initial decline fol-
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Figure 11 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Money Supply, 
October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 12 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve, 
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lowed by a modest rise in early 1930. From mid 1930 on, however, IS 
shocks appear to provide a more complete explanation of both the 
actual path of output and the characteristic phases of output during the 
Depression era. More precisely, the results reported in Table 1 show 
that the IS shocks nearly halve the RMSE of the base projection for the 
period ending in December 1933. These IS shocks also dominate the 
monetary shock explanation for the initial phase of the Depression, but 
not nearly so completely as for the entire period. For the initial phase, 
the RMSE of the base projection falls from 24.1 to 17.0, a 30 percent 
improvement. Note, however, that most of the improvement relative to 
the monetary explanation appears to occur after late 1930, so the initial 
months of the Depression don't seem to be dominated by either theory.
Figure 13 shows the ability of the debt-deflation hypothesis to 
account for the path of output. Note that this plot represents the effects 
of deflation without the complementary effects associated with the 
credit view; independent shocks associated with the credit view are 
discussed below. However, compared with the monetary explanation, 
deflation surprises provide some explanatory power for the path of out 
put, especially over the entire period. The notable aspect of this figure 
is that, unlike the results displayed in Figures 10, 11, and 12, the defla 
tion shocks do not produce a path in which output rises in late 1929 
and early 1930. The RMSE associated with the initial two years of the 
Depression is 18.2, midway between those for money and IS shocks. 
For the period ending in December 1933, the RMSE for the base pro 
jection plus the effects of deflation surprises is 30.9.
Figure 14 provides a representation of the credit view, where 
shocks to the market for bank loans and the interest rate differential are 
combined with the base projection of output. Visual inspection sug 
gests that, like shocks to the IS curve but unlike the monetary and 
deflation explanations, the credit view reasonably captures the charac 
teristic phases of the period. Notice in particular that industrial pro 
duction tends to fall in periods following banking panics in this plot, 
consistent with firms being forced to lower production due to drops in 
the availability of working capital. However, as reported in Table 1, 
the credit view explains less of the scale effects of the Depression than 
does the debt-deflation hypothesis, with a full period RMSE of 33.3 
and an initial period RMSE of 24.2. Of particular interest to credit- 
view proponents should be the declines in output accounted for by
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Figure 13 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Deflation, 
October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 14 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Loans and 
Interest Rate Differential, October 1929 to December 1933 
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shocks in the bank loan market around the first and second banking 
panics in late 1930 and mid 1931, and the accounting for rising output 
following the bank holiday in 1933.
Given that shocks to the IS curve generate the lowest RMSEs and 
most accurately capture the characteristic phases of the Depression 
over the full horizon, the remaining charts investigate the joint abilities 
of shocks to the IS curve and other explanations of the Depression to 
account for the path of output.
Consider Figure 15, which shows the joint contributions of shocks 
to the IS curve and the money supply; roughly, this plot represents the 
combined effects of the time-honored explanations of Temin and 
Friedman and Schwartz. Compared with Figure 12, the addition of 
money tends to bring the projected path of industrial production some 
what closer to the actual path. Specifically, as reported in Table 1, the 
RMSE of the base projection plus both IS shocks and money supply 
shocks is 17.7 for the full period, in contrast to an RMSE of 21.8 for 
the contribution of IS shocks alone; thus, the addition of money supply 
shocks lowers the RMSE by about 19 percent relative to the RMSE 
associated with IS shocks alone. Roughly the same percentage 
improvement occurs during the first two years of the Depression.
Figure 16 shows the joint contributions of IS and deflation shocks. 
As compared with Figure 12, the inclusion of deflationary shocks 
allows a closer description of the path of output than do just the IS 
shocks. This appearance is confirmed in Table 1, where the RMSE for 
the projected path relative to the actual path is 14.2 for the full period 
and where it is 11.9 for the initial phase of the Depression.
Figure 17 combines the base projection with shocks to the IS curve 
and the variables associated with the credit view. Unlike previously 
described alternatives, the output decline is noticeably faster after the 
second banking panic in 1931 and most closely parallels the upward 
spike in output after the 1933 bank holiday. However, this combina 
tion of IS shocks with the credit view shocks does not provide much 
initial explanatory power for the early part of the Depression. Thus, 
the RMSE for this combination is 17.1 over the first two years of the 
era (about the same as for IS shocks alone) but is 16.8 for the entire 
period.
Finally, Figure 18 combines the deflationary shocks associated 
with the debt-deflation hypothesis with those from the money view and
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Figure 15 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve + 
Money Supply, October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 16 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve 
Deflation, October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 17 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve +
Loans and Rate Differential, October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 18 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve + 
Money Supply + Deflation, October 1929 to December 1933 
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the autonomous shocks influencing the IS curve. While not capturing 
all of the Depression, the implied multicausal view of propagation of 
the Depression does capture most of the drop in output and closely 
describes the characteristic phases of the period, with the exception of 
the early months of 1930.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, for the 
period as a whole, there does not appear to be a single, dominant expla 
nation of the Depression; no factor alone can explain both the magni 
tude of the decline in output along with the characteristic phases of the 
Depression. Overall, the factor that does the "best" at explaining the 
various facts is the shock term to the IS curve. This term probably rep 
resents consumption early in the horizon, but later also probably 
reflects shocks to investment, fiscal policy, and external events.
Second, as indicated in Table 1, among shocks to the individual 
equations, those to the IS curve produce the lowest RMSE over the two 
years following the stock market crash. However, as was visually evi 
dent from Figures 11 to 14, only the debt-deflation hypothesis, as 
embedded in deflation surprises, suggested a downward path for output 
at the onset of the Depression. In fact, the RMSE for the base projec 
tion alone for the first year following the crash was 12.8. Among the 
various theories, only the RMSE associated with the debt-deflation 
hypothesis (10.6) shows a noticeable drop in the RMSE through Sep 
tember 1930; the RMSE associated with money was 12.6, with IS 
shocks was 13.2, and with shocks to the bank loan market was 13.0. 
This result seems to suggest that further investigation of the role of 
deflationary surprises may be warranted.
Third, the credit view that disruptions to the market for bank loans 
help explain the depth and length of the Depression is consistent with 
the data presented here. Specifically, the credit view seems to work 
well in explaining the rate of decline in output around the banking pan 
ics in the early 1930s.
Fourth, note that the credit view appears to contain explanatory 
power over the period from the stock market crash through the end of
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1933, even in the presence of money shocks. This result stands in 
some contrast to that of Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz, who argue 
that for an earlier period, the evidence for the credit view is weakened 
by the presence of the money stock.
Notes
This research was supported by a Summer Research Grant from the College of Busi 
ness and Economics of the University of Kentucky. The grant was made possible by a 
donation of funds to the College by Ashland Oil, Inc.
1. This theory was first proposed by Irving Fisher (1933). Recently, Calomiris and 
Hubbard (1989) and Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz (1992) have addressed 
some of the issues that arise in debt-deflation. Calomiris and Hubbard estimated a 
"credit view" model of the 1884-1909 period; Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz 
investigated "hybrid credit view" and "hybrid money view" models that attempt to 
sort out the relative roles of money and credit for economic activity over 1880- 
1914, a period that encompasses the Calomiris-Hubbard period. In contrast to 
these papers, the focus of this paper is (most of) the inter-war period, 1921-1937.
2. Eichengreen (1992) has argued that the breakdown of the gold standard that had 
governed international monetary arrangements prior to World War I and again 
over the first part of the inter-war period was the driving force behind the sharp 
and protracted decline in output. I do not address this explanation for the propa 
gation mechanism explicitly. However, as argued by Bernanke (1994), the "com 
parative approach" to understanding the Depression stimulated by the rise and fall 
of the gold standard in the inter-war period enhances the confidence in model 
identification when assessing the Depression experience of an individual country.
3. The data plotted in Figure 2 are for the Ml stock of money. A plot of M2 shows 
the same pattern of steep declines over the early 1920s.
4. Recent support for this hypothesis is presented by Schwartz (1981) and McCal- 
lum (1990). Schwartz presents Granger-causality tests consistent with the 
hypothesis of unidirectional causality from money to income during the Depres 
sion. McCallum demonstrates with counterfactual simulations that a monetary 
base rule aimed at keeping nominal GNP growing smoothly at a noninflationary 
rate would have avoided most of the decline in output during the 1930s. However, 
other evidence suggests that there remains room for additional explanations. For 
example, Gordon and Wilcox (1981) argue that money does not play an important 
role in the decline in output in the initial stages of the Depression. Burbidge and 
Harrison (1985) report similar results.
5. Recall that deposit insurance was not introduced until later in the decade.
6. Mishkin (1978) discusses the effect on wealth of the stock market crash. It seems 
clear that consumption in 1929 was adversely affected by the crash.
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7. Recent research supportive of Temin's view is provided by Romer (1988) and 
Flacco and Parker (1992), who argue that consumption fell due to increased 
uncertainty. Support for the premise of increased uncertainty is included in Nel 
son (1991), who documents accounts from the contemporary business press. 
Arguments attempting to refute the basic Temin hypothesis are included in Mayer 
(1978), Meltzer (1976), and Hamilton (1987).
8. Hamilton (1987) convincingly demonstrated that monetary policy was contrac 
tionary as early as January 1928. It follows that Temin must implicitly believe 
that monetary policy does not operate with a lag in its effect on real economic 
activity in order for the thrust of his nonmonetary arguments to go through. 
Moreover, if this is not believed, "much of the substance of Temin's objection dis 
appears" (Hamilton 1987, p. 155). Given a constant real money stock and falling 
nominal interest rates, Hamilton also concludes that Temin's position—that shifts 
in the IS curve are more important than shifts in the LM curve—"seems to be little 
more than an a priori specification that the parameters are such that monetary pol 
icy was unlikely to exert much of an effect on the economy anyway" (p. 158).
9. Romer's discussion of uncertainty is in terms of its impact on consumption and at 
face value may be viewed as supportive of the Temin explanation of the Depres 
sion. However, Romer's analysis is also consistent with other explanations of the 
Depression, since what matters is the impact of uncertainty on consumption rather 
than the source of the uncertainty.
10. There are, of course, many reasons other than stock market volatility that can 
explain why uncertainty would have persisted beyond 1929 and increased subse 
quent to mid 1930. Events such as massive unanticipated deflation, the Hawley- 
Smoot tariffs, Federal Reserve inaction, excessive government optimism, political 
dissension over the proper economic course, the doubling of tax rates in 1932, the 
failure of the Bank of the United States, the collapse of the Kredit-anstalt in Aus 
tria, Britain's departure from the gold standard, and the near complete collapse of 
the U.S. financial system are some sources of uncertainty that could well have 
kept consumption depressed for the entire October 1929-March 1933 period. 
Indeed, increasing uncertainty may have been pervasive up until March 1933, 
when the government finally stepped in.
11. Note, of course, that the plot shows a nominal rate of interest. If the rate of defla 
tion is high, then real rates may be high even though nominal rates are low. If the 
ultimate impact of monetary policy on the economy is through real rates of inter 
est, then low nominal interest rates can be consistent with restrictive monetary 
policy.
12. In Fisher's analysis, other factors such as the quantity of money, its velocity, busi 
ness confidence, and interest rates play secondary roles in the propagation of eco 
nomic fluctuations.
13. Suppose for a moment that the deflation is anticipated. Rational borrowers and 
lenders would take the anticipated deflation into account when drafting the loan 
contract. This might take the form of specifying the repayment schedule in real 
terms (e.g., adjusting the loan payments for movements in a broadly based price
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index such as the consumer price index) or altering the term to maturity of the 
loan (e.g., arranging for repayment to be complete prior to the onset of the defla 
tion if it is expected to occur some reasonable amount of time in the future), or 
some other type of arrangement. That is, presumably most of the debt burden 
leading to insolvency and bankruptcy can be avoided if the deflation is foreseen,
14. As a contemporary example, consider the evidence presented in Bernanke and 
Campbell (1988) for the decade of the 1980s in which, at least from the perspec 
tive of the popular press, there was a period of "excessive" debt build-up. This 
view can be supported from the perspective of the ratio of interest payments to 
firm cash flow. However, corporate debt-equity ratios did not change much in the 
1980s and were below their peaks attained in the 1973-74 recession. Thus, deter 
mination of whether there existed excessive debt in the period leading up to the 
Depression, for which data are not nearly as complete as are available today, may 
not be easy to discern.
15. Technical details on the model are included in an appendix, available from the 
author on request.
16. In September 1931, Britain left the gold standard. A fear of devaluation may have 
led foreign depositors to withdraw funds from the U.S. financial system. Domes 
tic agents responded by raising their currency/deposit ratios, afraid that flows of 
funds from an already-weakened banking sector could result in additional losses 
for depositors. However, just prior to Britain leaving gold, the United States held 
about 40 percent of the world's monetary gold stock, so these fears may not have 
been justified. That is, primary focus on domestic events beyond the fall of 1931 
may still be approximately correct.
17. In practice, of course, some of these loans are likely made to borrowers who are 
not constrained to borrow from banks; the data likely mix bank-constrained bor 
rowers with nonconstrained borrowers. However, we will generally interpret the 
loan series as representing bank-constrained borrowers.
18. As indicated earlier, shocks to the IS curve also may originate elsewhere in the 
world. These shocks are not considered explicitly in the model.
19. Notice that the sum of the systematic and random components equals the data 
itself.
20. Shocks from the international economy are not explicitly modeled here, but rather 
are subsumed in the errors terms.
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5 Monetary Policy in the Great 
Depression and Beyond
The Sources of the Fed's Inflation Bias
David C. Wheelock 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced his "New Eco 
nomic Policy." Nixon's plan included two features that reflected on the 
state of American monetary policy. First, to combat inflation, Nixon 
imposed wage and price controls; and, second, in response to Amer 
ica's long-running and worsening international payments deficit, 
Nixon suspended convertibility of the dollar into gold. Both policies 
were intended to be temporary. Wage and price controls were tempo 
rary, but the gold window appears to be permanently shut, and the dol 
lar has floated against other currencies since 1973.
The imposition of wage and price controls and suspension of dollar 
convertibility reflected the failure of U.S. monetary policy to control 
inflation under the prevailing international monetary regime—the Bret- 
ton Woods System. Although Bretton Woods was at its heart a gold 
standard, it did not impose the same level of discipline on monetary 
policy that the pre-war gold standard had. Under the classical gold 
standard, market-driven gold outflows would limit inflationary money 
supply growth and provide long-run price stability. Bretton Woods was 
a gold standard managed by central banks, however, and with central 
bank cooperation a country could run a long-term payments deficit if 
other countries were willing to hold its currency. The Bretton Woods 
System ultimately collapsed because other countries became unwilling 
to hold dollars and because the United States was unwilling to impose 
a monetary policy on itself that would ensure convertibility of dollars 
into gold.
The United States had confronted a similar choice before. In 1931, 
uncertainty about the ability or willingness of the United States to 
remain on the gold standard precipitated gold outflows that forced
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American monetary authorities to make a decision. They could choose 
to defend their gold reserve by tightening monetary policy or they 
could suspend convertibility of the dollar into gold. In the midst of the 
Great Depression, Federal Reserve officials understood that a tighter 
monetary policy might worsen the downturn, but to preserve the gold 
standard they chose to raise interest rates and allow a contraction of 
bank reserves.
In this paper, I argue that American officials chose to abandon gold 
in 1971 because of institutional and ideological changes brought about 
by the Great Depression. Key changes included a new avenue for 
monetizing federal government debt, a weakening of the Federal 
Reserve System's insulation from political interference, and a new eco 
nomic policy ideology that doubted the stability of private markets and 
prescribed government management of aggregate demand.
The most important change for monetary policy stemming from 
the Great Depression concerned the gold standard. In 1931, Federal 
Reserve officials viewed the gold standard as fundamental to long-run 
economic prosperity and were willing to defend the system even if it 
meant taking actions that would worsen the ongoing Depression. In 
1971, U.S. economic policymakers no longer viewed the gold standard 
in this way and were unwilling to tighten monetary policy to preserve 
the gold standard, even though the United States had a rising rate of 
inflation and a growing economy. The choice to abandon Bretton 
Woods was made, I argue, because the Great Depression had weakened 
the ideological underpinnings of the gold standard. 1
During the Depression, the gold standard had failed to preserve 
prosperity for those countries with even the largest reserve holdings, 
and suspension proved to be a prerequisite for recovery in most coun 
tries (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985). Although many people continued 
to view the gold standard and fixed exchange rates positively, most 
believed that the gold standard required the management of govern 
ment officials. Thus, after World War II, the managed gold standard of 
Bretton Woods supplanted the pre-war gold standard. Under Bretton 
Woods, the United States was able to run an inflationary monetary pol 
icy without the swift discipline of gold outflows. The initial impetus 
for inflation resulted from other changes—increased political pressure 
on the Fed and attempts to stimulate output by increasing aggregate 
demand, for example, as well as from flaws in the Fed's basic operat-
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ing strategy. But under Bretton Woods, inflation could gather substan 
tial momentum before policymakers were forced to confront the 
consequences of their policies. In the face of a hemorrhaging balance 
of payments deficit and no strong ideological attachment to gold, Bret 
ton Woods collapsed and external constraints on domestic monetary 
policy were abandoned.
This paper begins with an overview of monetary policy during the 
Great Depression. By many (though not all) possible measures, mone 
tary policy was exceptionally contractionary during 1929-1933, and I 
examine why the Fed pursued such a policy during this period. Next, I 
identify and discuss key institutional changes to the monetary policy 
environment that resulted directly from the Great Depression. I argue 
that these changes help explain the inflation bias of the Fed's post- 
World War II monetary policy. Finally, I describe the Federal 
Reserve's response, or lack thereof, to the growing balance of pay 
ments deficits leading up to the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, and 
how the decision to abandon gold in 1971 was a legacy of the Great 
Depression.
MONETARY POLICY IN THE FIRST PHASE 
OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
By almost any measure, monetary policy during the period 1929— 
1933 was a disaster: the money supply and price level both fell by one- 
third, ex post real interest rates reached double digits, and banks failed 
by the thousands (Table 1). How could the Fed have let this happen?
The explanations for the Fed's disastrous monetary policy during 
the Great Depression largely fall into two categories. One attributes 
policy failures to innocent mistakes or neglect, while the other con 
tends that the Fed willfully engineered contractionary monetary policy 
to foster bureaucratic objectives, or in response to interest group pres 
sure. Although some political scientists and public choice economists 
favor the latter explanation (e.g., Epstein and Ferguson 1984; Ander- 
son, Shughart, and Tollison 1988), most economists and economic his 
torians blame the Fed's policy on misguided policy rules, as well as on







































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: The value in each "% change" column refers to year-to-year differences in the logs of the series to the left.
a $ billions (Historical Statistics 1960, Fl).
b $ billions, 1929 prices (Historical Statistics 1960, F3).
c 1947-1949 = 100 (Historical Statistics 1960, El 13).
d $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Appendix Al).
e $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Appendix Al).
f Suspended banks (Board of Governors 1943, p. 283).
g Deposits in suspended banks, $ thousands (Board of Governors 1943, p. 283).
h Yearly average yield on 3-6 month Treasury notes and certificates (1919-1933) and bills (1934-1941)
(Board of Governors 1943, p. 460). 
1 Short-term government yield less CPI inflation rate in same year.
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petty jealousies that limited the Fed's ability to respond decisively to 
rapidly changing conditions.
The most prominent explanation of Federal Reserve behavior dur 
ing the Great Depression is that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who 
argue that a distinct shift in policy occurred with the death in 1928 of 
Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Like Fisher (1935) before them, Friedman and Schwartz contend that 
Strong understood how to employ the tools of monetary policy to min 
imize cyclical fluctuations in output and prices and to prevent or limit 
financial panics. His death created a void of both leadership and 
understanding that left the Fed unresponsive to financial crises, bank 
runs, and their contractionary effects.
Under Strong's leadership, the Fed had used the tools at its dis 
posal to pursue both domestic and international objectives (Wheelock 
1991). Large open-market purchases and discount rate reductions in 
1924 and 1927 were apparent attempts both to encourage domestic 
economic growth and to enable Great Britain to attract gold reserves 
(by lowering U.S. interest rates relative to those in Britain). Open-mar 
ket sales and discount rate hikes in 1928-1929, on the other hand, were 
intended to discourage stock market speculation, which at least some 
Fed officials viewed as a manifestation of inflation.
On the surface, the Fed seems to have been less responsive to the 
Depression than it had been to earlier, smaller, cyclical downturns. 
Table 2 presents a rough comparison of Federal Reserve actions during 
the initial phase of the Great Depression (1929-1931) with Fed actions 
during the recessions of 1924 and 1927. The Fed's Index of Industrial 
Production serves as a measure of economic activity. The index 
declined approximately 20 points from the cyclical peak in April 1923 
to the trough in July 1924. The recession of 1927 was considerably 
more modest—the index declined 11 points from October 1926 to 
October 1927. By contrast, the Index of Industrial Production declined 
by 42 points between July 1929 and July 1931 and by another 9 points 
from July 1931 to October 1931. In terms of the Fed's basic policy 
tools—the discount rate and open-market purchases of government 
securities—the Fed was much less vigorous in 1929-1931 than it had 
been in response to the smaller recessions of 1924 and 1927. This fact, 
along with the occurrence of banking panics and sharp declines in the 
money stock and price level during 1929-1931, lead Friedman and
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SOURCE: Board of Governors (1937), pp. 175-177 for IP, and Board of Governors 
(1943), pp. 370-371 for GS and DL, pp. 440-441 for DR, pp. 450-451 for /, and p. 400 
forDL(NYC). 
Definitions:
IP: Index of Industrial Production (seasonally adjusted) 
GS: Federal Reserve System's holdings of government securities (in $ mil 
lions) 
DR: discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (in %)
i: commercial paper interest rate (in %) 
DL: borrowed reserves of Fed member banks (in $ millions) 
DL (NYC): borrowed reserves of New York City Fed member banks (in $ millions)
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Schwartz (1963) to conclude that the intent and implementation of 
monetary policy during the Great Depression were dramatically differ 
ent from what they had been in 1924 and 1927. 2
Despite the Fed's weak response to the Depression, some research 
ers argue that policy changed little, if at all, with Benjamin Strong's 
death (e.g., Wicker 1966; Brunner and Meltzer 1968; Wheelock 1991). 
During the Depression, the Fed used borrowed reserves (discount-win 
dow loans) and market interest rates as policy guides. 3 When member 
banks borrowed relatively little from the Federal Reserve discount win 
dow or market interest rates were unusually low, Fed officials inter 
preted monetary conditions as "easy." Conversely, high levels of 
borrowed reserves or high interest rates signaled that money was 
"tight." Once the Depression began, both borrowed reserves and inter 
est rates fell sharply and generally remained low, giving Fed officials 
the impression that money was plentiful and "cheap."
The Fed's use of discount-window borrowing and interest rates as 
policy guides during the Depression appears consistent with the policy 
framework that Benjamin Strong had outlined when he was running 
the Fed. Speaking to Federal Reserve officials in 1926, for example, 
Strong described his rule of thumb for determining how to use open- 
market policy during a recession:
Should we go into a business recession while the member 
banks were continuing to borrow directly 500 or 600 million 
dollars ... we should consider taking steps to relieve some of 
the pressure which this borrowing induces by purchasing gov 
ernment securities and thus enabling member banks to reduce 
their indebtedness . . .
As a guide to the timing and extent of any [open-market] pur 
chases which might appear desirable, one of our best guides 
would be the amount of borrowing by member banks in princi 
pal centers . . . Our experience has shown that when New York 
City banks are borrowing in the neighborhood of 100 million 
dollars or more, there is then some real pressure for reducing 
loans, and money rates tend to be markedly higher than the dis 
count rate . . . When member banks are owing us about 50 mil 
lion dollars or less the situation appears to be comfortable, with 
no marked pressure for liquidation, (quoted by Chandler 1958, 
pp. 239-240)
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By Strong's guidelines, additional open-market purchases were not 
called for in 1929-1931. The borrowed reserves (discount loans) of all 
Fed member banks as well as those of New York City banks declined 
far below their levels of 1924 and 1927 (Table 2). Similarly, money 
market interest rates were unusually low in 1930-1931. Thus, by 
Strong's measures, the stance of monetary policy in 1930-1931 
appears to have been quite easy. Policymakers inferred that there was 
little more the Fed could, or should, do, and that it was now up to the 
economy to respond. As Strong (1926, p. 468) had said on another 
occasion, "The Reserve Banks do not push credit into use" (emphasis 
in original).
Many economists have noted that rigid use of borrowed reserves or 
interest rates as policy instruments will cause the money supply to rise 
and fall procyclically because borrowed reserves and interest rates tend 
to vary positively with economic activity. Moreover, the banking cri 
ses of 1929-1933 made borrowed reserves an especially poor indicator 
of monetary conditions during the Depression because a fear of runs 
made banks especially reluctant to suggest any weakness to depositors, 
which discount-window borrowing might do (Wheelock 1991). 
Although a few System officials questioned the reliability of borrowed 
reserves as a policy guide during the Depression, the prevailing view 
was that monetary conditions were exceptionally easy and that the 
economy's failure to expand was not the fault of monetary policy. We 
cannot say for certain whether monetary policy would have been dif 
ferent during 1929-1931 had Benjamin Strong lived, but it does seem 
to have been consistent with Strong's response to business cycle down 
turns in 1924 and 1927 and the guidelines for assessing the stance of 
monetary policy he had outlined.
THE GOLD CRISIS OF 1931
Federal Reserve policy during the initial phase of the Great 
Depression—from the stock market crash in October 1929 through 
September 1931—was largely predictable from the policy guidelines 
followed by Benjamin Strong during the 1920s. But interest rates and 
discount-window borrowing shot up dramatically in the fourth week of
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September 1931 and remained high until early 1932. During this 
period, the Fed raised its discount rate but failed to make significant 
open-market purchases, even though the Depression was getting worse 
and monetary conditions were exceptionally restrictive.
The year 1931 was marked by a series of financial crises that led to 
suspension of the gold standard by a number of European countries, 
culminating with Great Britain on September 21. Following Britain's 
departure from gold, speculation that the United States would soon fol 
low triggered a massive gold outflow from the United States and atten 
dant decline in commercial bank reserves. The Federal Reserve acted 
to stem the outflow by raising its discount rate—the classic defense— 
but did not use open-market operations to replace the outflow of com 
mercial bank reserves.
In the six weeks ending October 28, 1931, the monetary gold stock 
of the United States declined by $727 million, or some 15 percent. At 
this point, the gold stock stabilized, but uncertainty about the condition 
of American banks caused bank customers to redeem their deposits for 
currency. Between mid September and the end of December, currency 
held by the public rose $544 million (11 percent). Banks borrowed 
heavily from the Federal Reserve to replace reserves lost from deposit 
redemptions for gold and currency, even though the Fed had increased 
its discount rate from 1.5 percent to 3.5 percent. 4
The Fed made virtually no open-market purchases of government 
securities during the crisis. On February 24, 1932, the Fed's security 
portfolio was the same size that it had been on September 16, 1931, 
and thus open-market operations had contributed nothing toward off 
setting the gold and currency outflows. While increased discount-win 
dow borrowing offset these outflows somewhat, member bank total 
reserves still fell by $540 million, or 22 percent, between mid Septem 
ber and the end of February.
On the surface, the Fed's behavior in the fourth quarter of 1931 
appears inconsistent both with Benjamin Strong's policy guidelines 
and with appropriate lender of last resort policy. As Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963, pp. 315-322) describe, the Fed had acted to halt an 
"external drain" of reserves from the banking system (gold outflows), 
but not the "internal drain" (conversion of deposits into currency).
The Fed argued that it had not made open-market purchases during 
the crisis of 1931 because its own reserve position was in jeopardy.
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The Federal Reserve Banks were required to maintain gold reserves 
equal to 40 percent of their notes outstanding and 35 percent of their 
deposit liabilities (which consisted mainly of member bank reserve 
accounts). In addition, the Reserve Banks were required to hold collat 
eral in the form of gold or eligible securities against their note issues 
(gold held as reserves also counted as collateral). Finally, the Reserve 
Banks were required to deposit gold with the U.S. Treasury equal to at 
least 5 percent of their note issues that were collateralized by securi 
ties.
Securities eligible for use as collateral for Federal Reserve note 
issues included bankers acceptances and commercial notes the Reserve 
Banks had purchased or discounted for member banks, but not govern 
ment securities acquired in the open market. Thus, purchases of gov 
ernment securities increased Fed liabilities but did not add to the 
collateral backing them, and so the Fed had to hold excess reserves 
before it could engage in open-market purchases. 5
From July to October 1931, Federal Reserve Bank gold reserves 
declined from over 84 percent of Fed liabilities to 63 percent. 
Although the Fed still had sufficient gold to cover its gold reserve 
requirement, some of its excess gold reserve was used as collateral for 
Reserve Bank note issues. Consequently, the Fed's "free gold," i.e., the 
amount of gold not currently pledged as reserves or collateral, dwin 
dled.
In its 1932 Annual Report, the Federal Reserve Board implied that 
a lack of free gold reserves had kept it from purchasing government 
securities during the 1931 crisis, and it noted that large purchases had 
followed enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of February 27, 1932, 
which had expanded the types of securities that were eligible for use as 
collateral for Fed liabilities to include U.S. government securities (see 
also the Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1932). Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963, pp. 399-406) contend that the Fed's claim that a lack 
of free gold had prevented open-market purchases was a ruse, though 
others, such as Epstein and Ferguson (1984, pp. 964-965) argue that 
Fed officials truly felt constrained by a lack of reserves.
Regardless of whether or not the Fed was constrained by its collat 
eral requirement, the System had another option—the Federal Reserve 
Board had the right to suspend the Fed's reserve requirements. I am 
aware of no evidence that the Fed considered suspension, however.
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Wicker (1966, pp. 169-170) argues that Fed officials feared that open- 
market purchases would exacerbate gold outflows by increasing doubt 
about the Fed's resolve to maintain the value of the dollar in terms of 
gold over the long run. Presumably these officials believed that sus 
pension of the Fed's reserve requirements would also cause gold out 
flows, and hence that a combination of suspension and open-market 
purchases was untenable.
DID THE FED FOLLOW GOLD STANDARD ORTHODOXY?
Fed officials believed strongly in preserving the gold standard, and 
at first glance their policy actions appear to have reflected gold stan 
dard doctrine. But, two aspects of policy—the Fed's delay in raising 
its discount rate following Britain's suspension of the gold standard, 
and the Fed's long-time policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on 
the domestic money supply—suggest otherwise.
Wicker (1996, pp. 86-94) argues that the gold standard played 
only a "minor" role in the discount rate increases of October 1931, cit 
ing the fact that the discount rate was not increased until two and one- 
half weeks after Britain suspended gold payments and the United 
States had experienced heavy gold outflows. As further evidence, he 
cites meeting records of the board of directors of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York in which George Harrison, Governor of the New 
York Fed, argued against raising rates in the wake of Britain's action 
and then buried defense of gold among other reasons when later advo 
cating a discount rate increase. Wicker argues that the Fed's policy 
was thus not a "knee-jerk" response to gold standard conventions.
Chandler (1971, p. 177) interprets the Fed's delay in raising its dis 
count rate somewhat differently. He argues that some Fed officials 
believed that a discount rate increase might suggest weakness and 
thereby exacerbate gold outflows, though fear that a rate increase 
might hurt the economy also played some part in the delay. Moreover, 
other Federal Reserve policymakers did press for an immediate dis 
count rate increase to defend the gold standard. Fed Governor Eugene 
Meyer, for example, argued that "an advance in the rate was called for 
by every known rule, and . . . foreigners would regard it as a lack of
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courage if the rate were not advanced" (quoted by Wicker 1996, p. 93). 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 383) cite a memorandum prepared 
for a meeting of the Fed's Open Market Committee in November 1931, 
which concluded that the "foreign and domestic drains upon bank 
reserves were met in the classic way by increases in the discount rate 
combined with a policy of free lending." Although disputing the 
memo's conclusion regarding the policy's efficacy, Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) agree that the Fed had sought to maintain the gold 
standard.
Besides the delay in raising the discount rate in 1931, the Fed's 
long-standing policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on the domes 
tic money stock also suggests that the Fed was not fully committed to 
the gold standard. Gold standard doctrine (the "rules of the game") 
held that gold inflows (outflows) should be permitted to increase 
(decrease) a country's money stock and price level so as to induce 
shifts in capital flows and the balance of trade that would limit future 
gold movements. 6 Since the early 1920s, however, the Fed had largely 
offset reserve fluctuations caused by flows of gold, currency, and other 
sources by varying the quantity of reserves supplied by open-market 
operations and discount-window lending. In essence, the Fed "steril 
ized" gold flows, as Benjamin Strong explained in 1926:
In the old days there was a direct relation between the coun 
try's stock of gold, bank deposits and the price level because 
bank deposits were . . . based on the stock of gold and bore a 
constant relationship to the gold stock . . . But in recent years 
the relationship between gold and bank deposits is no longer as 
close or direct . . . because the Federal Reserve System has 
given elasticity to the country's bank reserves . . . Federal 
Reserve bank credit is an elastic buffer between the country's 
gold supply and bank credit. (Strong 1926, p. 470)
Moreover, Strong credited the Fed with preventing inflation by offset 
ting gold inflows in 1921 and 1922:
As the flow of gold imports was pouring into the United States 
in 1921 and 1922, many economists abroad, and in this country 
as well, expected this inward flow of gold would result in a 
huge credit expansion and a serious price inflation. That no 
such expansion or inflation has taken place is due to the fact 
that the amount of Federal Reserve credit in use was dimin-
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ished as gold imports continued. Thus . . . the presence of the 
Reserve System may be said to have prevented rather than fos 
tered inflation. (Strong 1926, p. 471)
Although the Fed generally sterilized gold flows, it proved willing 
to deviate from that policy when it seemed necessary to protect the 
gold standard. The easing of monetary policy in 1924 and 1927 seems 
at least partly motivated by a desire to repel gold inflows and thereby 
assist Britain's ability to maintain gold reserves (Wicker 1966; Whee 
lock 1991). Moreover, when gold outflows reduced the Fed's reserve 
ratio in 1920-1921, the Fed increased its discount rate to 7 percent (a 
level not reached again until 1973) and endured a sharp deflation in 
order to preserve its gold reserve. This episode demonstrated the Fed's 
resolve to maintain its gold reserve and set the precedent for its policy 
in late 1931. Benjamin Strong may have "discovered" and actively 
used open-market policy, but he was unwilling to conduct policy out 
side the framework of the gold standard. He testified in 1928 that
When you are speaking of efforts simply to stabilize com 
merce, industry, agriculture, employment and so on, without 
regard to the penalties of violation of the gold standard, you 
are talking about human judgment and the management of 
prices which I do not believe in at all. (quoted by Burgess 
1930, p. 331)
Like Strong, Federal Reserve officials in 1931 viewed preservation 
of the gold standard as fundamental to long-run economic stability, and 
to preserve the gold standard for the long-term they were willing to 
undertake policies that might be destabilizing in the short run. Their 
response to the gold crisis of 1931 may have sealed the fate of Herbert 
Hoover and the Republicans in Congress, however, and ensured the 
election of politicians who would prove willing to change dramatically 
the institutions of monetary policymaking in the United States, includ 
ing the gold standard.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES TO THE MONETARY 
POLICY REGIME
The year 1932 marked the beginning of a series of institutional 
reforms with potentially large consequences for monetary policy 
(Table 3). 7 Among the most significant were the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1932, which permitted the Federal Reserve to use government securi 
ties to back its note issues; suspension of the international gold stan 
dard by executive order on March 6, 1933 (ratified by Congress on 
March 9); the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933, which, among other things, permitted the Federal Reserve to 
adjust commercial bank reserve requirements; the Gold Reserve Act of 
1934, which authorized the President to fix the dollar price of gold and 
established the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund; and the Bank 
ing Act of 1935, which markedly altered the structure of the Federal 
Reserve System and expanded the Fed's authority to adjust reserve 
requirements.
By permitting U.S. government securities to serve as backing for 
Federal Reserve notes, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 removed an 
important constraint on discretionary monetary policy and enhanced 
the Fed's ability to initiate transactions that monetized government 
debt. 8 Although he lent his name to the enabling legislation, Carter 
Glass, who had sponsored the original Federal Reserve Act, apparently 
voiced considerable worry about the inflationary potential of permit 
ting government obligations to serve as collateral for Federal Reserve 
notes (Chandler 1971, p. 189). I argue below that Glass was prescient 
in his concerns.9
The next institutional change came when President Franklin 
Roosevelt suspended the gold standard upon taking office in March 
1933. Roosevelt was willing—perhaps forced—to take the step that 
Federal Reserve officials had so feared. As in other countries, eco 
nomic recovery followed suspension and thereby gave credibility to a 
regime of "managed money" (see Eichengreen 1992 or Temin 1989).
Using authority granted by the Gold Reserve Act of January 1934, 
Roosevelt fixed the value of gold at $35 per ounce (the previous level 
had been $20.67). Although the ownership of gold and its use for 
domestic payments remained prohibited, the United States returned to
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Table 3 Key Institutional Changes in Monetary Policy in the Early 1930s
1932 Glass-Steagall Act (February 27): temporarily made U.S.
government securities eligible collateral for Federal Reserve note 
issues, thereby expanding the Fed's ability to make open-market 
purchases (made permanent in 1933); also temporarily relaxed rules 
on discount-window lending (extended in 1933, made permanent in 
1935).
1933 Emergency Banking Act (March 9): ratified suspension of the gold 
standard.
Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act (May 12): 
authorized the Fed to set reserve requirements; gave the President 
authority to require open-market purchases by the Federal Reserve 
and to fix the weights of the gold and silver dollars.
Banking Act of 1933 (June 16): enhanced Federal Reserve Board 
control of discount-window lending; technical adjustments to Federal 
Reserve System organization.
1934 Gold Reserve Act (January 30): authorized transfer of monetary gold 
stock to the U.S. Treasury; amended the President's authority to fix 
the dollar prices of gold and silver; and established the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund.
Silver Purchase Act (June 19): authorized the President to purchase 
and nationalize monetary silver; authorized limited Federal Reserve 
lending to industrial and commercial firms.
1935 Banking Act of 1935 (August 23): reorganized Federal Reserve's
Open Market Committee and otherwise enhanced the authority of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System relative to the 
Federal Reserve Banks; extended Federal Reserve authority to adjust 
member bank reserve requirements.
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the gold standard for the settlement of payments with other countries 
that also were on the gold standard. The restored gold standard, how 
ever, differed fundamentally from the previous standard in the degree 
to which its operation was removed from private markets and placed 
under control of government authorities. Americans were forbidden 
from holding gold, gold clauses in private contracts were made illegal, 
and the Treasury would sell gold only for making foreign payments.
Gold also was no longer regarded as an absolute exogenous check 
on government manipulation of the supply of money. Under the 
weight of the Great Depression, the ideology of the gold standard, 
which viewed gold as fundamental to a country's economic prosperity, 
had cracked. Although the dollar remained linked to gold, the link was 
weakened and, perhaps more important, government authorities had 
demonstrated a willingness to manipulate the gold standard to limit the 
extent to which it would interfere with discretionary monetary policy. 
Thereafter, when the Fed's gold reserve requirement threatened to limit 
money supply growth, the reserve requirements were reduced and ulti 
mately eliminated with apparently little debate or fanfare. The gold 
standard as it existed after 1933 was thus fundamentally different from 
its precursor and foreshadowed the Bretton Woods gold standard that 
was to replace it after World War II.
In addition to marking a fundamental shift in the degree to which 
gold served as a constraint on domestic monetary policy, the revalua 
tion of gold in 1934 left the U.S. Treasury with a capital gain of some 
$2.8 billion on its gold holdings. Under authority conveyed by the 
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the Treasury used $2 billion of its windfall 
to establish the Exchange Stabilization Fund: "For the purpose of sta 
bilizing the exchange value of the dollar, the Secretary of the Treasury 
... is authorized ... to deal in gold and foreign exchange and such 
other instruments of credit and securities as he may deem necessary."
Although the operations of the Exchange Stabilization Fund during 
the 1930s had little effect on the quantity or growth of bank reserves, 
the size and open-ended authority of the Fund were widely viewed as a 
threat to the Federal Reserve System and its ability to effect monetary 
policy. For example, Roy Young, then Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, argued that the Gold Reserve Act "gives the 
Secretary of the Treasury such powers, of a permanent nature, that he 
could nullify anything we [the Federal Reserve] could do" (quoted by
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Johnson 1939, p. 36). The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (Janu 
ary 20, 1934, p. 367) had a similar reaction: "The Reserve authorities 
have been reduced to shadowy nonentities, the Federal Reserve System 
having become simply an adjunct of the United States Treasury and the 
Federal Government, to do what they are told to do."
In addition to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, additional authori 
ties granted the President and Treasury Secretary included the right to 
"request" the Federal Reserve to use open-market purchases to 
increase bank reserves by up to $3 billion, and, if the Fed refused, to 
issue a commensurate amount of fiat currency. This power was granted 
by the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933, which, along with the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, also autho 
rized the purchase of silver and permitted the President to devalue the 
silver dollar. Between 1933 and 1938, the Treasury purchased 1.8 bil 
lion ounces of silver, thereby increasing bank reserves by $1 billion 
(some 20 percent of the total increase in reserves during the period). 
Had the President chosen to devalue the dollar in terms of silver, the 
Treasury would have reaped a $2.2 billion windfall on its silver hold 
ings (Johnson 1939, pp. 195-198). In summarizing the various new 
authorities given the administration, Johnson (1939, p. 202) concludes,
The President could double or triple bank reserves, had com 
plete discretion over the gold value—and consequently the for 
eign exchange value—of the dollar, and could establish 
bimetallism by proclamation, in other words, he could com 
pletely refashion the monetary system of the country, and the 
sole criteria required were his own subjective evaluations of the 
situation.
Organizational changes to the Federal Reserve System may have 
also contributed to the Fed's willingness to accept the administration's 
desired monetary policy. The authors of the Federal Reserve Act 
agreed that the Federal Reserve System should not be a "central bank" 
on the European model, but a federal system of semi-autonomous 
Reserve Banks with an overseeing board. Dissatisfaction with the sub 
sequent performance of the Federal Reserve, both during the 1920s and 
during the 1929-1933 period, led to reforms that enhanced the author 
ity of the Federal Reserve Board at the expense of the Reserve Banks. 
Marriner Eccles accepted the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve
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Board in 1933 with the understanding that he would have freedom to 
redesign the Federal Reserve System. His reforms included limits on 
the power of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which he viewed 
as an instrument of the private interests of New York bankers, and mea 
sures to ensure oversight and coordination of the activities of the 
regional Reserve Banks in pursuit of the national interest (Eccles 1966, 
pp. 170-172).
Under Eccles' plan, which was largely adopted by the Banking Act 
of 1935, the Board of Governors was given substantial control over 
open-market operations and Federal Reserve Bank discount rates. The 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was reconstituted to include 
all 7 members of the Board of Governors and just 5 of the 12 Reserve 
Bank presidents. 10 The legislation thereby increased the authority and 
stature of the Federal Reserve officials located in Washington and 
appointed by the President. On the other hand, it also sought to limit 
the influence of the President by removing the Secretary of the Trea 
sury and Comptroller of the Currency as ex officio FOMC members. 
With his reforms, Eccles intended that monetary policy making would 
be by professionals whose allegiance was solely to the national inter 
est. These changes, however, increased political pressures on the Fed 
at the same time that establishment of the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
and other measures increased the administration's power to conduct 
monetary policy. Consequently, these reforms shifted power away 
from the Fed toward the Treasury and promoted an inflation bias in 
monetary policy.
THE POSTWAR MONETARY REGIME
From 1933 to 1951, the Federal Reserve System was largely subor 
dinate to the Treasury in the conduct of monetary policy. The Fed 
increased reserve requirements in 1936 and 1937 to absorb some of the 
large volume of excess reserves that member banks had built up. A 
subsequent increase in government security yields angered Treasury 
officials, however, and the Fed was forced to make open-market pur 
chases and eventually reverse some of the change in reserve require 
ments.
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During World War II, the Fed agreed to prevent government secu 
rity yields from rising above predetermined levels. The Fed remained 
an instrument of debt management until 1951, when rising inflation 
caused Fed officials to argue for an independent monetary policy. 
Negotiations between the Fed and Treasury produced the Accord of 
March 1951, in which the Treasury agreed that the prices of govern 
ment securities should be permitted to find their market levels and the 
Fed agreed to be mindful of Treasury debt financing in carrying out its 
monetary policies. Tacitly, the Fed accepted stability of government 
securities prices as an objective of monetary policy. In particular, the 
Fed followed a policy known as "even keel," in which it limited fluctu 
ations in Treasury bill yields around Treasury issuing dates.
The Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 established the interna 
tional monetary regime under which the Fed operated in the postwar 
era. 11 From the end of World War II through 1958, international trade 
and capital movements took place to the extent permitted by exchange 
and capital controls, with international payments settled by means of 
bilateral agreements among countries. Early on, European countries 
ran large current account deficits, and the world suffered from a "dollar 
shortage." American economic strength and stability, along with the 
Marshall Plan and other cooperative efforts, caused the dollar to 
emerge as the key currency of the international payments system. As 
the 1950s progressed, Europe strengthened economically and several 
countries ran substantial current account surpluses. The main Western 
European currencies became convertible into dollars for current 
account transactions in 1959 (various capital controls remained). The 
United States, in turn, maintained convertibility of the dollar into gold 
at the fixed price of $35 per ounce. Bretton Woods was thus a gold- 
exchange standard, as its inter-war predecessor had been. However, 
the mechanism of dollar convertibility under Bretton Woods was fun 
damentally different from the mechanism of the pre-Great Depression 
gold standard, and the new mechanism explains how the United States 
could conduct an inflationary monetary policy while maintaining a 
fixed exchange rate between the dollar and gold.
Unlike the gold standard as it existed before 1933, under the Bret 
ton Woods System, the balance of payments could exert monetary dis 
cipline only to the extent permitted by central banks themselves. This 
mechanism reflected a fundamental shift in ideology, from one that
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saw maintaining gold convertibility as paramount for long-run prosper 
ity, to an ideology that viewed fixed exchange rates and gold convert 
ibility as desirable, but not so important as to sacrifice short-run 
economic stability in defense of the international system. Discretion 
ary monetary policy—"managed money"—was permitted under Bret- 
ton Woods to a degree never before achieved under a gold standard. 12
Under Bretton Woods, American balance of payments deficits (sur 
pluses) would be reflected in rising (falling) foreign central bank hold 
ings of U.S. dollars unless foreign central banks and the United States 
exchanged dollars for gold. Although foreign central banks could 
enforce monetary discipline on the United States, in practice they 
refrained from doing so until 1965, when the French began large-scale 
conversions of dollars into gold in the face of large and persisting 
American payments deficits. Throughout the 1960s, dollars held out 
side of the United States increased rapidly, while American gold 
reserves dwindled (Figure I). 13 The United States' commitment to 
gold convertibility thus became less and less credible. Numerous rem 
edies other than a substantial tightening of monetary policy were 
attempted to improve the U.S. payments deficit. But, without address 
ing the fundamental problem, the Bretton Woods System was destined 
to collapse, which it did when President Nixon closed the gold window 
on August 15, 1971. 14
AMERICAN INFLATION
The Bretton Woods System collapsed because the dollar shortage 
of the 1950s was replaced by a dollar glut in the 1960s. The Federal 
Reserve pursued a monetary policy that contained inflation throughout 
much of the decade following the Fed-Treasury Accord of March 1951. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, during the 1950s, the growth rate of Ml 
(which consists mainly of commercial bank demand deposits and cur 
rency held by the public) generally moved opposite to the rate of infla 
tion (as measured here by the Consumer Price Index). 15 Inflation 
control was not the sole objective of monetary policy during the 1950s, 
but it did generally coincide with the Fed's other objectives of limiting
Figure 1 Monetary Gold and Dollar Holdings, United States and the Rest of the World, 1945-1971
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fluctuations in national output and employment and preserving the sta 
bility of the government securities market.
The money supply growth rate began to accelerate in the early 
1960s and, by the mid 1960s, inflation had also begun to rise (Figure 
2). The desires of Fed officials to promote full employment and to sta 
bilize the yields on government securities explain the initial accelera 
tion of money growth. Fed officials remained committed to controlling 
inflation, however, and the accelerating inflation rate of the 1960s did 
not reflect a substantial change in the taste for inflation among Fed offi 
cials. Rather, the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy as much 
because of flaws in its operating strategy as because of a desire to pur 
sue objectives other than inflation control.
The operating framework of Federal Reserve policy in the 1950s 
and 1960s was much like that which Benjamin Strong had described in 
the 1920s. That strategy was flawed because it permitted destabilizing 
fluctuations in the supply of money. I believe this helps explain why 
Fed officials were able to convince themselves that their policies were 
promoting recovery from the Depression when in fact they were per 
mitting a contractionary decline in the money stock (Wheelock 1991). 
Similarly, the Fed's use of this operating strategy in the 1960s explains 
how Fed officials could argue that policy was "leaning against the 
wind" of inflation despite accelerating money supply growth.
The Fed's policy strategy of the inter-war era, and its post-Accord 
reincarnation, focused on the levels of market interest rates and the net 
borrowed, or "free," reserves of commercial banks. Fed officials 
engaged in open-market operations to alter the level of free reserves, 
which equals the difference between reserves that banks hold in excess 
of legal requirements and reserves borrowed from the Fed's discount 
window. Through free reserves, the Fed sought to manipulate money 
market interest rates (Treasury bill yields in the early 1960s, the federal 
funds rate later on). Open-market purchases (sales) tend to add to 
(subtract from) the stock of free reserves, and an increase (decrease) in 
free reserves was viewed as an easing (tightening) of policy. In Figure 
3, the level of free reserves is plotted alongside the rate of inflation for 
the period from the Accord (March 1951) through December 1971. 
The Fed tended to reduce free reserves to combat increases in inflation 
and increase free reserves when inflation was declining. Thus, Fed 
officials sought to contract the level of free reserves in response to the
Figure 3 Inflation and Free Reserves
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generally rising rate of inflation of the 1960s. Because market interest 
rates tended to rise, Fed officials were further convinced that policy 
was tight.
Many economists, especially monetarists, criticized the Fed's pol 
icy strategy because of its tendency to exacerbate swings in money 
supply growth. 16 As illustrated in Figure 4, money supply growth 
accelerated throughout much of the 1960s, even as Fed officials ratch 
eted down the level of free reserves. The evidence therefore does not 
indicate that Fed officials lacked concern for inflation or failed to 
attempt to check the rising price level. Nevertheless, the Fed's policy 
permitted the money supply to rise at an inflationary rate.
The Federal Reserve was not powerless to halt the rising inflation, 
and Fed officials understood that inflation was contributing to the 
American balance of payments deficit and threatening the gold stan 
dard. Still, under the Bretton Woods System, U.S. policymakers did 
not have to make price stability the sole, or even primary, objective of 
monetary policy as long as other countries were willing to hold the 
growing supply of dollars available on world markets. Foreign central 
banks did forbear for a time, particularly since the dollar was the key 
currency of the international payments system. This gave the United 
States breathing room—not, as it turned out, to correct its balance of 
payments deficit, but to pursue other policy goals while inflation wors 
ened and the collapse of Bretton Woods became inevitable.
THE MONETARY POLICY LEGACY OF THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION
The Federal Reserve stumbled into an inflationary monetary policy 
in the early 1960s because, absent discipline exerted by balance of pay 
ments deficits, policymakers were able to pursue other objectives, 
namely employment growth and low interest rates on government debt. 
With its focus on free reserves and interest rates, the Fed's operating 
framework tended to cause money supply growth to accelerate at an 
inflationary pace as economic activity expanded. Because the Fed had 
used much the same operating framework before the Depression, this
Figure 4 Money Supply Growth and Free Reserves
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cause of inflationary policy during the 1960s was not a result of the 
Depression having occurred.
Keynesian Macroeconomics and Monetary Policymaking
Much of the "inflationary bias" in monetary policy during the 1960s 
can, however, be attributed to changed institutions and economic policy 
ideology caused by the Great Depression. Keynesian macroeconomics 
and its influence on economic policymaking was an important ideolog 
ical product of the Great Depression. The influence of Keynesian eco 
nomic ideas on policymaking during the 1960s has received 
considerable attention (e.g., DeLong 1995), with Lucas (1980, p. 704) 
writing that one of the "main features of the Keynesian Revolution and 
the neoclassical synthesis into which it evolved in the United States . . . 
[was] the onset of the Great Depression and the consequent shift of 
attention from explaining a recurrent pattern of ups and downs to 
explaining an economy apparently stuck in an interminable down."
Keynesian-oriented policymakers believed that monetary and fiscal 
policy could reliably increase aggregate demand and employment 
along a stable Phillips curve. Central to discussions of monetary pol 
icy among Federal Reserve officials was the perceived trade-off of 
unemployment and inflation. As Federal Reserve Governor Sherman 
Maisel explained it, "There is a trade-off between idle men and a more 
stable value for the dollar. A conscious decision must be made as to 
how much unemployment and loss of output must be made in order to 
get smaller price rises" (Maisel 1973, p. 14). Maisel added that "at 
least some of the Committee's differences on policy reflected differ 
ences in basic value judgments regarding the relative importance of 
various conflicting goals—for example, regarding the appropriate 
trade-off between employment and price stability" (FOMC Minutes, 
October 20, 1970, p. 41). 17
Maisel's views were widely shared among his colleagues, includ 
ing Arthur Burns, who became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors in 1970. Burns consistently was among those favoring 
an easy monetary policy in 1970 and 1971 and often cited the conse 
quences of monetary policy for employment. At an FOMC meeting on 
March 9, 1971, for example, Maisel read a New York Times editorial to 
the effect that "anyone who was a party to the use of unemployment to
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combat inflation had a moral duty to lead the way, either by relinquish 
ing his job or by contributing his income to the support of the involun 
tarily unemployed." Burns replied that "he wanted to endorse Mr. 
MaiseFs . . . comments," that the ongoing economic recovery was 
"fragile" and that "rising [interest] rates could prove fatal to the pros 
pects for recovery" (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, pp. 44-49). 18
To avoid confronting the inflation-unemployment trade-off, Burns, 
like many of his Fed colleagues, advocated wage and price controls so 
that monetary policy could focus on fighting unemployment. More 
over, Burns frequently argued that inflation associated with increases 
in wages and other production costs, as opposed to excessive monetary 
growth, should not be fought with tight monetary policy. At an FOMC 
meeting on June 8,1971, for example, he argued that "Monetary policy 
could do very little to arrest an inflation that rested so heavily on wage- 
cost pressures ... A much higher rate of unemployment produced by 
monetary policy would not moderate such pressures appreciably . . . 
He intended to continue to press [the administration] hard for an effec 
tive incomes policy" (FOMC Minutes, June 8,1971, p. 51). Burns and 
other Fed officials frequently argued that monetary policy could not 
effectively control inflation, but that fiscal policy and wage and price 
controls could better accomplish the task. Monetary policy, on the 
other hand, should prevent interest rates from rising and choking off 
economic growth. In arguing against a policy tightening in April 1971, 
Burns contended that any increase in long-term interest rates would 
slow the economy "and the nation might then enter on a long period of 
economic stagnation. The Federal Reserve could not permit that devel 
opment" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971, p. 56).
During the 1960s and 1970s, Fed officials believed that policy 
actions to push down interest rates could promote output and employ 
ment growth. Such action would not necessarily cause inflation, they 
argued, and if it did, inflation was an acceptable cost of high employ 
ment. Moreover, wage and price controls could limit inflation. It is my 
view that Federal Reserve policymakers were no less concerned about 
the unemployed and the prospects for economic growth during the 
Great Depression. Their views about how monetary policy could be 
used to foster growth, however, were almost diametrically opposed to 
those of Fed officials in the 1960s and early 1970s.
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During the Depression, a common view among Fed officials was 
that pumping liquidity into the economy would only prolong the 
Depression by delaying the adjustments to wages and prices that they 
saw as necessary for a recovery to begin. One example of this point of 
view is evident in the comments of William McChesney Martin, Gov 
ernor of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis during the Depression 
and father of William McChesney Martin, Jr., the Federal Reserve 
Board's Chairman from 1951 to 1970. In early 1930, Martin argued,
I cannot see how the situation can be benefited by putting fifty 
millions of dollars, or, in fact, any other amount, into the gen 
eral market at this time . . . The reason that more money is not 
being used is because it is not needed, and when there is 
already sufficient money to meet the expressed needs, it seems 
to me unwise artificially to add to the amount already suffi 
cient . . . because based on a redundancy of money rather than 
on actual needs may be hazardous, (quoted by Chandler 1971, 
p. 142)
A similar view was expressed by George Norris, Governor of the Fed 
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia:
We believe that the correction must come about through 
reduced production, reduced inventories, the gradual reduction 
of consumer credit, the liquidation of security loans, and the 
accumulation of savings through the exercise of thrift . . . We 
have been putting out credit in a period of depression, when it 
was not wanted and could not be used, (quoted by Chandler 
1971, p. 137)
The Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, John 
Calkins, also argued against trying to stimulate the economy by lower 
ing interest rates: "With credit cheap and redundant we do not believe 
that business recovery will be accelerated by making credit cheaper 
and more redundant" (quoted by Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 372). 
The views of Martin, Norris, and Calkins were not atypical among 
Federal Reserve officials during the 1930s. Nor was it unusual for gov 
ernment officials outside of the Federal Reserve to hold similar views. 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, for example, believed that 
the best medicine for the Depression was to "liquidate labor, liquidate 
stocks, liquidate the fanners, liquidate real estate . .. purge the rotten-
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ness out of the system" (quoted by Eichengreen 1992, p. 251). Such a 
prescription could hardly be called "Keynesian."
Political Pressures on the Fed
The macroeconomic model used by Federal Reserve officials dur 
ing the 1960s and 1970s was quite different from that used in the early 
1930s. So too was the extent to which the Federal Reserve was pres- 
sured by other government officials.
Although the Federal Reserve has never been a truly "indepen 
dent" central bank, certain institutional changes occurring as a result of 
the Great Depression subjected the Fed to greater political pressure, 
while at the same time increasing the opportunity for the Fed to mone 
tize fiscal deficits. Together these changes added an inflation bias to 
monetary policy.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, as noted previously, permitted 
U.S. Government securities to serve as partial backing for Federal 
Reserve monetary liabilities. Thus monetization of fiscal deficits could 
occur even if the Fed held no excess gold or commercial paper 
reserves. In the 1930s, special authorities given by Congress to the 
President to fix the value of the dollar in terms of gold, to monetize sil 
ver, to buy and sell foreign exchange, and even to order the Federal 
Reserve to make open-market purchases, all weakened the Fed's abil 
ity to conduct an independent monetary policy. In addition, changes to 
the structure of the Federal Reserve System itself increased the con 
centration of power within the Fed in the hands of government appoin 
tees located in Washington.
Although the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951 returned a measure of 
independence to the Fed, the level and stability of government security 
yields remained a key focus of monetary policy. Part of the explana 
tion for this focus may rest with the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The 
Fed had ensured plentiful and inexpensive funding for the Treasury 
during the two world wars, and the Fed may have sought to limit 
increases in government security yields during the Korean and Vietnam 
episodes out of a sense of patriotic duty. 19 A by-product of such a pol 
icy, of course, was a faster rate of increase in the supply of money.
New Deal changes to the Fed's internal structure may have also 
contributed toward its policy of limiting increases in interest rates. By
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reducing the role of Federal Reserve Bank presidents in favor of the 
Board of Governors, the Banking Act of 1935 subjected the Fed to 
greater political influence by concentrating power in the hands of 
Washington-based officials who are presidential appointees. Political 
influence on monetary policy has been the subject of extensive study 
(e.g., Woolley 1984; Havrilesky 1993), and a general conclusion seems 
to be that the short, finite horizon of political election cycles gives pol 
iticians an incentive to favor more expansionary monetary policies than 
does the public as a whole. To the extent that politicians are able to get 
the monetary policy they desire, the result is a higher long-run rate of 
inflation than would otherwise occur. Thus, countries with less inde 
pendent central banks tend to have higher inflation rates than countries 
with relatively independent central banks.
An infamous example of Federal Reserve acquiescence to political 
pressure came in 1972, when at the request of the administration 
Arthur Burns was alleged to have increased the money supply growth 
rate to promote President Nixon's reelection (see Wells 1994 for dis 
cussion). Whether or not such overt pressure was exerted, it is clear 
that under both Burns and Martin political considerations influenced 
the setting of monetary policy. With the possible exception of Nixon's 
reelection, such pressure was not overtly connected to elections, but 
rather to consideration of the administration's or Congress' policy 
preferences. To the extent such considerations influenced policy out 
comes, they would almost always have done so on the side of promot 
ing inflation.20
Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments
The Fed's operating strategy, desire to promote high employment, 
and pressures on the Fed to keep interest rates low all gave monetary 
policy a bias toward inflation. By themselves, however, they could not 
have resulted in a sustained inflation without an accommodating inter 
national monetary regime. Under the classical gold standard, for 
example, an inflationary monetary policy could not have been sus 
tained. But, under Bretton Woods, sustained inflation was possible as 
long as foreign central banks were willing to hold the dollars they 
accumulated as a result of the American payments deficit, rather than 
demand payment in gold for those dollars.
The Economics of the Great Depression 159
Although the Bretton Woods System provided some insulation for 
discretionary monetary policy, Federal Reserve officials understood 
that the United States could not run a balance of payments deficit 
indefinitely. But, Fed officials were also wary of combating a balance 
of payments deficit with policies that might interfere with other goals. 
On one occasion, President Alfred Hayes of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, argued that "I would think it unwise to let the gold out 
flow itself affect our monetary policy directly, i.e., in the way of using 
a tightening move directed specifically toward stemming the flow and 
unrelated to domestic economic developments" (FOMC Minutes, 
November 10, 1958, pp. 14-15). Another time, a Reserve Bank presi 
dent expressed concern about the balance of payments deficit but was 
reluctant to advocate a tighter policy for fear of disrupting the market 
for government securities: "Generally, he felt that the course of mone 
tary policy should be moving toward a more restrictive posture. At the 
same time, he was quite concerned about the rate picture in the govern 
ment securities market and the problems facing the Treasury in the 
future" (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 34). This reluctance to face 
squarely gold outflows and a balance of payments deficit stands in 
marked contrast to the Fed's reaction to gold outflows in 1931. At that 
time, Fed officials agreed that maintaining convertibility of the dollar 
into gold at a constant price was fundamental to long-run economic 
stability, and they were willing to tighten monetary policy in the mid 
dle of a depression to preserve the international monetary regime. By 
contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s, Fed officials viewed the balance of 
payments with concern but were hesitant to make it the sole, or even 
the primary, focus of policy. This change in philosophy, attaching less 
importance to the gold standard rule and more to discretionary policy, 
was an important legacy of the Great Depression.
Although Fed officials were unwilling to tighten sufficiently to 
arrest the balance of payments deficit, they did see the deficit as influ 
encing their ability to promote domestic economic activity. Chairman 
Martin, for example, argued that "If the Federal Reserve got the reputa 
tion of following a cheap money policy just for the sake of doing so, 
people abroad would be encouraged to think the System was not con 
cerned with the balance of payments or the soundness of the dollar" 
(FOMC Minutes, December 13, 1960, p. 40). Martin also argued that 
"The balance of payments problem . . . was a vital factor in the unem-
160 Wheelock
ployment situation. Foreign capital was finding the United States less 
and less attractive, there were pressures for movement of capital 
abroad, and this was having a deleterious effect on employment in this 
country" (FOMC Minutes, March 6, 1962, p. 56).
Fed officials also understood that the balance of payments deficit 
stemmed from differences in the macroeconomic policies of different 
countries. At an FOMC meeting in 1959, a Fed staff member reported 
that "the net result of attempts in this country to validate our wage and 
price policies through monetary expansion could succeed only if we 
could inflate the whole world." The staff member went on to argue that 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy could "price United States' 
goods out of world markets" because officials of other countries, nota 
bly Germany and the Netherlands, surely would not permit inflation in 
their domestic prices (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 14). The same 
official, however, was unwilling to blame monetary policy alone for the 
balance of payments deficit. In arguing that gold outflows "call for a 
generally restrictive credit policy . . . more effective corrections . . . 
would be moves to reduce the budgetary deficit and the checking of 
price rises due to wage and other cost increases" (FOMC Minutes, 
October 21, 1958).
The Fed's unwillingness to tighten sufficiently to stem the balance 
of payments deficit led it to consider other actions it might take. One 
of the earliest of the policies intended to restore external balance was 
"Operation Twist"—an attempt to raise short-term interest rates high 
enough to attract foreign capital while keeping long-term interest rates 
low enough to favor domestic expansion.
Other policies intended to correct international payments imbal 
ances without slowing domestic activity included agreements with for 
eign central banks to forbear from demanding gold, intervention in 
foreign exchange markets, the issuance of foreign-currency-denomi 
nated U.S. bonds ("Roosa bonds"), requests of early repayment by for 
eign governments of debts to the U.S. government, the removal of 
interest rate ceilings on U.S. bank time deposits, capital outflow con 
straints imposed in the United States, and changes in U.S. tax treat 
ment of foreign earnings. Balance of payments deficits continued, 
however, and the long-term feasibility of the existing dollar gold- 
exchange standard grew increasingly doubtful.
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THE COLLAPSE OF BRETTON WOODS
When Arthur Burns took over as chairman of the Fed's Board of 
Governors in early 1970, the U.S. economy was sliding toward a reces 
sion, the inflation rate stood at 6.5 percent (first-quarter average annu- 
alized rate of CPI inflation), and the U.S. balance of payments had 
been in deficit nearly every year since the late 1950s. At his first meet 
ing, Burns announced that "in his judgment, economic developments 
had reached a point at which a rethinking of monetary policy was in 
order" (FOMC Minutes, February 10, 1970, p. 3). It quickly became 
apparent that Burns would make avoidance of a recession his first pri 
ority. Against three dissents, the Federal Open Market Committee 
voted to ease monetary policy at that meeting. One of the dissenting 
votes came from Andrew Brimmer, who expressed the hope that "the 
Committee would not lose sight of the highly unfavorable outlook for 
the balance of payments and would give the payments balance some 
what greater than customary weight in formulating policy over the near 
term" (FOMC Minutes, February 10, 1970, p. 59).
Federal Open Market Committee meetings usually begin with 
analysis of economic conditions by Fed staff members, and during 
1970 and 1971, the staff frequently expressed pessimism about the bal 
ance of payments deficit. Following the staff reports, there usually was 
a report from a Fed governor, often Dewey Daane, who attended a reg 
ular meeting of central bank officials in Europe. The U.S. payments 
deficit was a principal topic at those meetings, with the Europeans fre 
quently questioning American resolve to control inflation (see, e.g., 
FOMC Minutes, June 23, 1970). The balance of payments seems to 
have had limited impact on FOMC deliberations, however, because 
after hearing the summary of the European meeting, the Committee 
would review domestic economic conditions and discuss the policy 
directive, usually with little or no reference to the balance of payments.
At the FOMC meeting of October 20, 1970, the Fed staff gave a 
particularly lengthy and pessimistic report on the balance of payment. 
Following the report, Burns "said he could add one word of reassur 
ance. Work on the balance of payments problem was going forward 
actively, and he was confident that adequate measures for grappling 
with the problem could be devised" (FOMC Minutes, October 20,
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1970, p. 21). From this comment, it is clear that Burns viewed the bal 
ance of payments deficit as a problem that could be controlled effec 
tively without monetary policy action. Moreover, the comment reflects 
the fact that the Treasury, especially Undersecretary Paul Volcker, was 
taking the lead in devising America's international economic policy.
Despite the seeming lack of influence of the balance of payments 
deficit on Federal Reserve policy, some of the Fed's staff, as well as the 
occasional governor, warned about the worsening payments deficit. At 
an FOMC meeting on June 23,1970, the first vice president of the New 
York Fed argued that "a convincing and sustained attack on domestic 
inflation remains essential for improving our balance of payments and 
strengthening confidence in the dollar" (FOMC Minutes, June 23, 
1970, p. 57). On another occasion, Alfred Hayes, president of the New 
York Fed noted that "a stiff price is being paid for the easing of money 
market conditions in the United States . . . International conditions 
underline the need for giving high priority to the inflation problem" 
(FOMC Minutes, September 15, 1970, pp. 43-44). But, Governor 
Maisel replied that
It would be improper to assume that balance of payments con 
siderations should be a constraint on [policy]. If the balance of 
payments remained unsatisfactory with demand still far below 
normal, that would appear to be an indication of basic struc 
tural problems in the balance of payments sphere. The Com 
mittee should be working to correct those structural imbalances 
rather than assuming a posture which traded off losses of 
income, output, and jobs in an attempt to offset basic structural 
defects in the balance of payments sphere. (FOMC Minutes, 
September 15, 1970, p. 46)
Arthur Burns added that "he believed that balance of payments consid 
erations should not prevent the Committee from taking the policy 
actions it felt required by the domestic economy" (FOMC Minutes, 
September 15, 1970, p. 65). Later in the same meeting Burns advo 
cated "special measures," presumably capital controls or similar mea 
sures, to deal with the balance of payments deficit (FOMC Minutes, 
September 15, 1970, p. 81). Burns reiterated this view on February 9, 
1971: "Chairman Burns commented that while the System was faced 
with international as well as domestic problems, the latter were the
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more pressing. Moreover, special tools were available for dealing with 
the former" (FOMC Minutes, February 9, 1971, p. 92).
The balance of payments deficit grew increasingly worse in early 
1971, and the Fed staff warnings became stronger. At the March 
FOMC meeting, a Fed staff member warned that "Sooner or later—and 
he suspected that it would be sooner—the central bank complaints now 
being voiced privately [about their build-up of dollar balances] would 
become known to the market, which might then decide to protect itself 
against the risk of a sudden break in the structure of exchange parities" 
(FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, p. 22). Another staff member 
reported that
1) the balance of payments deficit in the first two months of 
this year was enormous; [and] 2) the monetary aggregates have 
been growing very rapidly. What connects these two sets of 
facts is the very steep decline in short-term interest rates. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the short-term capital outflow has 
been extremely large . . . Considerable reluctance has been 
built up abroad, especially among financial officials in Europe, 
over what they regard as an undermining of their own mone 
tary policies resulting from the massive short-term capital out 
flows from the United States and from the steep decline in 
short-term rates. The impression exists that . . . the United 
States has completely ignored the effects its policies are having 
on the rest of the world. (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1970, pp. 
28-29)
As the year 1971 progressed, the international payments crisis 
worsened. At the FOMC meeting of May 11, New York Fed president 
Hayes remarked that "We are ... in the midst of an international mon 
etary crisis ... A vote of no confidence in the dollar has been taken by 
several central banks" (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, p. 53). Hayes 
also reported that the directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York had voted to increase the Bank's discount rate by one-half point, 
the same step taken in response to a flight from the dollar in October 
1931:
The directors felt in this major international crisis there was 
nothing the System could do that would be more useful and 
more timely than to give an overt signal of our concern and our 
willingness to move quickly toward narrowing the interest rate
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spread which was a major cause of the difficulty .. . While rec 
ognizing the risks involved in a general increase in domestic 
interest rates, they felt that those risks were outweighed by 
international conditions. (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, pp.
55-56)
The Board of Governors turned down the New York Bank's request 
for a discount rate increase, citing weakness in the domestic economy, 
the adverse effects of higher interest rates on the mortgage market and 
the market for state and local government debt, and the likely instabil 
ity that a discount rate hike would cause in all financial markets. At the 
prior FOMC meeting, Burns seems to have predicted the New York 
Bank's request for a discount rate increase when he relayed that "he 
had a vivid recollection of developments in 1931, when the Federal 
Reserve had raised its discount rate and acted to stiffen short-term rates 
because of a balance of payments problem, and an incipient [domestic 
economic] recovery had been cut off" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971, 
p. 56). For Burns, the lesson of 1931 was to put the domestic economy 
first, ahead of the balance of payments and preservation of the gold 
standard.
CONCLUSION
The failures of economic policy, especially monetary policy, dur 
ing the Great Depression produced several significant institutional and 
ideological changes in the monetary policy regime. Not surprisingly, 
because monetary policy was associated with deflation and contraction 
during the period 1929-1933, the new regime included features that 
gave policy an inflation bias. Those features included both a new ave 
nue for monetizing government debt and increased political control of 
Federal Reserve policy. The Great Depression also put the new eco 
nomics of Keynes, with its emphasis on government management of 
aggregate demand, into the professional and policy mainstream.
The most fundamental legacy of the Great Depression for mone 
tary policy, however, concerned the international gold standard. 
Although governments interfered with the operation of the gold stan 
dard before 1933, and an unsettled question among economic histori-
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ans is the extent to which a laissez-faire gold standard would have 
proved more stable, a key lesson taken from the Great Depression was 
that the international monetary system required active management of 
government officials. Faith that the gold standard would ensure pros 
perity was destroyed, as was any notion that a disaster worse than the 
Depression would result if the gold standard was abandoned. Begin 
ning in 1933, and continuing at least to the 1970s, the dominant ideol 
ogy was that a gold standard and fixed exchange rates are desirable but 
not worth sacrificing high employment to maintain. This change in 
attitude, and the institutional changes accompanying it, largely 
explains the inflationary monetary policy of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
as well as the decision to abandon gold and fixed exchange rates in 
1971-1973.
Since the 1970s, the pendulum has swung away from inflationary 
monetary policy somewhat. The costs of high inflation and the seem 
ing inability of aggregate demand policy to maintain full employment 
helped promote New Classical macroeconomics and caused a rethink 
ing of the appropriate goals of monetary policy among government 
officials. Several countries now specify inflation targets for their cen 
tral banks and have formally adopted price stability as the paramount 
objective for monetary policy. The institutional environment of mone 
tary policy in the United States, however, has not changed since 1973, 
when fixed exchange rates were abandoned. The legacy of the Great 
Depression for monetary policy was in causing an institutional and 
ideological shift to a managed, discretionary monetary regime. The 
fundamentals of this regime remain in place today.
Notes
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect official positions of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
1. Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) examine institutional changes to U.S. monetary 
policymaking resulting from the Great Depression and argue that those affecting 
the gold standard were the most important. That paper focuses on Federal 
Reserve policy during 1933-1941 in particular and during the 1950s and 1960s 
generally. By contrast, this paper examines in much greater detail the policy 
record leading up to suspension of gold payments in 1971 and how it compares 
with Federal Reserve policy during the Great Depression.
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2. Wheelock (1991) presents econometric estimates of the Federal Reserve "reaction 
function" for 1924—1929. Simulations of this function also illustrate that the Fed 
made fewer open-market purchases and cut its discount rate less during 1929— 
1931 than it would have done under the pre-1929 reaction function. But, as dis 
cussed below, this does not necessarily imply that the policy regime, i.e., the Fed's 
objectives or strategy, had changed.
3. The use of open-market operations for objectives other than to secure earning 
assets evolved in the early 1920s, but their use to manipulate instruments or oper 
ating targets, such as borrowed reserves, evolved only gradually as the Fed gained 
experience. Well into the Depression, the directions to the Fed's trading desk 
from the Open Market Committee specified the dollar amounts of securities the 
desk was authorized to buy or sell. By 1932, however, discussion at Open Market 
Committee meetings turned more toward the desired level of excess reserves and 
focused less on the specific dollar volume of securities to buy or sell. Later in the 
1930s, the Committee targeted yields on Treasury securities, as well as excess 
reserves.
4. This refers to the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. By 
December, the discount rates of all 12 Reserve Banks were at 3.5 percent or 
higher. The Fed also augmented bank reserves by purchasing bankers acceptan 
ces from member banks. The Fed purchased all eligible acceptances offered by 
banks but, as with its discount rate, the Fed increased the interest rate at which it 
made these purchases.
5. Whereas Fed holdings of government securities could not serve as collateral, dis 
count-window loans always produced collateral, including those secured by com 
mercial bank holdings of government securities.
6. See Eichengreen (1992) or Temin (1989) for detail about the operation of the 
international gold standard and its role in the Great Depression.
7. This section draws heavily on Calomiris and Wheelock (1997), where additional 
detail can be found.
8. During World War I, the Fed lent reserves to banks against their holdings of U.S. 
government securities at a discount rate that guaranteed banks a profit on their 
security holdings. This also had the effect of monetizing government debt.
9. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 was originally set to expire after one year, but it 
was made permanent in 1933. It should not be confused with the Banking Act of 
1933 which, among other things, established Federal deposit insurance, separated 
commercial and investment banking, and outlawed the payment of interest on 
demand deposits. The Banking Act of 1933 is also sometimes referred to as the 
Glass-Steagall Act.
10. The Banking Act of 1935 also changed the titles of the chief executive officers of 
the Federal Reserve Banks from the more prestigious "Governor" to "President," 
while discontinuing the Federal Reserve Board in favor of the Board of Gover 
nors, whose members all held the title "Governor." The Board of Governors was 
also authorized to approve the appointments of Federal Reserve Bank presidents 
and first vice presidents and to generally supervise Reserve Bank operations.
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11. See Bordo (1993) or Solomon (1977) for a history of the Bretton Woods System, 
and Meltzer (1991) for more specific analysis of U.S. economic policy under 
Bretton Woods.
12. Redish (1993) argues that Bretton Woods represented just one of a series of steps 
away from a gold standard operated solely by private markets, with little or no 
government interference, to a fiat monetary regime. As noted above, under the 
inter-war gold-exchange standard, the Federal Reserve (and other central banks) 
sterilized gold flows and used open-market operations and discount rate policy to 
manipulate gold flows.
13. The data sources for Figure 1 are The Role of Gold in the Domestic and Interna 
tional Monetary Systems: Report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role 
of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary Systems, Volume 1, Table 
SC-10, column 3 (U.S. monetary gold stock) and Table SC-8, columns 1 and 2 
(world monetary gold stock), and International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics Supplement, 1972, pp. 2-3, rows 4 and 4a (U.S. external lia 
bilities).
14. A system of fixed exchange rates was imposed by the Smithsonian Agreement in 
1972, but this system collapsed in 1973, and the dollar has since floated. Since 
my interest here concerns the end of dollar convertibility into gold, I treat August 
15, 1971, as the date at which the Bretton Woods regime ended.
15. All series in Figures 2 to 4 are smoothed using a centered 13-month moving aver 
age filter.
16. Meigs (1962) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964) were among the earliest critics of 
the Fed's free reserves strategy.
17. The Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee are not verbatim transcrip 
tions of FOMC meetings. They do appear to give a reasonably full account of the 
discussion, however, and attribute comments to individuals by name.
18. See Wells (1994) for analysis of Burns' views.
19. Evidence of this is given in Calomiris and Wheelock (1997).
20. Burns had a close relationship with Nixon and clearly understood the monetary 
policy desired by the administration. Two examples of the interjection of political 
considerations into monetary policy discussions occurred at a meeting of the 
FOMC in October 1970 and January 1971. On the first occasion, Burns suggested 
that committee members consider the "judgments of members of Congress, senior 
officials of the Administration, and others" when attempting to determine how 
high they were willing to let the unemployment rate rise in fighting inflation 
(FOMC Minutes, October 20, 1970, p. 41). Three meetings later, Burns told the 
committee that "the Administration's confidence in the System was weakening as 
a result of the shortfalls that had occurred in the rates of money growth . . . The 
credibility of the Federal Reserve would be greatly strengthened if it became 
apparent that the Committee was seeking to make up the ... shortfall" (FOMC 
Minutes, January 12, 1971, p. 37). See Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) for exam 
ples of political pressure on the Fed when William Martin was Fed chairman.
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6 Understanding the 
Great Depression
Lessons for Current Policy
Stephen G. Cecchetti 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Ohio State University, and 
National Bureau of Economic Research
Macroeconomists continue to search for an understanding of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The defining characteristic of this 
period is the wholesale collapse of virtually every aspect of the econ 
omy. Over the four years beginning in the summer of 1929, financial 
markets and institutions, labor markets, and international currency and 
goods markets all virtually ceased to function. Throughout this, the 
government policymaking apparatus seemed helpless. The complexity 
and magnitude of the economic catastrophe during this period make it 
extremely difficult to fashion a comprehensive explanation.
Over the nearly 65 years since the cyclical trough in March 1933, 
researchers have churned out volumes of work analyzing the 43-month 
contraction. EconLit, the CD-ROM index compiled by the Journal of 
Economic Literature, lists over 400 articles on the Great Depression 
that have appeared since 1969 alone. Where has all of this work gotten 
us? What have we learned over the past quarter century that can help 
us as we go forward?
One of the things we know is that our economic institutions are 
very different today than they were in 1929. Many of the changes are 
surely the result of the Depression itself. A few of the more important 
things that clearly came out of this period are that the Federal Reserve 
System is more centralized, we have deposit insurance and stronger 
bank regulation, commercial and investment banking are separated (at 
least for now), we have a pure paper money standard, and we have 
unemployment insurance and social security.
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Have these changes worked in helping us to avert the onset of 
another Great Depression? Clearly, the past 50 years have been charac 
terized by a substantially more stable economic environment. Since 
1945, the longest recession, from November 1973 to March 1975, 
lasted a mere 16 months—just over one-third the length of the Great 
Depression. The largest sustained drop in output has been a 2.1 per 
cent change in the early 1980s, compared with the decline of nearly 30 
percent in the early 1930s. While consumer prices fell 28 percent from 
August 1929 to April 1933, in no year since 1949 has the Consumer 
Price Index shown a decline. In December of 1982, the civilian unem 
ployment rate hit its post-World War II peak of 10.8 percent, while the 
estimate of the 1933 peak exceeds 25 percent!
Financial markets and institutions have fared equally well in the 
stable environment of the post-World War II economy. From its peak 
in mid September of 1929 to its trough in late June 1932, a broad index 
of large company stocks (equivalent to the Standard & Poor's 500) fell 
by 86 percent. By comparison, the largest sustained drop in the past 50 
years is the decline of 52 percent from mid January 1973 to early Octo 
ber 1974.
The total collapse of the financial intermediation system was evi 
denced by the fact that from the beginning of 1930 to the bank holiday 
of 1933, there were an astounding 9,096 commercial bank suspen 
sions! The number of suspensions in 1930 alone—1,350—was more 
than double the 659 in 1929. By contrast, in the 60 years since 1934 
there has been a total of just over 2,000 bank closings.
International goods markets broke down as well. From 1929 to 
1932, exports fell from 6.8 percent to 4.5 percent of gross output. In 
the 50 years since the end of World War II, exports of goods and ser 
vices have grown from 3.5 percent of gross national product to nearly 
12 percent.
International financial markets suffered as well during the Great 
Depression, with the gradual breakdown of the fixed exchange rate sys 
tem administered through the gold-exchange standard. Slowly, over the 
decade of the 1930s, all of the countries that followed the recon 
structed, post-World War I gold standard left it. The desire to have a 
fixed exchange rate system has obviously been very strong, as this was 
followed by the Bretton Woods System and then the European Mone 
tary System.
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Analyzing all of these events in any detail is clearly too big a task 
to undertake in one short essay. Instead, my goal is to point out what I 
think are the highlights. My presentation is split into four basic sec 
tions. Each begins with what I believe to be one of the major fallacies 
contained in the literature on the Great Depression. My purpose is to 
examine each of these fallacies to see what lessons we can learn. I 
come away with three important lessons that have become my own per 
sonal guide to policy analysis.
The four fallacies are as follows:
1. The Great Depression was caused by the stock market crash of 
1929.
2.. The banking system of the 1920s was fundamentally unsound.
3. The fact that nominal interest rates were approaching zero 
meant that Federal Reserve policy was loose and ineffective.
4. Tariff wars were primarily responsible for the spread and depth 
of the Depression.
I will argue that from analysis of these fallacies come the following 
lessons for current policy:
1. The central bank's function as the lender of last resort is of pri 
mary importance in the short-term stabilization of the financial 
system.
2. Deflation is extremely costly.
3. A gold standard is very dangerous.
Finally, I will comment on remaining mysteries. There are two 
important aspects of the Depression that we still do not fully under 
stand. First, why was it so long? Second, what is the comprehensive 
explanation for the entire inter-war period?
THE STOCK MARKET CRASH OF 1929
The crash of October 1929 has played a large role in the lore of the 
Great Depression. Over time, however, a number of issues have
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become clear, and we now understand the likely causes of the crash, as 
well as its likely consequences.
Let me begin with myths about the causes. In Cecchetti (1992b), I 
argue that there is little evidence for the three most commonly 
accepted reasons that asset prices fell so precipitously: 1) the bursting 
of a speculative bubble; 2) massive fraud and illegal activity; and 3) 
margin buying. Regarding the first, I note that, as Dominguez, Fair, 
and Shapiro (1988) demonstrate, contemporary data did not reveal any 
trends that suggested the drastic downturn that followed. Further 
more, it is easy to find statements from contemporary analysts sup 
porting the position that the market would rise and statements 
supporting the opposite position that the market would fall. In other 
words, economic fundamentals were also sound in late 1929.
There are numerous anecdotes that leave one feeling that fraud and 
illegal activity are an important explanation. 1 But Bierman (1991) has 
carefully examined the evidence and shows that there was probably 
very little actual insider trading or illegal manipulation. Instead, a 
number of lucky and unlucky investors were pilloried for perfectly 
legal actions.
The best evidence we have is that the crash was caused by Federal 
Reserve behavior, together with the public statements of numerous 
government officials. It has been amply documented, initially by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and more recently by Hamilton (1987) 
and others, that Federal Reserve policy became substantially tighter in 
the fall of 1928, almost immediately following the death of Benjamin 
Strong, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. While 
he was alive, Strong controlled Federal Reserve policy, as the Federal 
Reserve Board was not as powerful as it is today. But when Strong 
died, Adolph Miller of the Federal Reserve Board was able to take con 
trol of policy. Miller believed that speculation was causing share 
prices to be too high and that this was damaging the economy. 
Together with Herbert Hoover, who had just been elected President, he 
set out to bring down stock market prices.
In its attempt to bring equity prices down, the Federal Reserve 
sought to keep banks from extending loans that would be used to buy 
stock. To this end, the February 1929 Federal Reserve Bulletin con 
tained the following policy statement, taken from a February 2, 1929, 
letter sent to Federal Reserve banks.
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During the last year or more,... the functioning of the Federal 
reserve system has encountered interference by reason of the 
excessive amount of the country's credit absorbed in specula 
tive security loans. The credit situation since the opening of 
the new year indicates that some of the factors which occa 
sioned untoward developments during the year 1928 are still at 
work. The volume of speculative credits is still growing . . .
The extraordinary absorption of funds in speculative security 
loans, which has characterized the credit movement during the 
past year or more, in the judgment of the Federal Reserve 
Board, deserves particular attention lest it become a decisive 
factor working toward a still further firming of money rates to 
the prejudice of the country's commercial interests . . .
The Federal Reserve Act does not, in the opinion of the Federal 
Reserve Board, contemplate the use of the resources of the 
Federal reserve banks for the creation or extension of specula 
tive credit. A member bank is not within its reasonable claims 
for rediscount facilities at its Federal reserve bank when it bor 
rows either for the purpose of making speculative loans or for 
the purpose of maintaining speculative loans.
The board has no disposition to assume authority to interfere 
with the loan practices of member banks so long as they do not 
involve the Federal reserve banks. It has, however, a grave 
responsibility whenever there is evidence that member banks 
are maintaining speculative security loans with the aid of Fed 
eral reserve credit. When such is the case the Federal reserve 
bank becomes either a contributing or a sustaining factor in the 
current volume of speculative security credit. This is not in 
harmony with the intent of the Federal Reserve Act, nor is it 
conducive to the wholesome operation of the banking and 
credit system of the country. (Board of Governors of the Fed 
eral Reserve System 1929, pp. 93-94)
(It is worth noting that the term "speculation" appears to have been 
common usage for share purchases that were made with borrowed 
money.)
I will simply note that this passage suggests the central bankers did 
not understand the difference between transactions that represent port 
folio reallocations and those that use real resources. An example will 
help to make the point. Consider a case in which a person holding an
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equity share wishes to sell it and purchase a bond. Another person 
wishes to purchase the share and incur debt (issue a bond). For sim 
plicity, say that the seller is willing to accept the bond issued by the 
buyer in payment. Such a transaction is essentially a risk trade and 
results in a net increase in the gross quantity of debt outstanding with 
no change in the level of equity or anyone's net worth. The portfolios 
of the two people do change as one individual goes from holding 
equity to holding debt, and the other goes from having no assets ;arid 
liabilities to having an equity asset and a bond liability.
The passage from the Federal Reserve Bulletin clearly shows that 
the Federal Reserve Board thought the increase in debt somehow used 
real resources and reduced the level of real investment. While confu 
sion between real and financial investment is common in the popular 
press, we can rightly expect more from those people who are in charge 
of policymaking.
It is no surprise that following the Federal Reserve Board's pro 
nouncement, the interest rate charged on broker loans rose dramati 
cally. In fact, this action very nearly generated a crash on March 26, 
1929. On that day, call money rates opened at 12 percent and rose to 
20 percent by noon. Meanwhile, stock prices fell by nearly 10 percent. 
But action by both the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the First 
National Bank to provide liquidity to the market in the form of broker 
loans stemmed the decline, and prices recovered almost entirely by the 
close of the day. Both Charles E. Mitchell, President of First National 
Bank, and George Harrison, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, were later criticized for taking these actions. In many ways, 
these attempts at expansion of liquidity and the associated criticisms 
were a precursor of things to come.
Even after the near crash in March, Federal Reserve policy contin 
ued to stifle the market by restricting the ability of member banks to 
make broker loans. This policy of "direct action," whereby the Federal 
Reserve openly discouraged lending collaterized by stock, did have the 
effect of stemming the increase in broker loans that originated from 
banks. In fact, broker loans from New York banks fell between March 
and May of 1929.
A second important contributor to the crash was likely to have 
been the repeated statements by public officials that stock prices were 
too high. The main culprit here is President Herbert Hoover, whose
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public comments supported Adolph Miller's attack on speculation. 
(See, for example, Hoover 1952, p. 172.)
We do not know why the market crashed exactly when it did. But 
it is clear that the actions of the Federal Reserve were very different in 
October than they were in March. After many months of warning, 
banks were not willing to extend broker loans to stem the decline, and 
the Federal Reserve had no desire to provide the liquidity that would 
have been necessary for the banks to do so. As a result, once the mar 
ket became disorderly and prices began to plummet, matters simply 
became worse.
This story suggests that the Federal Reserve could have stopped 
the stock market from crashing. The reason it did not is that Adolph 
Miller and his colleagues believed that credit extended to brokers for 
loans to purchase securities was, in some sense, credit that was 
unavailable to the commercial sector, and so raised interest rates and 
harmed business activity generally. This position is very difficult to 
justify, particularly since Federal Reserve accommodation could have 
simply increased total credit outstanding in order to keep interest rates 
on commercial loans at a level that was considered desirable. Further 
more, there is evidence that Benjamin Strong understood in 1928 that 
the solution to high interest rates was looser policy, not artificial 
attempts to reduce broker loans.
The consequences of the crash are more difficult to ascertain. The 
explanations just cited follow Friedman and Schwartz in viewing the 
crash as a by-product of the tight Federal Reserve policy and in ignor 
ing any direct effect of the crash on economic activity. But there are at 
least four ways in which the stock market decline could have influ 
enced consumer spending and therefore output. First, the crash could 
have depressed consumer spending by leading people to believe that 
the Depression was coming. The work of Dominguez, Fair, and Sha- 
piro (1988) suggests that this is unlikely. Second, the market crash 
reduced wealth, and this could have reduced consumer spending. But 
this is unlikely to have had a large effect, given that the stock market 
throughout 1929 remained above its level at the beginning of 1928. 
Third, Mishkin (1978) argues that the crash, together with recently 
accumulated consumer debt, served to make households illiquid. He 
then estimates that roughly two-thirds of the fall in spending can be 
accounted for by the deterioration of household balance sheets.
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Finally, Romer (1990) argues that the stock market crash created 
immediate income uncertainty, resulting in a decline in the purchase of 
consumer durables, for which she provides substantial empirical sup 
port. Specifically, Romer shows that there was a dramatic decline in 
new automobile registrations and department store sales immediately 
in November 1929. Mail-order sales began to fall in January 1930. 
This evidence suggests that some of the blame for the contraction can 
be traced directly to the stock market crash of 1929 and substantiates 
certain aspects of Temin's (1976) original hypothesis that the initial 
contraction in output in 1929 resulted from a collapse of consumption 
expenditure. Romer's position is bolstered by evidence in Cecchetti 
and Karras (1994), who find that there was a very large aggregate 
demand shock of nonmonetary origin in November 1929 that is largely 
responsible for the downturn of 1930.
There are two important lessons to be taken away from this experi 
ence. Both concern the behavior of central bankers. First, I believe 
that if central bankers allow the fluctuations in asset market prices to 
affect their decisions it may distract them from concentrating on some 
combination of output growth and inflation. The focus of the Federal 
Reserve on the level of equity prices in 1929 clearly led to a disas 
trously contractionary path for policy.
Second, the central bank can operate effectively as a lender of last 
resort only if it stands ready to provide immediate liquidity to any bank 
that presents assets meeting certain predetermined criteria. That is to 
say, if the financial system comes under stress—as it surely will during 
a sudden downturn in equity prices—the Federal Reserve must stand 
ready to supply reserves to the banking system. Again, the evidence 
suggests that, in October 1929, the Federal Reserve's actions served to 
exacerbate the problems caused by the crash.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES
The Financial Crises of the 1930s
The failure of the system of financial intermediation, which culmi 
nated in the bank holiday of 1933, strongly suggests that there was 
something inherently wrong with the organization of the banking sys 
tem prior to the Depression. Why did the banking system collapse? 
Was the net worth of banks too low? There is a simple prima facie 
case that we can make against such a suggestion. First, there is the fact 
that banks entered the Depression with what, by modern standards, 
were very high amounts of equity. Book-value bank balance sheets 
indicate bank capital was 14 percent of assets at the end of 1929. By 
1940, it had fallen to 9 percent. While it has risen to over 7 percent 
recently, capital was less than 6 percent of assets for most of the 1980s.
But these are accounting numbers, and they may not be representa 
tive of the true economic condition of banks. If we had been able to 
compute the market value of bank assets, would they have been less 
than the value of bank liabilities? As has been emphasized in the bank 
ing literature, banks are maturity transformers. They take short-term 
liabilities and turn them into long-term assets. Since these assets are 
often not marketable, there is substantial risk involved in such a transi 
tion. The main risk comes from nominal interest rate movements. As 
nominal interest rates rise, the revenue stream from banks' long-term 
assets may be insufficient to service the obligations created by their 
short-term liabilities.
Were nominal interest rates rising during this period? The answer, 
which we can obtain from Cecchetti (1988b), is clearly no. The data in 
Figure 1 and Table 1 clearly show that nominal interest rates fell 
throughout the Depression. Three-month U.S. government rates fell 
from just over 5 percent in the spring of 1929 to less than one-half of 1 
percent by July 1931. While they went up significantly for a few 
months in late 1931, around the time when Britain left the gold stan 
dard, they quickly returned to very low levels and remained there until 
after World War II. Long-term interest rates followed a similar pattern, 
falling through most of 1929, 1930, and most of 1931.
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Figure 1 Monthly Nominal Interest Rates, 3-Month and 5-Year Yields, 
1929 to 1940
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Table 1 Chronology of Monetary Events during the Depression
1 - October 1929 Stock Market Crash
2 - October 1930 First Banking Crisis
3 - March 1931 Second Banking Crisis
4 - September 1931 Britain Leaves the Gold Standard
5 - January 1933 Last Banking Crisis
6 - March 1933 Bank Holiday 
Numbers correspond to vertical lines in the figures.
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An alternative explanation for the banking system collapse is the 
debt-deflation hypothesis. First advanced in Irving Fisher's (1933) 
paper, and more recently formalized by Ben Bernanke and Mark 
Gertler (1989, 1990), the theory is that the 30 percent cumulative defla 
tion of 1930-1932 was primarily responsible for the depth of the 
Depression. The argument proceeds as follows. Since unanticipated 
deflation increases the real burden of nominal debt, it caused debtors to 
default on loans, which led to bank failures and the collapse of the 
financial system. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) examine a formal 
model in which deflation lowers borrower net worth, thereby increas 
ing leverage and the desire of entrepreneurs to take on risk. This raises 
the probability of bankruptcy, lowers the level of investment, and 
causes a reduction in both aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
Once again, the problem can be traced to behavior of the Federal 
Reserve. Without the deflation, the financial system would not have 
disintegrated. Since the deflation is clearly a monetary phenomenon, 
we have found the villain.
Unfortunately, we should not stop here. We must look further, as 
the banking system crashed in a series of systemic panics. These 
waves were surely unnecessary. Their defining characteristic was that 
solvent banks were forced into bankruptcy as depositors demanded 
convertibility of their deposits into currency, and all the banks had 
were nonmarketable assets.
Was there a policy failure here as well? The consensus is that there 
was. The job of the lender of last resort is to step in at exactly these 
times. Why was the Federal Reserve so reticent to engage in making 
discount loans during this period? Figure 2 shows the path of discount 
loans during the inter-war period. The most striking feature of this fig 
ure is that during the 1920-1922 deflation, Federal Reserve lending 
increased substantially, hitting its peak just prior to the trough of the 
business cycle. 2 This is in stark contrast to the pattern during the initial 
phases of the Depression. Beginning with the crash and ending in late 
1931, well after the second banking crisis, the level of borrowings fell 
and stayed at a very low level.
Data on bank suspensions show that from 1930 to 1932 an average 
of 1,699 banks, representing an average of over $1 billion in deposits, 
suspended operation each year. Assuming that the volume of loan 
defaults is roughly proportional to the level of suspended deposits, one
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can infer that as banks were becoming illiquid in 1930, Fed lending 
was declining.
In light of the deterioration of bank assets during the early 1930s, it 
seems extremely unlikely that the decline in borrowing from the Fed 
resulted solely from demand-side factors. 3 Instead, it seems plausible 
that the Fed played some role. The Fed's failure to actively encourage 
borrowing to meet the short-run liquidity demands of depositors 
should not be overlooked. In essence, the Fed failed to perform as the 
lender of last resort. Without an ultimate source of short-run cash, 
banks were forced to suspend operation. If, on the other hand, the Fed 
had actively sought to discount bank assets, the bank panics could have 
been averted, and the deflation would not have been as prolonged.
Institutional Responses
The solutions offered during the 1930s had three major compo 
nents. They were the provision of added information to potential
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investors, the creation of deposit insurance, and the fragmentation of 
the financial system. The last of these has now largely been undone. 
The first has been, and I hope will continue to be, emphasized. But, 
what should we make of deposit insurance? The purpose of deposit 
insurance is to eliminate systemic bank runs. Surely, it has worked.
But deposit insurance creates incentive problems for banks, since 
depositors do not have any interest at all in the quality of bank assets. 
Bankers are, in essence, able to gamble with government-guaranteed 
funds. This leads to powerful arguments against deposit insurance. 
The alternative, implicitly advocated by some critics, is that the lender 
of last resort will function to keep solvent banks from folding and 
allow insolvent ones to close. The problem with such a strategy is that 
it requires that the lender of last resort be quick and nimble in its reac 
tions. My sense is that we are better off relying on imperfect institu 
tions that offer automatic responses than on central bankers, who may 
not realize what is needed.
UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF DEFLATION
Past discussions of the Depression have at times been muddled by 
the fact that nominal interest rates were extremely low during the entire 
period. Once the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate fell below 3 per 
cent in 1930, it did not rise back to this level until after World War II. In 
fact, as Figure 1 shows, by modern standards the nominal interest rate 
was remarkably low over the entire period from 1929 to 1940.
This fact caused a particularly simple type of confusion. It was 
thought by some that since nominal interest rates were low, Federal 
Reserve policy must not be contractionary, and so it could not be respon 
sible for the Depression. How, people thought, could monetary expan 
sion have been efficacious in this circumstance, when the nominal 
interest rate was already so low? This argument led to theories of a so- 
called liquidity trap—the notion that there is some point at which further 
changes in the quantity of money have no impact on the interest rate.
This line of reasoning confuses nominal and real interest rates. 
During the early 1930s, there was a tremendous deflation. Over a 
three-year period, consumer prices fell by nearly 30 percent. Figure 3
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Figure 3 Monthly Changes in Consumer Price Inflation, 1919 to 1940
1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941
shows the pattern of inflation for the entire inter-war period. The main 
point to note is that there were two large deflations. In addition to the 
1930s, there was the 1920-1922 deflation in which consumer prices 
fell by approximately 18 percent.
When people expect prices to keep falling, ex ante real interest 
rates will be very high. To see exactly how high they might have been 
during the Depression, in Cecchetti (1992b) I estimated real interest 
rates for three-month loans. The results are reported in Figure 4. The 
most important thing to realize is that the real interest rate during the 
entire Depression period was extremely high—the peak in early 1932 
exceeded 20 percent! This is high by any standard. At no point since 
the end of the Depression have real interest rates exceeded even 10 per 
cent. So, while nominal interest rates were low, real interest rates were 
very, very high.
The clear cause of these high real interest rates was extraordinarily 
tight policy. As was first emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz
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Figure 4 Ex ante Real Interest Rate, 1919 to 1940
(monthly at an annual rate, 3-month horizon)
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(1963) and has been observed by many others since, the monetary 
aggregates were shrinking quickly over this period. For example, Ml 
went from a high of $26.7 million at the August 1929 cyclical peak to 
$19.5 million at the April 1933 cyclical trough, a drop of 27 percent. 
M2 followed the same pattern, declining by one-third over the same 
nearly four-year period. The Federal Reserve's confusion, of course, 
came from the fact that this was all going on at the same time that they 
were actively expanding the monetary base. Clearly, policymakers did 
not take account of declines in the money multiplier—the ratio of 
broad measures of money such as M2 to the monetary base—when 
they were evaluating their policy stance.
Once again, the debt-deflation hypothesis is the widely accepted 
explanation for how central bank policy created such a disaster. But 
the theory requires that deflation be unanticipated. There is some 
debate over whether the deflation was actually unanticipated (see 
Cecchetti 1992a; Hamilton 1992; Nelson 1991). If not, then theories
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that rely on high ex ante real interest rates, and the resulting collapse 
of consumption and investment, might be more relevant than the debt- 
deflation hypothesis.4
A complementary explanation is that temporary deflation led to 
high real interest rates, which in turn caused the decapitalization of the 
economy. Such a theory can be constructed from a model used by 
Calvo (1985, 1986) to study anticipated temporary changes in money 
growth. While his original purpose was to study the impact of disinfla 
tion programs in Central and South America, his results can be used 
here as well.
If one accepts that the deflation of 1930-1932 was (at least par 
tially) anticipated but expected to be temporary, then it is possible to 
study the behavior of consumption and capital accumulation using a 
monetary version of Calvo's (1985, 1986) model. When the money 
growth rate declines, depending on whether the ensuing deflation is 
severe enough to cause the nominal interest rate to hit its lower bound, 
two things can happen. 5
If the money growth rate is negative but the opportunity cost of 
money remains positive, then the impact of anticipated temporary 
deflation is straightforward. Consumption jumps up and then declines 
throughout the temporary policy period. At the same time, the capital 
stock falls and then begins to rise slowly. The reason for the transitory 
rise in consumption is that the effective cost of consumption is 
expected to rise in the future. The severity of the consumption and 
investment collapse depends on both the size of the money growth 
decline and the length of time it is in place. The larger the fall in the 
money growth rate, the more severe the collapse. On the other hand, 
increases in the length of time the policy is in place can be either good 
or bad. If the policy were in effect for either zero or infinite time, there 
would be no change in consumption or the capital stock—the model is 
superneutral. This implies that there is some finite value for the time 
that the money growth rate is at its low level that maximizes the fall in 
consumption and the capital stock. The impact is less severe if the pol 
icy is in place for either a longer or shorter time.
In the second case, in which the opportunity cost of holding money 
becomes negative, the consumption and investment declines are poten 
tially much larger. When cash or other government-issued liquid assets 
provide a real rate of return above that available on any physical invest-
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ment, agents will attempt to move their assets into cash. The nature of 
money is completely changed. This simultaneously drives down the 
value of the in-place capital stock and results in negative net invest 
ment. In essence, the economy is decapitalized. The decapitalization 
is accompanied by a decline in consumption. The consequences are 
clearly catastrophic. Not only does the value of the in-place capital 
decline, but the demand for firms' production falls as well. This in turn 
decreases the firms' ability to repay loans, making bank deposits less 
safe. The deterioration of the quality of bank assets drives individuals 
to hold cash.
The main lesson here is clear. We must avoid deflations, even 
expected ones. The fact that the nominal interest rate has a natural lower 
bound means that deflation can lead to increases in real interest rates that 
are extremely damaging. For recent discussions of inflation targeting, 
the message is to be wary of targets that imply a significant chance of 
deflation. It may therefore be dangerous to target zero inflation.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE DEPRESSION
The Great Depression was a worldwide phenomenon, affecting 
virtually all of the industrialized countries. The pervasiveness of the 
economic collapse has led to a study of the manner in which aggregate 
fluctuations are transmitted across economies. Both financial and 
goods market transactions link the international system. What part did 
each of these play in the global collapse and what are the important les 
sons we have learned about exchange rate systems and international 
trade? The remainder of this short section discusses each of these. I 
begin with a description of the gold standard, followed by a short dis 
cussion of the tariff system.
The Gold Standard
In the last decade we have made great strides in understanding the 
role of the gold standard in the propagation of the Depression. 
Numerous people contributed to this understanding, beginning with 
Choudhri and Kochin (1980) and followed by Hamilton (1988), Temin
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(1989), and Bernanke (1995). But it is Eichengreen (1992) who is 
responsible for consolidating the improvement in our knowledge. 6
The gold standard of the inter-war period was a fixed exchange rate 
system, whereby the central banks in all of the major countries of the 
world stood ready to exchange their currency for gold at a fixed rate. 
The purpose of the system was to stabilize economies through specie 
flows. If one country's economy began to shrink, its aggregate price 
level would begin to fall. At the fixed gold-currency exchange, it 
would then be profitable to import gold into the affected country. This 
would increase the stock of money and provide a stabilizing force.
It is important not to confuse this international institutional 
arrangement with contemporary calls for the institution of a domestic 
gold standard. For one country to adopt a gold standard in isolation 
would be to fix the currency price of gold. The result would be that all 
fluctuations in the relative price of gold, for whatever reason, would 
have to be absorbed by the general price level. For example, if an 
increase in political instability somewhere in the world were to drive 
up the demand for gold, instead of the currency price of gold rising, the 
aggregate price level would have to fall. Needless to say, given the 
fluctuations in the real price of gold since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods System 25 years ago, this would create incredible instability.
The gold standard of the inter-war period is more correctly 
referred to as a gold-exchange standard, and, as mentioned above, its 
primary purpose was to establish and maintain a system of fixed 
exchange rates. While central banks were required to hold reserves to 
back their monetary base, those reserves could be part monetary gold 
and part foreign exchange. Furthermore, requirements generally stated 
that the central bank need hold only 30 to 40 percent of the value of the 
monetary base as backing. The real problem came with the fact that 
countries losing gold (e.g., because they were running current account 
deficits) had no choice but to contract their money stocks. But coun 
tries gaining reserves could choose whether to sterilize the inflows, 
leaving their money stocks unchanged, or allow their monetary base 
and money stock to grow.
The United States and France were the major surplus countries 
during this period, and so they were beneficiaries of gold inflows. But 
both of these countries sterilized the inflows, forcing the world money 
stock to decline substantially and rapidly. Once again, we come to the
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conclusion that the Federal Reserve's contractionary policy, beginning 
in 1928, is of the utmost importance in understanding the nature of the 
Depression.7
The most persuasive case for the causal role of the gold standard 
comes from Bernanke and James (1991) and Bernanke (1995). They 
show that the depth of the Depression depended critically on when a 
country left the gold standard. Those countries that left earliest, such 
as Great Britain (in 1931), had shallower contractions than the United 
States (1933) and France (1936).
It seems likely that we have learned the most important lesson that 
comes from this experience—namely, that the international transmis 
sion of shocks depends on the exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange 
rates allow transmission of certain types of shocks that are buffered by 
the movements in flexible exchange rates. In particular, in a fixed 
exchange rate system, central bank policy is unable to buffer distur 
bances to the real economy—in effect, one loses control of the size of 
one's money stock. Without coordination of central bank policies 
among central banks, a fixed exchange rate block is not viable.
The European Monetary Union is an obvious response to this. 
European countries have decided to institutionalize fixed exchange 
rates and coordinated policy by actually eliminating both individual 
currencies and autonomous central banks. Such a setup will surely 
eliminate the possibility of the calamitous events of the 1930s.
Tariffs
A commonly held view is that the tariff wars of the 1930s bore sig 
nificant responsibility for the wholesale collapse of economic activity. 
For example, Meltzer (1976) has argued that the Smoot-Hawley tariff, 
instituted in June 1930, was of paramount importance in deepening the 
worldwide depression.
This view has been challenged by Crucini (1994), who notes that 
most import duties were specific, not ad valorem. This means that they 
were stated in fixed dollar amounts per unit of import. As a result, the 
main fluctuations in the real value of the tariffs came not with legis 
lated changes in the tariff rates themselves, but with movements in the 
aggregate price level. Once again, it is the deflation during the 1930s
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that is the villain, raising tariffs by much more than even the Smoot- 
Hawley tariff.
But this point raises the question of the impact of the tariff 
changes. Crucini and Kahn (1996) examine the macroeconomic effect 
of these changes. They note that by raising real tariff rates, contrac 
tionary central bank policy could have a quantitatively important 
impact on output. But while the authors calculate an effect on output 
that is large in comparison with what one might expect, it accounts for 
at most 10 percent of the peak-to-trough decline in output, or some 
thing like a cumulative 3 percent decline.
LESSONS AND REMAINING MYSTERIES
Our collective efforts at understanding the Great Depression have 
yielded a number of important lessons for current policy. These fall 
into two broad categories: lessons for policymakers and lessons about 
the construction of financial institutions. The experience of the 
Depression teaches central bankers both about the dangers of deflation 
and about the proper operation of the lender of last resort.
Whether or not it is anticipated, deflation clearly devastates an 
economy. Extreme aversion to deflation has a number of important 
implications for current policymakers. First and foremost, it suggests 
that setting a target of zero inflation for central bank policy may be 
dangerous. One must assume that, with a competent policymaker in 
control, there is an equal chance that resulting inflation will be above 
or below the targeted level. But if deflation is a bad outcome, there 
should be an extreme aversion to it, and so the initial target level 
should be set above zero. It seems to me that a modest amount of per 
manent inflation is a small price to pay for significantly reducing the 
chances of repeating the catastrophic events of the early 1930s.
The second lesson for central bankers concerns the functioning of 
the lender of last resort for the short-term stabilization of the financial 
system. If the lender of last resort operates effectively, there is abso 
lutely no reason that we should ever again face a systemic collapse of 
the banking system of the type seen in the early 1930s.
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Two episodes in the recent financial history of the United States 
suggest to me that the most important aspects of this lesson have been 
learned. I have in mind the response to the stock market decline of 
October 1987 and the collapse of the savings and loan industry begin 
ning around the same time. A stock market crash puts the entire finan 
cial system at risk for a very short period of time, because some 
individuals are inevitably bankrupted and cannot make payments on 
debts that are due immediately. In October 1987, the Federal 
Reserve's reaction was to offer banks large amounts of discount loans 
to enable them to make loans to securities dealers who faced immedi 
ate liquidity problems. This is exactly what the lender of last resort 
should do, and it worked.
The second success was the fact that the savings and loans collapse 
was neutralized. While the difficulties virtually wiped out the savings 
and loan industry, the financial system continued to function and 
remained sound. The method for containment of the problem was the 
deposit insurance system. Deposits in savings and loans were insured, 
and while the insurance system itself was bankrupted, the insurance 
guarantees were honored by the U.S. government through the issuance 
of Treasury securities. It is clear to me that the ultimate guarantor of 
these transactions was the Federal Reserve, acting again in its capacity 
as lender of last resort.
The lessons for the construction of financial institutions clearly 
overlap those for policy makers. I believe the most important involves 
deposit insurance. While deposit insurance has clear costs in that it 
cuts the link between a bank's depositors and its asset allocation deci 
sions, it has one extremely important benefit. Since the central bank is 
the ultimate guarantor of the insurance system, deposit insurance 
removes any element of discretion about the behavior of policymakers 
during a pending financial collapse. Beyond this, it is clear that regula 
tory structures need to be in place to ensure that market participants 
receive as much information as possible about the riskiness of different 
financial instruments.
Finally, I come to the international lessons. There are two. First, 
there is the failure of the inter-war gold standard. From this we should 
have learned about the difficulty in establishing well-functioning insti 
tutions to maintain fixed exchange rates and the implications of this 
type of system for the international transmission of business cycles.
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While I believe that we have learned the lesson, it has taken quite a 
long time. Second, we have learned that deflation affects international 
trade through its impact on the real value of tariffs. This simple lesson 
is yet another reason to fear deflation.
We have clearly come a long way in our understanding of the 
Depression, but I do not believe we are quite finished. There are still 
some remaining mysteries. I will close by listing two, each of which 
comes from a comparison of the recession of 1920-1922 with the 
Great Depression. First, it is my opinion that our understanding of the 
impact of deflation is not quite complete. The logical difficulty is that 
the earlier period suffered from a more rapid, but nearly as extreme, 
deflation, but the result was a sharp and quick recession. This suggests 
that the duration of the deflation is important. But the debt-deflation 
hypothesis would actually predict that shorter, sharp deflations should 
be worse, not better. Why was there no depression in 1922?
Related to this same point is the apparent change in the nature of 
the wage-setting process between 1920 and 1930. Here the point is 
that real wages seem to have been much less flexible during the 
Depression than immediately following the end of World War I. Why 
was this? Without a full understanding of the reason for the slow 
adjustment of aggregate supply during the Depression, we will not be 
sure that we have learned all that we can.
Notes
I thank Margaret Mary McConnell and Mark Wheeler for comments.
1. This is surely the conclusion that would be drawn by a reader of Galbraith (1954).
2. The increase in borrowing came about despite the increase in the discount rate 
from 4 percent to 7 percent.
3. From December 1929 to June 1933, total assets of Federal Reserve System mem 
ber banks fell steadily from $48.1 billion to $33.0 billion.
4. Examples of these competing theories can be found in the simple IS-LM theory of 
Gordon and Wilcox (1981) and the classical theory in Cecchetti (1988a).
5. This lower bound is difficult to determine. One would expect that it restricts the 
nominal interest rate to be nonnegative. If this were true, the short-term interest 
rates plotted in Figure 4 would lead one to conclude that this is an irrelevant case 
for the 1930-1932 period. But in studying this period, it is important to keep in 
mind the existence of postal savings accounts. These effectively increased the
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nominal interest rate floor for individuals to the legislated 2 percent rate paid by 
the U.S. government.
6. See Bernanke's (1993) review of Eichengreen's book and his February 1995 arti 
cle for concise summaries of Eichengreen's argument.
7. I am leaving out numerous details about the mechanics of the gold-exchange stan 
dard and its impact. For example, the sequence of bank panics led central banks 
to reduce their foreign exchange holdings, forcing them to contract their money 
stocks further.
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The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit 
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to 
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an 
activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was 
established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn, 
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of 
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of 
publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a 
research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social 
scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements 
the internal research program by providing financial support to researchers 
outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major 
vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other 
selected works in the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services 
division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and 
training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publication 
programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of 
public and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make 
knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit 
of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, 
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and 
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work 
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional 
economic development and local labor markets.
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